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Weeks #1-2c, Continued: My Lecture NO.tes used for the Seminar, Wednesday, 2000, January 19th.
Previous Notes #1b | (Originating Notes #1a) | Next Notes #1d
continued>>
 Communication Triangle. Kinneavy et al. |
We will be moving now from a discussion of Systems, or Synoptic views of rhetorics, as they are theorized and practiced by two major theorists in Departments of Speech-Communications, to a discussion of Taxonomies by major theorists in Rhetoric and Composition as they are theorized and practiced in Departments of English. What the two groups have in common is that they--acknowledged or not--are mutually working with the Communication Triangle,
as I suggested when summarizing Scott's refinements of Ehninger's systemic-synoptic view. One thing that should be obvious to most, if not all, is that the Communication Triangle is very Aristotelian (if a proper name should be assigned), for the elements of the Triangle correspond to Aristotle's three major proofs of Ethos, Pathos, and Logos. In drawing the CT we are very "human" in drawing a representation of what we need and desire and demand (J. Lacan) for mutual communication.
James L. Kinneavy: Perhaps the most summarized work produced by a major taxonomist and theorists in the field of rhetoric-composition is Kinneavy's A Theory of Discourse (1971)--especially the 'anthropomorphic' Aims of discourse
An Aside:
For the triangle in Linguistics, see Roman Jacobson's rendering.
For a broader discussion of triangulation, coding, the production of language (natural and otherwise), and theories of information, see Jeremy Campbell's Grammatical Man: Information, Entropy, Language and Life. NY: Simon and Schuster, 1982. Of special interest will be the Afterword: "Aristotle and DNA." |
as they are developed within and out of JK's version of the Communication Triangle. (I say 'anthropomorphic,' for I read the book as both religious and secular, and as nonhuman and human, and as sacrifice and solidarity, but I will not go into this distinction here.) It is crucial to understand at the outset that KJ's work is more than a CT, for it gives us ways of thinking about and locating theories of and pedagogies for composition, writing. One last brief point: A taxonomy is not a theory but has a set of theories implied, or potentially present, in it. A taxonomy, as in this case, is a graphic representation of ways of seeing (theoria, speculating, spectaclizing, seeing) what can be and become in a discipline or field of common interests.
In the first two chapters (esp. the second), JK suggests subtly without needing anyone's assistance the differences between Alexander Baine's Modes (Narrative, Descriptive, Persuasive, Expository [argumentative, poetic]) and his own Aims (the Expressive, Referential, Literary, Persuasive). Since vastly summarized, Kinneavy's discussion in A Theory of Discourse does not need summarizing by me. (See JK's commentators's accounts and uses of his theory-taxonomies of discourse (e.g., Tim Crusius's various illuminating accounts and James Berlin and Bob Inkster's use of the Kinneavian triangle to identify and to interpret a variety of 'ideologies' informing composition textbooks). As stated, I'm not going to go into these rather simple--yet at times, when fully elaborated, baroque--sets of trinities; but I do want to at least turn to and illustrate, if ever so briefly here, JK's synthesis (in his article "pluralistic synthesis") of four (including his own) taxonomies-topologies of discourse, which JK identifies as models of teaching composition. (It might be helpful, for the sake of establishing familiarity, to link Kennth Burke's "Ways of Placement" and "The Philosophic Schools" in A Grammar of Motives with JK's ways of placing the composition schools. If we are interested in influencing people "to see" the profession 'we' think we are in, 'we' explore, survey, make maps, and colonize the lay of 'our' professional land. [un/Just as SFreud mapped and colonized the lay of the unconscious mind]. Though we include various ways, we cannot help but exclude as well. Do not ever think or assume that a map includes all or even near all. And, as AKorzybski reminds us, Never confuse the map for the territory.)
One additional thing that needs to be understood collaterially before we proceed is that these models or taxonomies or any category system can do two (among other) primary things: Serve as
As we well know--but seldom acknowledge--KBurke's Pentad, as a case in point, can produce discourse (originate or invent content) and can help interpret (read) content. It can of course also arrange (structure, place in a sequence) discourse. And yes it can help with memory and delivery!
Therefore, at this point, let me emphasize for our common understanding that any category system is a set of topoi (or conceptual starting places) that can serve as a map to locate a discipline and ourselves in it (can help us Read and Interpret a field) but also can and does re/produce a field. A set can, thus, identify What was said and What wants or needs or demands to have been said. (VVe can say, therefore, the modes of location are the modes of production; modes of production, the modes of location. We are the dog chasing our own tail/tale!) We have as many discussions and conflicts in our field as we have explicit and implicit (tacit) category systems. Knowing these systems--remember the systemic or synoptic approach that Ehninger and Scott discussed--leads to knowing our places in these systems vis-a-vis others people's places (topoi) in the field. I must equally emphasize, however, that these categories as ways of seeing are also ways of being and becoming blind to what also can be said, or realized, that is not said. There is always already a 'remainder.' VVhich can but keep some of us in business forever! If we do not make our (one true, apostolic) theory our epistemology; our (one true, apostolic) epistemology, our theory.
The Analysis and Synthesis (of the basic semiotic structures of four models):
The four models that JK is synthesizing are from
 James Moffett, Teaching the Universe of Discourse (1968)
James Britton, The Development of Writing Abilities (11-18) (1975)
Frank D'Angelo, A Conceptual Theory of Discourse (1975)
James Kinneavy, A Theory of Discourse (1966 in mimeographed version; 1971)
JK says about the first, Moffett (popup window), that it is
explicitedly grounded in two dimensions, the I-thou relations [horizontal, the order of discourse] and the I-it relations [vertical, the "What?"]. The I-thou relations yield the 'orders of discourse,' the types of media situations which obtain between author and audience as the two become further and further separated in space and as the audience grows to include several and then finally unknown masses.
The I-it relation raises the question of What
to do with the subject matter. Even more than in the first dimension, Moffett uses the notion of abstaction. He applies the notion ... to the traditional forms of discourse: description, narration, exposition, and argumentation. He substitutes drama description and then arrives at a continuum of time abstractions: drama records 'what is happening,' narrative reports 'what happened,' exposition generalizes about 'what happens,' and argumentation theorizes about 'what may happen.'
About the second, Britton (popup window), that, like Moffett's, his
system is also two dimensional.... The first dimension addresses the question of audience. [His] audiences are also arranged in a scale moving from the self to the teacher to the unknown audience.
JK continues:
Britton's second dimension, however, differs significantly from Moffett's because he aske[s] a different question, Instead of 'what,' he aske[s] 'why.' ... The simplified (and yet expanded) answers to the questions of why we use language are given in the vertical axis of Britton's models. Under the informative, Britton used some of the categories of Moffett (recording, reporting, generalizing, and theorizing). But Moffett's major categories are different from the question of why we discourse.
About the third, D'Angelo (popup window), that D'angelo's model and
graphic presentation is not, like the [ones] of Britton and Moffett, a graphic rendition of a verbal presentation; D'Angelo ... uses ... branching to illustrate his theory.... He devides the topics into logical and nonlogical. The logical are then divided into static, progressive, and repetitive.... The static categories reflect the more traditional topics which are associated with Aristotle.... The progressive logical topics ... are related to narrative.... D'Angelo's nonlogical topics do not seem to be 'topics' in the usual sense of the term at all. They are related ... to the right hemisphere of the brain; it is also obvious that some of them derive from Freud.
About himself, Kinneavy (popup window), that
he starts out with the communication Triangle.... Following Charles Morris, Kinneavy establishe[s] grammar as the field which specifically studies the langauge, semantics as the field which studies the capabilities of the language to refer to subject matters (to mean), and discourse study as the field which studies the actual full communications of users of the language.
Under discourse study, Kinneavy parallels Britton's functions of language with his aims of discourse.... Kinneavy addresse[s] the question of removal from audience in his categories under 'Media.' Here he classifies media as monologual, small group, large group, or mass.....
Kinneavy addresses the question of 'what' the subject matter is in his 'modes' of discourse... He retains description and narration but substitutes two new categories, classification and evaluation, for exposition and argumentation.... [T]he aims of discourse, like Britton's, are attempts to answer the question 'what' we discourse about; the modes are attempts, like Britton's and Moffett's, to determine the kinds of audiences addressed in discourse.
This is an attempt at a synthesis (of all four) and therefore JK's conclusion is
(1) Four of the major contemporary rhetorics are compatible with each other and can be incorporated into a meta-system which profits from the strengths of each component system but yet respects each component system.
(2) The meta-system comprises an interest in the functions (or aims) of language, the modes of discourse, and the different kinds of audiences for which one writes or speaks.
(3) The operative conceptual processes for at least the functions and modes of discourse are different. Consequently a different type of intellectual chore is presented by these different types of assignments. These differences in no way prevent or discourage the overlap of these kinds of discourse.
(4) The psychologocal developmental sequences for the presentation of these various types of discourse and audiences are critical for a workable educational program. The research of Britton and Moffett is a healthy beginning in this area and needs to be supplemented in some areas. Without such a supplement, Kinneavy's and D'Angelo's systems are Brunerian systems without level adjustments.
(5) These four authors favor the holistic teaching of composition over the isolated teaching of parts of the theme (such as grammar, paragraph, etc.).
(6) Although the school situation must be realistically respected, the teaching of composition ought to be related to the situation and cultural contexts of the student whenever possible.
(7) The empirical evidence of Britton, the psychological bases of Moffett and D'Angelo, and the philosophical and critical foundations of Kinneavy give such a meta-system a strong plausibility.
What should be clear by now is that Ehninger, Scott, Kinneavy (et al.) are thinking in terms of a metadisciplinary approach. They are the best at being Neo-Aristotelian and Grammarian (i.e., Formalist) in approach. And yet, we should acknowledge Kinneavy's strong suggestion that his (and we might add others') approach is a meta-semiotic one as well. Grammar-Logic, Semiotics! What do they have in common? Semiotics (the structuralist approach, but less the poststructuralist approach) is the new logic-grammar. Or so/w it was.
We find this urge and yet carefulness to express this urge among Formalists to find foundational or quasi-foundational order "IN" language and to build, from language, the disciplines. (We will eventually in the weeks ahead return to this way of thinking when we read, e.g., KBurke [in his grammars and anatomies of motive and purpose and his master tropes] and Hayden White [in his tropics/tropologies of discourse] among others. For now, however, we turn to a transitional point in time, from Formalism to the beginnings of a Political concern with the teaching of writing as the teaching of a version or versions of reality itself. Hence, we are headed toward a variety of poststructuralist notions, some of which are radically political. We are moving to rhetoric as a site for the advocacy of different realities. Some approaches will continue to attempt to formalize these approaches, while other approaches will work and play at fracturing these differences and yet others will begin to design and produce recombinant third-sophistic rhetorics. Paul DeMan writes: "Rhetoric radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberation." The times they were and still are a-changin'.
Let's retune in now to see very specifically what the next generation of compositionist were (are) saying about theories of teaching composition. The grammatical approach continues and yet with a political difference that eventually explodes, but with a very controlled BANG.
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Philosophies of Composition. Fulkerson, Berlin, et al. |
Richard Fulkerson selects M. H. Abrams's category system (map, configuration) in
The Mirror and the Lamp to illustrate a very important point, namely, that many teachers of writing assign a discourse type and then assess it by way of a contradictory type.
Historical Note:
James A. Kinneavy discusses Abrams and his categories in numerous sections of A Theory of Discourse, 1971. Moreover, Hal Rivers Weidner in his doctoral dissertation ("Three Models of Rhetoric: Traditional, Mechanical and Vital," U of Michigan, 1975) opens his discussion by writing, "I owe a debt" [iv] to Abrams's The
Mirror and the Lamp. There are many other theorists in and outside the field of rhetoric- composition who are indebted to Abrams, though they do not acknowledge it. It has to be equally emphasized, however, that these categories are not Abrams's. It's the compilation and application to literary studies that are perhaps his.For a parallel working out of the four + categorical permutations in the field of Speech- Communications, see the exchange on Lloyd Bitzer's "The Rhetorical Situation." |
Abram's categories (according to Fulkerson):
Pragmatic ("Any theory making the reader primary, and judging literature by its effect, Abrams labels pragmatic");
Mimetic ("When the universe shared by artist and auditor becomes the primary element and measure of success, then, Abrams says,
we have a mimetic theory, such as that of Pope and the Neo-Classical period");
Expressive ("Emphasis on the personal views of the artist, such as in the Romantic period, Abrams labels the expressive position");
Objective ("...theories emphasizing only the internal relationships within the artifact, Abrams calls objective criticism").
Fulkerson's appropriation and renaming of the categories:
Pragmatic becomes Rhetorical
Mimetic stays Mimetic
Expressive stays Expressive
Objective becomes Formalist
Fulkerson writes: "I will keep the term expressive for philosophies of composition emphasizing the writer and the term mimetic for
philosophies emphasizing correspondence with 'reality.' But philosophies emphasizing the effect on a reader I will call rhetorical, and
philosophies emphasizing traits internal to the work I will call formalist."
Fulkerson's thesis:
...this four-part perspective helps give a coherent view of what goes on in composition classes. All four philosophies
exist in practice. They give rise to vastly different ways of judging student writing, vastly different courses to lead
students to produce such writing, vastly different textbooks and journal articles. Moreover, the perspective helps to
clarify, though not to resolve, a number of the major controversies in the field, including the "back-to-the-basics" cry
and the propriety of dialectical variations in student writing.
Fulkerson points out how the four categories are in line with Kinneavy's persuasive, reference, expressive, and literary aims.
Having established his four philosophies, Fulkerson adds:
My research has convinced me that in many cases composition teachers either fail to have a consistent value theory or
fail to let that philosophy shape pedagogy.... [T]hey are guilty of mindlessness. A fairly common writing assignment ...
directs the student to 'state and explain clearly your opinion about X'.... There is nothing wrong with such an
assignment. But if a student does state his or her opinion and if the opinion happens to be based on gross ignorance or
to contain major contradictions, the teacher must, to be consistent, ignore such matters. The topic as stated asks for
opinion; it does not ask for good opinion, judged by whatever philosophy. In short the assignment implies an expressive
value-theory. It does not say, 'Express your opinion to persuade a reader' (which would imply a mimetic theory), or
even 'Express your opinion correctly' (implying a formalist theory). To give the bald assignment and then judge it from
any of the perspectives not implied is to be guilty of value-mode confusion. (emphasis mine)
Caveat: Larger Context:
You need to be well aware that there is a much larger context for James Berlin's response to Fulkerson, for he was responding to Paul Kameen as well. Take a look at my seminar notes for the Berlin seminar during week 3. (Scroll down the "Kameen's Categories.") While Berlin's response to Fulkerson's discussion is negative, his response to Kameen's is very positive and one on which he builds. |
Again Fulkerson claims: "There is nothing wrong with an expressive philosophy, but there is something seriously wrong with
classroom methodology which implies one variety of value judgment when another will actually be employed. That is modal
confusion, mindlessness" (emphasis mine).
James Berlin begins by announcing his disagreement with Fulkerson and others over the importance of "emphasis" on the different elements of
the composing process (writer, reality, reader, and language). If you will recall, Fulkerson writes about the confusion among and
mindlessness of teachers of composition in relation to what they are teaching. The confusion deals with what Fulkerson calls "modal
confusion"; that is, teachers, at the time, were not able to distinguish topologically among the aims of discourse. As a result, in giving
assignments, teachers often contradictorily 'emphasized' the expressive aim in giving the assignment but then 'emphasized' the
argumentative aim in assessing the assignment. Hence, the confusion. It is the case that Fulkerson is talking about "emphasis" through
out, to which JB responds:
Pedagogical theories in writing courses are grounded in rhetorical theories, and rhetorical theories do not differ in the
simple undue emphasis of writer or audience or reality or language or some combination of these. Rhetorical theories
differ from each other in the way writer, reality, audience, and language are conceived--both as separate units and in the
way the units relate to each other. In the case of distinct pedagogical approaches, these four elements are likewise
defined and related so as to describe a different composing process, which is to say a different world with different rules
about what can be known, how it can be known, and how it can be communicated. To teach writing is to argue for a
version of reality, and the best way of knowing and communicating it--to deal, as Paul Kameen has pointed out, in
the metarhetorical realm of epistemology and linguistics. And all composition teachers are ineluctably operating in this
realm, whether or not they consciously choose to do so. (emphasis mine)
And then in direct response to Fulkerson, JB writes:
The dismay that students display about writing is, I am convinced, at least occasionally the result of teachers
unconsciously offering contradictory advice about composing--guidance grounded in assumptions that simply do not
square with each other. More important ... in teaching writing we are tacitly teaching a version of reality and the
student's place and mode of operation it it. Yet many teachers (and I suspect most) look upon their vocations as the
imparting of a largely mechanical skill, important only because it serves students in getting them through school and in
advancing them in their profession. This essay will argue that writing teachers are perforce given a responsibility that far
exceeds this merely instrumental task.
Therefore, what JB is attempting to warn teachers and theorists about is the importance of pedagogy in relation to something more
than, but which is paradoxically the same as, the teaching of writing, and that is The Teaching of a View or Views of Reality. The
teaching of ... What can be known and not known, understood and not understood, given a particular view of reality! (If the teaching
of writing is viewed only as the teaching of consistency in the teaching of the aims, then this is an impoverished view of the teaching
of writing!) There is nothing innocent, therefore, about the teaching of literacy! since what is being taught--unbeknownst to most
teachers, students, citizens--is not writing per se, but the dominant Reality or, more accurately put, ways of not knowing and not
arguing for or against this dominant Reality by way of counter-realities.
The stakes--political in nature--are the highest. While contrary emphases leading to modal confusion are important to our consideration
since such contradictory emphases wreck havoc on a rhetoric of the classroom, it must/ought to be understood, in contrast, that a
total lack of understanding how a particular writing process does exclusively emphasize a particular view of reality is of by far
greater importance to our consideration since otherwise such a lack and state of ignorance in the teaching of writing wrecks and will
continue to wreck total mindlessness on a rhetoric of the polis. And its citizens.
Hence, with litotes, JB writes: "... writing teachers are perforce given a responsibility that far exceeds this merely instrumental task"
(766). Writing teachers will continue (wittingly or not) to keep students in a subordinate relationship to the dominant discourse--as
mere functionaries of this discourse--or will enlighten students of its existence and give them the means of emancipation.
In effect, what JB is attempting is a demystification of an approach to the 'aims' (processes of writing) as formalist and of the teaching of writing just as innocently 'the teaching of writing.' What is implicit in his argument is that writing should be taught as a means of resisting the dominant discourse. Which in later articles and books will become the major theme of his work.
Here is JB's taxonomy ("epistemic complex"):
JB's Revisions:
JB was constantly revising his taxonomy. See some of these revisions as I've discussed them at the site for the JB Seminar or specifically as I've listed and cited them in his publications. |
Neo-Aristotelian (or neo-classical)
Edward P. J. Corbett.
Positivist (or Current-Traditional)
John Genung, A. S. Hill, Barrett Wendell.
Neo-Platonic (or Expressivist)
Ken Macrorie, William Coles, Jr., James E. Miller, Stephen Judy; pre-writing school of D. Gordon Rohman, etc; early Donald Stewart.
New Rhetoric (or epistemic)
Ann E. Berthoff, Young-Becker-Pike, I. A. Richards, KB, James Moffett, Linda Flower.
I've often seen people in class stumbling to understand this basic complex--like an infant attempting to become a toddler. It's a rather
simple grouping after a while. It's rather elegant. It's powerful heuristically and heretically. It's a continuance of what was read and
learned in the NEH seminar (1978-79) but with differences, which I have tried to capture and report above. Dialectically. If any one of you will
simply take, say, "reality," and see how each of these dominant modes defines (limits) reality or explores (dialectically) reality/-ies, you
will begin to understand the powerful implications of this grouping. Then try semiotically reading the other elements of the composing
process--writer, audience, language--across this complex and see what you come to see.
There is a logistics, a tactic, and a strategy behind the groupings. If these are not understood, then the article with this set of
groupings and plot will be--at least, from my perspective--for the most part missed. Not appreciated.
Notes #1d>>
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