

CREATING A MULTI-RACIAL DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: CASE STUDY OF THE TEXAS INDUSTRIAL AREAS FOUNDATION

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This paper represents work in progress. I have already benefitted tremendously by comments received from colleagues and from organizers and leaders in the Industrial Areas Foundation. Not all of their contributions have yet been incorporated in this work. I welcome other comments; please send them to the address on the title page, or to warren@cfia.harvard.edu.

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INTRODUCTION

My ministry has always been tied to social justice. I had experienced a lot of defeats, lost battles. Generally you had one group, usually a church, dealing with one issue. I was invited to go to a meeting on the west side of town. Reverend Davis invited me. I saw a group of pastors there and it struck a chord in me. They had what was missing before -- a diversity, a group of support outside of one church. Over time...I began to think this was the only way in America for poor black congregations to have a voice, power to change things, without going with hat in hand, shuffling feet.

Reverend D. L. Ellison, Pastor of Pilgrim Rest Missionary Baptist Church and a leader of Allied Communities of Tarrant. [0]

Well-organized social capital within a neighborhood or community does not automatically lead to a capacity for political collaboration across community boundaries. In other words, no matter how strong the politically engaged social networks of a community, it may still be isolated. Poor minority communities have particularly suffered from problems of social and political isolation (Wilson 1987). Yet alliances that cross race and class lines have proven important to the success of social and political movements (Tarrow 1994; Skocpol 1992). Granovetter (1985) has also noted the limitations of strong intra-group ties and the importance of weaker inter-group networks. A community empowerment strategy that focusses solely within a community can often serve to reinforce more narrow social identities less conducive to broad democratic and inclusive politics.

Residential segregation in American cities means that neighbors tend to share common racial and socio-economic characteristics (Massey and Denton 1993). Consequently, building social capital across neighborhood lines means, in practice, uniting people across race and class. While differences along each dimension have provided challenges to cross-neighborhood unity, race has proven to be the most significant division in community organizing and in American politics. It will discuss issues of class (and religious) differences as they intersect with race.

This paper reports on research conducted on the Texas Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF). The IAF is a national network of over forty community-based organizations in urban centers. It is the most successful community organizing network in the country. IAF professional organizers work with church leaders to build local organizations that address such issues as affordable housing,

job training, school reform, and community policing. The "members" of the local organizations are churches; but they are not coalitions in the usual sense. The IAF draws indigenous leaders (mostly women) out of the community through church networks. These participants then become active in the local organization directly, not as representatives of their churches.

In Texas, the IAF has built some of its most successful organizations, including COPS in San Antonio, arguably the strongest community organization in the country. With eleven organizations across Texas, the IAF has succeeded in creating a state-wide network and exerting political influence at the state level. Moreover, the network has brought Mexican-American Catholics, African-American Protestants and white Protestants together to work on common issues and for mutual support.

This paper will analyse the Texas IAF's approach to building tri-racial organizations. It will focus on the IAF's experience in Fort Worth, although efforts will be made to compare this experience to that of other IAF organizations in Texas cities. Research for this paper was conducted through participant observation, in-depth interviews, and an analysis of organizational documents and newspaper articles.

OVERVIEW: KEY ELEMENTS OF THE IAF MODEL

Three factors combine to explain the nature of inter-racial cooperation in the Texas IAF. The Texas IAF unites African-American, Hispanic and white neighborhood leaders into single local organizations, but allows for significant neighborhood and racial autonomy. Second, these IAF organizations follow a consensual issues strategy that avoids divisive campaigns and frames issues in a non-racial manner. Finally, the IAF taps the religious culture of its social capital base to provide trust for the initial establishment of multi-racial organizations and a common identity to sustain cooperation.

Bringing African-American, Hispanic and white community leaders together into a single organization is unusual in American politics. [1] The coalition model has become the predominant form of inter-racial cooperation. Coalitions bring institutional representatives together to work on common issues or for the support of candidates. Consequently, they are temporary formations. Each racially oriented institution maintains its organizational independence and control over its own followers. In that sense, coalitional forms limit grass-roots participation. Cooperation is restricted to representatives at the top, who maintain primary allegiance to their own organizations.

By contrast, the Texas IAF has developed an institutional model for its local organizations that combines elements of federation and unitary organization. Formally, the structure allows for

autonomy and initiative by local units, that is, racially constituted churches or groups of churches in a community, as long as they remain within the broad unitary framework of the IAF. In this way, IAF organizations allow groups to pursue their own, often racially defined, interests. On the other hand, IAF local affiliates are single, unitary organizations that carry out organization-wide campaigns as well. The IAF builds new social capital by bringing together a group of leaders beyond institutional representatives and uniting them around a common agenda and organizational commitment. IAF organizations are consequently more broadly participatory, and their leadership more united, than in the typical coalition. Overall, the hybrid structure offers a balance of consensus and autonomy.

The IAF's issues strategy reinforces its consensus-based organizational structure. With coalitions, an issue or an election provides the basis for cooperation. The issue or candidate platform that defines the coalition has a strong effect on the extent of its racial inclusiveness (Sonenshein 1990). Coalitions (like those in the civil rights movement) that emphasize racial demands often limit white participation to liberal elements. Meanwhile, coalitions behind more universalistic policies that de-emphasize race specific demands have often proven successful in winning their demands and sustaining support for policies (Skocpol 1991). In one sense, the IAF follows a universalistic strategy, defining issues in a nonracial manner and emphasizing the potential benefit of its campaigns to all Americans. At the same time, the IAF chooses issues in part for the propose of building consensus within its organizations and avoids divisive issues of all kinds.

The religious social capital base of the Texas IAF provides two key contributions to its inter-racial organizations. First, Protestant ministers and Catholic clergy find an initial basis of trust in their common religious traditions, drawing upon shared ideals to form the organization in the first place. Second, religion provides a way for leaders of diverse races to find a common identity as "children of God" and see a commonality to their interests. The possibility for religion to play these roles, of course, depends on the history of inter-faith relations in the local area. But, aside from relatively rare cases of religiously organized racial conflict, most communities share in this potential resource, this Christian universality.

The IAF shapes the use of this religious culture by its consensual political strategy. It frames its issues within a broader context of religious and family values. Meanwhile, it taps religious symbols and practices, like prayers, for political purpose. [2] At the same time, the IAF tries to downplay religious prayers or sermons at its events that might exacerbate denominational differences. In essence, common Judeo-Christian identity serves as a glue to unite leaders with somewhat different group allegiances and perceptions of their interests.

Social capital means more than the existence of networks. It includes the common set of beliefs that are embedded in and cement the relationships. In this sense the IAF builds new social capital by reshaping religious culture through a political strategy, resulting in multi-racial political institutions.

The IAF's use of religious social capital may also set certain limitations on the Texas IAF. Although the IAF stresses the Judeo-Christian tradition, and one or two Jewish synagogues have been peripherally involved in Texas IAF organizations, the potential for its ecumenical Christian organizations to include Jewish communities is as yet unproven. At the end of this paper I will discuss several other important limitations to the Texas IAF's approach to inter-racial cooperation.

THE CONTEXT OF INTER-RACIAL COOPERATION: FORT WORTH

Under Saul Alinsky's direction, the IAF built organizations within one predefined community. These organizations scored important victories, but were limited in the power they could command within broader city politics. Eventually, black Alinsky organizations like The Woodlawn Organization in Chicago and FIGHT in Rochester dissolved in part as a result of factional in-fighting. Meanwhile, the white ethnic Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council degenerated into a protectionist organization working to prevent the racial integration of its neighborhood.

Beginning in the seventies, the IAF made a number of changes in its strategy to help sustain its local organizations and ensure they maintain a broadly inclusive orientation. Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) has united leaders from different neighborhoods across the west and south sides of San Antonio, an area of almost one half million people. It has benefitted from the racial and religious homogeneity of these leaders to forge a very powerful organization. But as the city's population expands to the north, COPS' racial and geographical boundaries are proving to be limitations to its power as well because its neighborhoods comprise a diminishing share of the polity. In response, the IAF has built the Metro Alliance as a tri-racial organization covering the east and north sides of the city. COPS and Metro began to cooperate on many campaigns in the early nineties. By 1994 they shared an office and a lead organizer. While maintaining their organizational independence, the two groups collaborate on virtually all major campaigns.

The unusual circumstances of San Antonio's racial composition, and the establishment of COPS originally as an all-Hispanic organization, have shaped the nature of inter-racial cooperation in San Antonio. Mexican-Americans constitute over one half of the city's population, while African-Americans make up less

than 8%. COPS established itself as a powerful Hispanic organization before the IAF attempted to recruit African-American churches, who consequently have been reluctant to join with the IAF for fear of domination by the Hispanic COPS. Other Texas cities have large and growing Hispanic populations; but they usually constitute only about a fifth of the population, as do African-Americans. In these situations, the Texas IAF has built organizations that unite Hispanic, African-American and white neighborhood leaders into one organization. These organizations are also ecumenical, involving Catholic and Protestant churches.

This paper will draw extensively from the experience of the IAF's organization in Fort Worth, Allied Communities of Tarrant (ACT). Founded in 1982, ACT is a tri-racial organization of African-American, Mexican-American and white churches. In order to understand the IAF's experience in Fort Worth, it is important to appreciate the social and political context in which it has occurred.

In 1980, Fort Worth had a population of 385,000, about one third of the surrounding county's population. Although much of the area's growth occurred in suburbs outside of the city limits, by 1990 Fort Worth's population had grown to 448,000, making it the twenty-eighth largest American city. In 1980, African-Americans made up 22.8% of the population, with Hispanics about 13%. By 1990, African-Americans remained about 22% of the population; but Hispanics have risen to 19.5%. [3] While Mexican-Americans have lived in Fort Worth for years, many are recent arrivals.

Fort Worth is a segregated city. African-Americans are concentrated in several neighborhoods, primarily on the east side and central city. In 1980 Fort Worth had a black/white segregation score of 77.9, the 18th highest in the U.S. 77.9% of the population would have to move to achieve fully integrated neighborhoods. By 1990, Fort Worth's score had fallen to 63.6, still high, but indicating a certain amount of middle class exodus from poor black neighborhoods. [4] Mexican-Americans, meanwhile, were concentrated mainly in north-central and south-central neighborhoods. Figures 6 and 7 show the distribution of the black and Hispanic population in Fort Worth. Originally based in cattle -- hence the name "Cowtown" -- and then oil, Fort Worth developed a large defense industry during World War II. Average pay is higher than in San Antonio; but many of the more affluent live outside the city limits. Consequently, in 1989 Fort Worth had a median household income of \$26,547, below the state average.

Poverty is concentrated among both African-American and Hispanic communities in Fort Worth. 28% of black families and 23% of Hispanic families lived below the poverty line in 1990. [5] Meanwhile 31,000 of Fort Worth residents lived in concentrated poverty, that is, in the 14 census tracts where 40% or more of families lived below the poverty line (Kasarda 1993). Both African-

American (a majority) and Hispanic neighborhoods fell in these concentrated poverty tracts. Figure 8 shows the distribution of poverty in Fort Worth.

Before the seventies Fort Worth politics had been controlled by a small Anglo elite centered around the Bass family, known as the Seventh Street Gang. This group, however, was never as tightly unified as the Good Government League in San Antonio, nor did it have as strong a monopoly on city government. In the sixties a good government oriented "Town Hall" movement sprung up to broaden city politics through study committees and neighborhood conferences (Abbot, 1981). With the implementation of single member districts in the mid-seventies, the group dissolved (Melosi, 1983).

A few African-Americans won election to the non-partisan city council prior to the seventies. With the advent of single member districts, however, two African-Americans and one Hispanic gained election in 1978, constituting a share roughly equal to their population. As black electoral politics emerged, they became organized around individual families, especially the Webbers and the Bigsbys. [6] Louis Zapata won election in the older Hispanic community on the north side and held his position until the early nineties.

While the Democratic Party has a relatively supportive voter base in Fort Worth, it does not maintain a strong organization in the neighborhoods. Meanwhile, Fort Worth's city manager form of government has served to diffuse patronage style local politics. African-American ministers traditionally aligned themselves with white politicians in exchange for benefits to their communities. But they were not strongly committed to any political organization.

Integration, such as it was, came peacefully to Fort Worth in the fifties and sixties, without violence or a strong civil rights movement (Williams 1973). The NAACP filed suit repeatedly in the sixties and seventies to desegregate Fort Worth schools. Although legal segregation ended by 1967, de facto segregation rooted in neighborhood segregation continued to characterize the school system through the seventies (Melosi 1983).

By the late seventies, then, Fort Worth had a relatively inactive and unorganized polity. There had been no history of sharp racial conflict. On the other hand, there was no history of strong social or political movements either. The NAACP pursued legal cases, while parties and individual minority politicians concentrated on elections.

RELIGION AS A SOURCE OF INITIAL TRUST

Impressed by the success of COPS in San Antonio, a multi-racial sponsoring committee formed in the late seventies to invite the Texas IAF to form an organization in Fort Worth. The sponsoring committee consisted of black Baptist ministers, white Lutheran and Disciples of Christ ministers, and Hispanic and Anglo priests. The Texas IAF responded quickly to the overtures because it was anxious to expand to new cities. Both the IAF and the ministers wanted to form a multi-racial organization in Fort Worth.

The ministers interested in the IAF had known each other and had worked together on religious and social issues only within their denominations. For example, two white Lutheran ministers had earlier formed an Urban Ministries group among Anglo protestant clergy to address social issues in Fort Worth. [7] The black Missionary Baptist ministers knew each other through the Baptist Ministerial Alliance. Meanwhile, the Catholic diocesan structure provided many opportunities for socially and politically conscious clergy to meet.

These pastor networks provided an important source of social capital on which to build ACT. [8] But the separate networks needed to be brought together. Each group had come to the point of seeing the limitations of separate efforts and wanted to try cooperative efforts across racial lines. According to one ACT founder, Reverend Nehemiah Davis, "we wanted the organization to reflect the city and to do that we needed to be multi-denominational. We wanted to cover the whole city to prevent the local government from playing one section of the city off against another." [9]

However, the ministers were not willing to try cooperation with just anyone else. They were interested in cooperation with other churches. Another ACT founder, Reverend Terry Boggs, describes why the ministers chose the IAF: "We like the IAF's institutional base and church base. We were all ministers who felt the church had a larger role." [10] The ministers felt that their common concern for Judeo-Christian values provided a link between them as well as an initial basis for trust.

The ecumenical group took a long time to build up sufficient trust. They spent five years meeting with each other before ACT was formally launched in 1982. In part, they had to acquire sufficient resources to found the organization. But the money was to come mainly from the member churches. So the discussion process really was a time for ministers to decide if they would make the commitment, financial and otherwise, to ACT.

During this relationship-building, sponsoring stage, the group struggled to find common ground for the organization. In this context, many ministers found it difficult to raise differences, especially those based on race. Reverend Nehemiah Davis says that Ernesto Cortes, Jr., the IAF's

Texas director, encouraged group members to get out their views: "Ernie is an excellent organizer. He got the sensitive points on the table, even created tension around it. Get it all out -- don't submerge it. One black minister asked if whites were serious. It was debated out. Those who felt enriched by the process stayed on. You still have Anglo pastors uncomfortable with it. And we still have African-American pastors still in the 'can't trust you' zone." [11]

In 1982, the ecumenical group officially launched ACT. ACT carefully chose reform of public utilities as its first action campaign. With utility rates rapidly increasing in the early eighties, the issue affected people of all races across Fort Worth. Working with IAF affiliates in other Texas cities, ACT won seven of the eight changes it sought in the state public utilities legislation enacted in 1983, most notably the establishment of a consumers counsel for the public.

THE IAF'S CONSENSUAL ISSUES STRATEGY

The IAF sustained multi-racial cooperation in ACT beyond its founding through a consensual issues strategy. The strategy can be summarized as follows. IAF organizations work both on issues specific to neighborhoods and on issues of concern to people throughout the city. In either case, the IAF defines issues non-racially and avoids potentially divisive issues.

Neighborhood Issues and Racial Autonomy

IAF organizations encourage leaders in member churches to act on issues of specific concern to their neighborhoods. Reverend Terry Boggs of St. Matthew's Lutheran Church describes the IAF approach at the church level: "we center around what are our issues in congregations and how can we get to the table with them. So we continually do house meetings in our congregations." [12] Some neighborhoods are ready to act about bad streets, others about crime, still others about schools.

IAF leaders in a racially defined church or neighborhood can set their own agenda, act on it, and get assistance from the organization for their campaign. For example, African-American leaders in ACT, led by Reverend Nehemiah Davis, had been particularly concerned with the failure of many black youth in school. In 1986 they acquired ACT approval to develop a parental involvement program at Morningside Middle School, a predominantly black inner city school whose students were scoring last among all Fort Worth Independent School District middle schools on tests of educational achievement.

The program drew on the IAF relational organizing strategy of one on one meetings by sending ACT leaders out to visit every parent at the school in their home. The leaders sought to get every

parent involved in the education of their child by determining their concerns and needs, developing training programs to address these needs, and by recognizing the efforts of students and their parents. Working with Morningside principal Odessa Ravin, who had been visiting churches herself looking for community support for the school, the program had immediate success. [13] By the end of the first year, attendance at the fall back-to-school open house increased from 40 to 700 and student scores had risen from last to third of all middle schools. [14]

ACT's parental involvement program subsequently served as the model and catalyst for the Texas IAF's Alliance Schools project. ACT has since expanded its parental program to the elementary schools that feed into Morningside and to J P Elder Middle School in the predominantly Hispanic north side. In 1993, ACT changed the name of the parental involvement program to the parental empowerment program. It has tried to use its work with parents to develop site-based management in schools and to develop a political constituency for school reform.

Internal Negotiations and Mutual Support

Although racial groups have a certain degree of autonomy in mounting campaigns within the local IAF organization, all churches are expected to help each other in these campaigns. The ACT organization, like all the other multi-racial IAF organizations in Texas, make it a special responsibility for leaders of all races to lend support to each other's group efforts. For example, Anglo and Hispanic leaders from ACT joined African-American leaders in visiting parents of students at Morningside Middle School.

ACT has institutionalized the process of mutual support through its role in bond elections. Fort Worth, like all Texas cities, must raise money for improvements to the city's infrastructure and for other large capital projects through bond elections. Prior to 1986, the electorate approved a lump sum for projects like streets, and the city managers decided where to spend the money. The city had historically directed funds to development in the new and more affluent sections of the city.

In 1986 ACT mobilized to participate in the bond campaign that the city government proposed for that year. Each member church had the chance to name specific projects for its area. The organization approached the city council as a group with its package. It demanded that the city government, rather than propose a lump sum for streets, specifically name the projects in the package. ACT used its mass mobilization tactics to pressure public officials. But it also had something to offer city officials who feared the bond package might fail due to opposition from more affluent parts of the city. ACT could offer a grass-roots organization to campaign for

passage of the whole package. In exchange for ACT's support of the city's priority project to fund redevelopment of the Will Rogers Complex into an equestrian center, the city agreed to allocate \$57 million for specific streets and parks in ACT neighborhoods. ACT registered more than 7,000 new voters and campaigned for the bond in 40 precincts, all of which passed the package. Public officials credit ACT with providing the margin of support to secure passage of the whole bond package. [15]

Before presenting its proposals, and during negotiations with the city government, however, ACT leaders had to negotiate among themselves for the limited funds that could realistically be included in the bond package. The long-term nature of IAF organizations became particularly important in this process. IAF strategy emphasizes what it calls "quid pro quo," or a mutual exchange of support. But the concerns of different groups arise at different times. The trust built up through past support for such campaigns as parental involvement at Morningside School provided a willingness by some ACT leaders to forgo certain bond projects in exchange for the promise of future support in other campaigns.

In addition to bond money, member churches may end up competing for other limited resources, not least of which is the time of paid staff organizers. The IAF's use of its "iron rule" --never do for others what they can do for themselves -- helps temper competition over resources. The IAF admits that this rule is sometimes violated. [16] But an IAF organizer, or top organizational leader, will not long work on an issue for a community if local leaders do not emerge and take on the work. When COPS and Metro Alliance make their yearly proposals to the city of San Antonio for Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), the IAF organizations will not allocate money to a project unless leaders from that neighborhood come to meetings, do the research necessary to develop a project proposal, and rally their own supporters for CDBG actions.

In practice, the most active leaders assert their neighborhood's interests and command organizational resources. The process, however, is open to anyone to become an active leader, as long as they accept the IAF's organizing approach. Consequently, a certain fairness is assured and some of the edge of competition is dulled. Moreover, the approach maximizes initiative and participation.

Common, City-Wide Issues

So far, I have discussed how member churches are free to pursue their own issues and how leaders from different churches give support to each other. I have also described how IAF

organizations collect similar issues into packages, like bond campaigns. The IAF, however, also develops common issues for the organizations to address. These are issues of concern to many communities within the city, like utility reform or job training.

In ACT's job training campaign, a multi-racial group of leaders from several member churches have joined an action team that has developed a plan for long-term job training called the Individual Training Account (ITA). They work closely together conducting research, planning strategy and meeting with business leaders and public officials. All member churches are required to mobilize for large actions in support of this campaign. Like Project Quest, the IAF's job training program in San Antonio which served as a model for the ITA, member churches will also be involved in recruiting and selecting candidates for training slots.

While leaders support each other across race lines in neighborhood issue campaigns, leaders from different races and neighborhoods work closely together on these collective organization-wide campaigns. In addition, organization-wide issues emphasize the commonality of the situation and experience of racially diverse communities. As a result, these campaigns build new social capital by forging close relationships among leaders around common goals and interests.

An examination of ACT's agenda for the fall of 1993 shows that the organization pursues the three types of issues discussed. Leaders supported neighborhood efforts to organize parents in the five Alliance schools. They negotiated a common package of neighborhood needs for the 1993 bond campaign. And they pursued a common organization-wide campaign for a job training program. During this period ACT also continued to pursue its plans for health services and school reform and to support organizing efforts in particular neighborhoods like the Poly area. [17]

Defining Issues Nonracially

ACT defines none of these issues racially. In fact, Texas IAF organizations never frame issues racially. When floods used to occur on the Hispanic west and south sides of San Antonio, COPS did not present this as an issue of racism or as an "Hispanic issue." COPS presented it as an issue of poor drainage and disgraceful neglect of the lives of citizens of San Antonio. Even though Morningside Middle School served predominantly African-American students, ACT did not present its work for parental involvement as addressing racial discrimination in education. ACT described itself as tackling the problem of school failure, period. [18]

Instead of defining issues racially, the IAF draws from church values to frame its issues as family-based. In the view of Sister Gabrielle Lohan, a Metro Alliance leader, "religious values are very important. But family values are more important. The purpose of the IAF is to improve the family, in jobs, housing. So the family can grow and have quality of life." [19] In contrast to the social and ideologically charged definition of family values by the Christian Right, the IAF defines family needs in a more practical, economic manner. This approach to family values has proven to be broadly popular and attractive.

Texas IAF organizations avoid issues that can not be framed non-racially. They do not call for affirmative action in city hiring or promotion, for example. Nor do they support candidates for any position because of their race. In fact, IAF organizations are particularly careful to avoid divisive issues of all kinds, following a consistently consensual practice.

IAF organizations pick their fights carefully: they avoid any possibility of conflict, especially of a racial character. For example, Austin Interfaith, the IAF organization in Austin, Texas, had long called for moving the Austin airport. The airport had been built years ago on the east side, a predominantly black community. As Austin experienced a boom in the seventies and eighties, airport traffic increased tremendously, causing noise pollution and traffic congestion in the black neighborhood. Affluent whites who were the main users of the airport liked its central location, however, and opposed moving it to the outskirts of the city.

When the U.S. government announced the closure of Bergstrom Air Force Base in 1992, the city proposed moving the airport to that base. However, the base happened to be located in a poor, Hispanic neighborhood. The city expected Austin Interfaith's support for the move. But the Interfaith group refused to lend support to the plan because it was a divisive issue racially, even though they had no current members in that Hispanic neighborhood. The group took no position on the move. Instead, expecting passage of the city plan anyway, Austin Interfaith began preparations to organize in the affected area around issues of traffic, noise pollution and jobs. [20]

In San Antonio, the all-Hispanic COPS organization opposed the public financing of the Alamo Dome, a sports and convention complex. COPS argued that public money could be better spent improving the city's neighborhoods. In COPS' view, if business interests wanted the dome project, they should pay for it. The tri-racial Metro Alliance organization in San Antonio, however, took no position on the Alamo Dome. Some of its Hispanic and Anglo members opposed the public financing plan. However, the dome project offered the promise of jobs and revitalization to the east side of San Antonio where most African-Americans lived. Many black

leaders both in and outside of the Metro Alliance supported public financing of the Alamo Dome. As a result, instead of opposing the public financing of the dome project, the Metro Alliance avoided the issue. [21] In fact, COPS' opposition to the dome financing project is still cited as a reason for some African-American pastors to remain outside of the IAF. Despite COPS' opposition, the dome project passed.

There are really three inter-related criteria at work in the IAF decision about a campaign: whether an issue can be defined nonracially; whether it is divisive; and whether it can build the IAF organization. The IAF believes racially defined issues are counter-productive to building its organizations for two reasons. The issues are seen as divisive, and they often do not offer concrete, visible benefits to neighborhoods. Instead, the IAF often concentrates on positive-sum issues that can offer distributive benefits widely to its members.

While IAF organizations do not address racially-identified issues, some IAF leaders believe these issues remain important to their communities. Such leaders join other organizations, like the NAACP, which work explicitly on issues of discrimination. Maurice Simpson, an African-American lay leader of ACT, argues:

"I believe blacks need our own organization. I'm a life member of the NAACP. But we need different types of organizations [like ACT]." [22] African-American ACT leaders that are, or have been, members of the Fort Worth NAACP Board of Directors include Reverend Nehemiah Davis, Monte Elliot, and Reverend Ellison. They believe that ACT and the NAACP supplement each other's work.

BUILDING NEW TIES AND IDENTITIES WITHIN IAF ORGANIZATIONS

The organizational structure of IAF organizations reinforces the IAF's consensual issues strategy and helps to build multi-racial networks for political action. Like the issues strategy, the structure promotes cooperation by balancing group autonomy with a framework for unity. Although IAF organizations are technically federations of churches, each church does not send a formal representative. Instead, church leaders come together in various action committees to build relationships and unity across group lines, thereby incorporating cooperation into a single, unitary organization. The IAF organization provides the context for repeated interaction with leaders across race lines necessary for trust and long-term cooperation.

The Relative Autonomy of Member Churches

ACT's organizational structure is detailed in Figure 9 and presented schematically in Figure 10. The base unit of the organization is the church committee. As the IAF has expanded into schools,

or in some cases neighborhood associations, these units can be around school institutions as well. In any case, they are neighborhood units based in institutions. The committees are mobilized around issues of primary concern to them. Consequently, the activity of these committees tends to ebb and flow a lot, depending on whether they have a "hot issue."

Figure 9. Organizational Forms in Allied Communities of Tarrant, 1993
Co-Chairs:

2 or 3 top leaders, including chair of Strategy Team and of TOC

Strategy Team (executive committee):

16 key leaders, tri-racial
meets bi-monthly
plans strategy; sets agenda for TOC
co-opts its members from TOC

The Organizing Council (TOC) (steering committee):

45 attenders -- but varies; usually
2-3 leaders from each member church
meets monthly
decision-making body

Delegates Assembly:

Size varies
Meets occasionally (usually every 3 months)
Ratifies important decisions

Annual Convention:

all leaders mobilize networks;
ritual events that endorse agenda, leadership and conduct
public business as well (e.g. pressure public officials)

Member church committees:

address issues for church/neighborhood;
implements ACT-wide campaigns in church

Action Teams:

5-7 members; usually tri-racial; always leaders from different churches

Job Training

Bond

Health Care

Parental Empowerment (schools)

Education Reform

Poly (neighborhood) Strategy Project

Utility Reform

Money Campaign (fund raising)

Note: all Texas IAF organizations follow this basic structure, but use different names for the units. COPS, and most other organizations, call the strategy team an executive committee; the organizing council a steering committee; and action teams issue committees.

Source: ACT Ad Book 1993; Perry Perkins, ACT Lead Organizer, at ACT Leaders Retreat, August 28, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.

These committees also have the responsibility to carry out organization-wide campaigns in their neighborhoods. They have to raise money for the organization. And they have to mobilize their networks for actions of the organization.

The committees have a certain degree of relative autonomy. They can work on their own issues and expect support from the rest of the organization. They can implement organization-wide campaigns in a way that is appropriate to their conditions. The IAF follows the principle of subsidiarity, a term it has taken from the Catholic Church.[23] The principle calls for decisions to be made at the lowest appropriate level of organization. The IAF believes that leaders at that level will understand best what is needed and appropriate for their communities.

New Ties through Committee Work

If the structure of IAF organizations remained simply a loose federation of local churches, little new social capital across communities would be formed. The IAF builds this social capital by providing an institutional structure for leaders from different racial groups and neighborhoods to work together on common issues. While annual conventions and delegates assemblies bring large numbers together, the more important relationship-building occurs in smaller groups that meet more often, like action teams and the strategy team. While a smaller group of more experienced leaders comprises the strategy team, the action teams continually bring in new leaders to build relationships with each other.

IAF leaders from all three racial groups report that IAF involvement has led them to build new and deeper relationships across racial lines. Rosemary Galdiano, an Hispanic lay leader and chair of ACT's Health Care Action Team, grew up in a predominantly Hispanic neighborhood in Fort Worth. She became more comfortable with whites through her studies with white students at the University of Texas at Austin and through working with white nurses at All Saints Hospital. Before her involvement with ACT, however, fear and misunderstanding shaped her attitudes towards the black community: Growing up in Fort Worth, my experience with the African-American community has been negative. My father is very prejudiced. In high school racial tension was very high. There was a riot in school. I became afraid at school. I saw hate and it frightened me. We never mixed after that....This organization [ACT] changed my fear and misunderstanding with the black community by working together on a practical level. Working a phone bank, you begin to develop relationships, develop trust and begin to depend on each other....I still have a long way to go. Most of my relationships are not with blacks, except now I have a few. [24]

Working together in ACT builds deeper relationships than most people have the opportunity to develop in other settings. Joyce Oliver, an African-American lay leader of ACT, works with whites and a few Hispanics at her job. She compares those relationships to the ones she has built in ACT: But ACT is different. On the job, you just do a job. In ACT, you sit down and learn their values, how they feel. You begin to share, build a bond. Because it's church-based, if you say we're all children of God, it will prove that. It will change the way you look at other races, or else you'll leave. And some do.[25]

ACT makes it a point to vary the location of its meetings around the city. This policy brings leaders from one community into other parts of the city. Juanita Cisneros, an Hispanic lay leader of ACT, lives in a predominantly Anglo middle class community on the south side of Fort Worth. She joined the Job Training Action Team when she first got involved in ACT out of concern for her two sons' futures:

One of reasons I stayed with jobs work is that my husband and I grew up in poor families. We put ourselves through school and we have good jobs, feel secure. But I've been disappointed that even though we gave our kids all they wanted, my son didn't go to college. So at 24 he finds himself working at \$6 or \$6.50 per hour and he has a baby to support. He still lives with us. My younger son is serious at high school, but doesn't take education seriously. If you don't go to college, there is a lack of opportunity for good paying jobs. [26]

Involvement in ACT required Cisneros to go to parts of town she never set foot in before:

Job team meetings were in the black part of town. I always went, but I felt uneasy, due to the high crime rate there. I would try to go with someone else. I don't think twice about going to South Hills [in a white middle class area]. I'm familiar with the north side [a poor Hispanic area] because I used to live there. Others might be afraid to go there. But it wouldn't even occur to me to worry about it. Even now, I still try to go with someone if a meeting is in the black community. Black people, the men especially, I've met in ACT are all gentlemen. I wouldn't hesitate to go anywhere with them. But everyone else isn't a gentleman. [27]

Crossing the lines of residential segregation proves to be a powerful force for constructing a sense of the city as a single community in the minds of IAF leaders. Reverend Terry Boggs, a long-term white ACT leader, reports that "...everything changes because of relationships [built in ACT]. I can't write off a part of the city anymore because I know those people and have worked with them." [28]

Organizational Loyalty and Common Identity

Common membership in a single organization also helps to build a common identity because leaders develop loyalty to the same organization. IAF organizations reinforce organizational loyalty at every opportunity. They hold mass annual meetings in part to ratify important decisions and to publicly display their support.

But these mass meetings also serve a symbolic purpose for members. The IAF makes no secret that these events are carefully staged. For ACT and other tri-racial organizations, one key staging task is to display a racially balanced leadership.

In sum, the structure of IAF organizations balances local autonomy and participation with central unity and direction. It allows for a degree of local autonomy and therefore respects difference, racial or otherwise. Participants do not just follow centrally adopted campaigns, but can pursue their own neighborhood

agendas. Similarly, they can adapt organization-wide campaigns to their own needs. At the same time, the organization itself provides a context for repeated interaction with leaders across race lines. They are expected to support the campaigns of other members, and can expect support in return. Leaders negotiate when resources are limited. Finally, organization-wide committees provide a context for leaders to develop relationships across race lines while working on common campaigns. Leaders develop loyalty to the same organization, which reinforces a sense of common identity.

RELIGION AS A SOURCE OF COMMON IDENTITY

In the Texas IAF a common Judeo-Christian tradition and set of religious beliefs provides the last key element to inter-racial cooperation. Initial trust, a nonracial issues strategy, and an organizational form that balances autonomy and unity provide key conditions for multi-racial cooperation. But they may not be sufficient to fully cement social capital among leaders of different racial groups. In a society so fractured along racial lines, people from different racial groups often have difficulty "seeing" that they share interests in common. Some set of common beliefs must serve as a way for people to identify as members of the same community. The Texas IAF taps common religious traditions to define all members of the community as "children of God."

According to Maurice Simpson, an African-American lay leader in ACT, "religious values help keep racism down. It's key to unity along race lines. At every meeting we talk of our values. Religious values are even more important than the common goal. It helps people see the common goal." [29] As Oliver put it above, "if you say we're all children of God...it will change the way you look at other races."

ACT leader Reverend Terry Boggs discusses both the importance of a common faith to cooperation as well as the necessity to control the divisive potential of religion:

I know no other forum where I can sit down with blacks and Hispanics with common interests and a trust level. It's due to our common faith. Even if we differ theologically, we are all part of God's family. Some would like the faith commitment to be stronger publicly. But we need to be careful not to exacerbate differences theologically.[30]

An identity needs symbols and rituals to sustain it. Prayers are an important part of religious practice for all Christians. [31] IAF organizations start all meetings with a prayer. Even the smallest meetings start with prayer. Prayers serve to tap the religious sentiment that motivated many leaders to get involved in the IAF.

Moreover, they act as symbols to remind participants of their religious commonality.

Since these prayers are to serve a unifying function, they typically draw from scriptures that stress the importance of community. Prayers that emphasize the affirmation of faith, or that are associated too strongly with particular denominations, are avoided. Instead, ministers (and leaders) say prayers that call people to social action, or that refer to the rebuilding of community. For example, before the start of COPS' 20th anniversary convention, Father Al Jost told the story of Ezekiel's prophecy for the rebuilding of Jerusalem; he did not say the "Hail Mary." [32]

ACT maintains a tradition of holding ecumenical services every year or so. Many ACT leaders report that this service is perhaps one of ACT's most important actions. 450 people attended the prayer service in 1992, some of whom do not normally attend ACT actions. ACT leaders believe that the service shows the community that ACT is a different type of political organization. And it inspires leaders to continue their involvement, while attracting potential new leaders. [33]

A common faith has played an important role in uniting African-American, Hispanic and white leaders from local organizations in the Texas IAF network. Rogers (1990:153-4) reports the experience of Patricia Ozuna, an Hispanic Catholic leader of COPS at an early meeting of the network. The network's leadership thought sharing Bible verses that inspired IAF leaders to help others in the community would be a good way to come together. The readings included a passage from the first epistle of John:

But if a man has enough to live on, and yet when he sees his brother in need shuts up his heart against him, how can it be said that the divine love dwells in him? My children, love must not be a matter of words or talk; it must be genuine and show itself in action. (I John 3:17-18)

Another leader read a verse from Isaiah:

This, rather is the fasting that I wish: releasing those bound unjustly, untying the thongs of the yoke; setting free the oppressed, breaking every yoke. (Isaiah 58:6)

A third quoted from Matthew:

Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these, my brethren, you did it to me. (Matthew 25:40)

Ozuna described the impact of the experience on herself:

Here were people who had a wide difference in income. The voices were different, the religions had their differences, but the words were the same. There was a common message that united them. It still gives me goose bumps.

LIMITATIONS OF THE IAF APPROACH

The religious social capital and nonracial issues strategy of the Texas IAF sets certain limitations on the political capacity of its organizations. These effects concern the inclusiveness of the organizations, the strength of their leadership, and the kinds of issues that they can address. This section will take each of these issues in turn.

The Breadth of New Social Capital: Charity vs. Cooperation

The Texas IAF has had little success in recruiting Southern Baptists to its organizations. Basing its cross-race alliances on religious social capital, therefore, has meant that the majority of white Texans are not included in the process. Consequently, the IAF can not build new social capital between racial minority communities and a large proportion of white Texans.

In addition, some African-American ministers are unavailable for recruitment to the IAF because they are too strongly committed to a racial approach to politics. Although many have joined IAF organizations when given a significant role in their founding, some still perceive the IAF to be controlled by white, or Hispanic, organizers.[34] These perceptions are, of course, accurate as far as the composition of professional IAF staff goes. Cortes is the only non-white member of the IAF's national staff. Meanwhile, the Texas IAF hired its first African-American lead organizer only in 1994.

The new social capital that the IAF builds has had another serious weakness: the IAF has had difficulty recruiting large numbers of affluent whites in mainstream denominations to work cooperatively with leaders of African-American and Hispanic communities. I have argued that religious motivation leads people to see a common identity and collective interest in working together across race lines. However, a powerful strain in religious thought and practice traditionally has led more affluent people, as well as others, to do acts of charity for "those in need." This approach separates "us" from "them," however sympathetic people may be to another's plight.

IAF organizations will certainly take financial contributions from more affluent churches on the basis of sympathy for the plight of inner city communities. But a charity orientation has proven

to be incompatible with IAF participation in the long run. Charities usually give money for services to be provided. Since the IAF organizes communities to assert power in the political process, its organizations do not fit the criteria of typical charity recipients. To participate in IAF organizations affluent white church leaders need to be willing to work side by side with poorer leaders of color. In order to stay involved, these white leaders have to develop a sense of their own self-interest connected to poorer communities.

Black and Hispanic IAF leaders do not report this difficulty to such an extent. Hispanic Catholic leaders normally live in the member parish, so the sense of commonality of interest with poor and working class communities is clearer. But even African-American leaders who have moved out of their old neighborhoods retain a stronger sense of community identity. So the problem occurs most sharply with Anglo leaders from affluent churches in affluent communities.

IAF organizations in San Antonio and Fort Worth, as well as elsewhere, have succeeded in recruiting a small number of such churches. St. Matthew's Lutheran Church in Fort Worth has the characteristics that seem to make for success. First, most of its membership of 170 families come from the lower middle class and middle class, for example, teachers, nurses, technicians, insurance people and engineers. They have suffered from defense cut-backs at the nearby General Dynamics facility and generally feel their standard of living and quality of life threatened. The pastor of St. Matthew's, Reverend Boggs, says "there is a feeling of people wanting to leave; but property values are low and so people can't leave so easily. That leads to people wanting to change things." Second, the pastor is strongly committed to ACT. Reverend Boggs helped found the organization and has been a key leader. Interestingly, the congregation is neither strongly liberal nor conservative. The neighborhood surrounding the church does vote Republican consistently in elections, but has not produced extremely conservative officials.

Colonial Hills United Methodist Church in the affluent north side of San Antonio, is the strongest Anglo Protestant church in Metro Alliance. Out of the thousand member families the congregation has an active core of twenty or so and can turn-out seventy-five to one hundred supporters to the largest actions. Like St. Matthew's, Colonial Hills is a socially and theologically moderate congregation made up of middle class professionals and located in a conservative neighborhood.

Colonial Hills has even stronger ministerial support for IAF work. The pastor, Bill Easum, along with two other ordained ministers affiliated with the congregation, Homer Bain and David Semrad, provided a solid core from which to build a base for Metro membership. Through participation in Metro Alliance, Colonial Hills got the street fixed in front of their church.

Education has been the most popular Metro program at Colonial Hills because the church has many members who are teachers in inner city schools.[35] Homer Bain describes the tension between charity and cooperation.

the affluent don't readily identify with the problems of the inner city, but they have their own feeling of impotence around public policy. We work to have them feel their lack of power. The first step is the do-gooder attitude to "help the less fortunate." But our philosophy is partnership - an alliance that can offer each other something. And there are issues that cross economic and racial lines. [36]

In more truly wealthy congregations, the pastor has often found it difficult to build a core of leaders to participate in IAF organizations. Homer Bain reports that the Metro Alliance has lost several small or medium sized protestant churches because the minister could not find even one or two lay people to get involved.

The pastors felt alone and dropped out of Metro. [37] Some pastors appear sympathetic to IAF organizing, but can not make the connection to their congregations.

Strength of Leadership

Building new social capital across racial lines may be important for the political strength of IAF organizations. But it may also result in a weaker leadership core. Drawing upon its homogeneity, COPS has produced a collective leadership unparalleled in size, unity and sophistication in the Texas IAF. Systematic mentoring of new leaders by experienced ones has produced this result. Since the majority of COPS leaders are Hispanic women, they can draw upon a strong common identity. In multi-racial organizations, the ties between leaders appear to remain weaker. Their diversity seems to have precluded systematic mentoring. Some ACT leaders spoke of mentoring by leaders, usually of the same gender and race, as important to their development. But many said they lacked such experience. Moreover, a few women remarked that having to deal with experienced leaders of a different gender and race was quite difficult and even hindered their early development as leaders. [38]

A Non-racial Strategy and Racial Inequality

In 1991 a white skinhead shot and killed a black man in Arlington, Texas, a city next to Fort Worth. A jury convicted Christopher William Brosky of the hate-inspired killing in 1993, but the court sentenced him to probation. The African-American community reacted angrily. More than ten thousand people, mostly black, marched in protest through downtown Fort Worth the Sunday after the verdict. [39] Several African-American ACT leaders, including Reverend Robert

Sample of Holy Tabernacle Church of God in Christ and Reverend C. M. Singleton of First Missionary Baptist Church, participated in planning and leading the protest.

The ACT organization did not participate in the protest. ACT did not decide to avoid the issue; it simply made no decision at all. Afterwards, there was some resentment by African-Americans in ACT that the organization did not join the march. Many Anglo and Hispanic leaders also expressed disappointment that ACT could not respond to an issue that was an outrage not just to the black community, but to most people of all races in Fort Worth.

Many reasons were cited for ACT's failure. First, although ACT can and does react quickly to new developments in campaigns it has formally adopted, ACT's structure does not allow it to respond quickly to new issues. Second, ACT is not a "protest" organization, so does not normally address this kind of issue. Several ACT leaders described the Brosky protest as a "movement" issue, by which they mean it is a single-issue campaign that does not lead to long-term change. Yet the protest did lead to pressure to raise new charges against Brosky, to consider changes in sentencing guidelines and to hire more black lawyers in the District Attorney's office. [40] Third, African-Americans in ACT did not demand that the organization take part in the protest. The IAF's "iron rule" conditions the organization to react when a community pushes their "self-interest." [41] Nevertheless, ACT does decide centrally if an issue is of benefit to the organization and will send an organizer out to help generate action in a community. In the Brosky case, white Anglo and Hispanic leaders, and the Anglo lead organizer, did not grasp the unique importance of the verdict to the black community and so did not ensure ACT's participation. [42]

The Brosky case demonstrates that the IAF has difficulty addressing important issues that it can not frame in a nonracial way. The Texas IAF has often proven adept at redefining issues that many perceive as racial, such as the poor state of education in inner city African-American neighborhoods. Even here, however, its approach has not been to focus on equalizing funding, which could create opposition from more affluent communities.

Instead, the Texas IAF has worked primarily on parental and community involvement in schools, with the limited extra funding for its Alliance Schools coming from the state's budget. IAF leaders do believe that this strategy will do more to help improve education for their children. But they are not ignorant of the fact that great racial inequalities in funding exist and contribute to poor schooling as well. Their strategy, however, makes it difficult for them to address this issue.

CONCLUSION

The IAF receives a significant amount of criticism for ignoring issues of race. [43] In one sense this criticism is correct and points to a weakness in the IAF approach. The IAF has not been able to address some important issues that are unavoidably racially defined and divisive. The new social capital that the IAF builds offers a great potential resource for racially fragmented cities. IAF organizations, as often the only multi-racial political force in a city, could offer leadership in addressing racial injustice. But multi-racial organizations like ACT have not proven capable of that kind of leadership so far, as the Brosky case demonstrates.

This paper began by contrasting the IAF model of multi-racial cooperation within a single local organization to the coalition model. The IAF model has been shown to build social capital across race in ways that coalitions do not. In particular, it goes beyond institutional representation to draw leaders from institutions into contact and dialogue directed towards common action. At the same time, it is precisely the demands of organizational unity that prevent the IAF from addressing racially defined issues.

Temporary coalitions can form around a campaign among whatever groups are willing to agree. IAF organizations can not afford to alienate constituent groups on any issue because it needs to maintain a permanent organization. The IAF releases some of the pressure for action by allowing members to participate in race-oriented campaigns separately from their IAF involvement, as many ACT leaders did in the Brosky protest. But ACT could not apply its multi-racial social capital to the effort.

While containing some truth, the criticism of the IAF for ignoring issues of race, however, misses the larger significance of the IAF's experience. The IAF does indeed take up very many "issues of race," like poor schools, neighborhood neglect, health care shortages, and lack of economic opportunity. But it frames these issues in nonracial terms, emphasizing the interest of the whole community in addressing them. The IAF follows a local version of universalistic public policy (Skocpol 1991), developing programs potentially open to all but with special benefit to low-income, minority communities. Publicly, the Texas IAF uses "family values" rhetoric to articulate the need for families to survive and prosper. In doing so, it has achieved broad support for its campaigns and won many victories for African-American and Hispanic communities.

Despite its weaknesses, the Texas IAF does offer a compelling model for inter-racial cooperation. The Texas IAF can not incorporate non-believers, members of other religious traditions, or Southern Baptists, into the process of building new social capital. There are certain issues it cannot address. Nevertheless, the Texas IAF does bring leaders from large numbers of Texas communities together to address critical urban problems in a manner seldom seen in American politics. The Texas IAF uses a common religious identity to unite leaders across racial

lines, suggesting that religion may provide the framework for cooperative action often lacking in American society.

FOOTNOTES

0. Interview with Reverend D. L. Ellison, August 30, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.

1. When workers of different races work in the same workplace, some unions have succeeded in building multi-racial unions. But the history of American unionism has been plagued by problems of race as well (Davis 1986). On race and social reform movements, see Allen (1974).

2. On frame alignment processes, see Snow et al (1986); on the transferability of culture, see Swidler (1986).

3. Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1981 edition Table 24; 1994 edition Table 46.

4. Scores computed by Kasarda (1993) based on census information.

5. Population and Housing Characteristics for Census Tracts and Block Numbering Areas 1993, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

6. Interview with Jeff Guin, August 26, 1994. Fort Worth, TX.

7. Interview with Reverend Terry Boggs, June 8, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.

8. See Morris (1984) on the importance of pastor networks in the civil rights movement.

9. Interview with Reverend Nehemiah Davis, June 8, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.

10. Interview with Reverend Terry Boggs, June 8, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.

11. Interview with Reverend Nehemiah Davis, June 8, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.

12. Interview with Reverend Terry Boggs, June 8, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.

13. Interview with Odessa Ravin, August 24, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.

14. Material on ACT's work at Morningside taken from: interview with Reverend Nehemiah Davis, June 8, 1993, Fort Worth, TX; Fort Worth Star-Telegram, December 3, 1988 p. 1A and September 20, 1992 p. 1F.
15. Interview with Reverend Terry Boggs, June 8, 1993, Fort Worth, TX; Fort Worth Star-Telegram September 20, 1992 p. 1F.
16. IAF National Trainer Frank Pearson, IAF National Training, July 18, 1994, Los Angeles, CA.
17. ACT Leaders Retreat, August 28, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.
18. See, for example, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, September 20, 1992, 1988, p. 1F.
19. Interview with Sister Gabrielle Lohan, July 7, 1993, San Antonio, TX.
20. Interview with Lead Organizer Joe Higgs, May 3, 1993, Austin, TX.
21. Interview with Metro Alliance Co-chair Homer Bain, July 21, 1993, San Antonio, TX.
22. Interview with Maurice Simpson, August 28, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.
23. Pope Pius XI originally articulated the principle of subsidiarity in the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*.
24. Interview with Rosemary Galdiano, August 30, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.
25. Interview with Joyce Oliver, August 26, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.
26. Interview with Juanita Cisneros, August 29, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.
27. Interview with Juanita Cisneros, August 29, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.
28. Interview with Reverend Terry Boggs, June 8, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.
29. Interview with Maurice Simpson, August 28, 1993, Fort Worth, TX. Simpson sees religious prejudice as stronger than race, but not so easily identified. He credits ACT with bridging denominational as well as racial divisions by appealing to shared religious values.
30. Interview with Reverend Terry Boggs, June 8, 1993, Fort Worth, TX.

31. The IAF stresses that it taps Judeo-Christian traditions and one or two Jewish synagogues are peripherally involved in Texas IAF organizations. I will limit my discussion to Christians here, the vast majority of Texas IAF participants.
32. Personal observation, May 29, 1994, San Antonio, TX.
33. Compiled from comments made by ACT leaders in planning November 1993 ecumenical service at the ACT Leaders Retreat, August 28, 1993. Fort Worth, TX.
34. Interview with Reverend Claude Black, July 21, 1993, San Antonio, TX.
35. Interview with Homer Bain, May 21, 1993, San Antonio, TX.
36. Interview with Homer Bain, May 21, 1993, San Antonio, TX.
37. Interview with Homer Bain, May 21, 1993, San Antonio, TX.
38. This argument is based on interview material from a number of ACT leaders, many of whom wished their comments to remain confidential on this issue.
38. Fort Worth Star-Telegram, August 26, 1993, p. 15A.
40. New York Times, March 25, 1993, p. A9(N).
41. The "iron rule" states that an organizer or leader should never do for someone else what they can do for themselves.
42. Compiled from interviews with Lead Organizer Perry Perkins, August 28, 1993; Organizer Leonora Friend, August 30, 1993; Maurice Simpson, August 28, 1993; Raymond Rodriguez, August 25, 1993; Monte Elliot, August 30, 1993; Claudia Camp, August 30, 1993; Reverend D. L. Ellison, August 30, 1993; Reverend C. M. Singleton, August 27, 1993. All interviews conducted in Fort Worth, TX. Many of those interviewed wished the specifics of their views to remain unattributed.
43. See Jennings (1990:116-119) for a representative argument.

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