VALUES FOR TEAM GAMES

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ABSTRACT. In this presentation we consider cooperative games where the characteristic function could be not zero only in coalitions with a prescribed cardinality. We call these games team games. We assume that there is given an exogenous amount $c$ to be distributed among the players. These situations arise when a group of individuals is organized in several teams with equal number of players in each one, e.g. the distribution of television rights of the transmission of a tournament among the teams in a league.

We propose several solutions satisfying certain desired properties for this kind of games: First, we get an explicit expression for every linear symmetric solution, the dimension of all such solutions is found to be three. We get also formulas for solutions that further satisfy either the efficiency or the natural (inessential) axioms. Finally, it is shown that there exists a unique linear solution which is symmetric, natural and efficient.

We conclude the presentation by studying bankruptcy games as a particular case of these type of games.