PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Overview

Philosophy of mind is arguably the most dynamic sub-discipline within the field of philosophy, today. In this course, we shall examine some of the central problems in contemporary philosophy of mind - among others, the ontological or mind-body problem (What is the relationship between mind and body - specifically, between mind and brain?), the semantical problem (How do the ordinary terms of our language get their meaning?), and the methodological problem (What is the proper approach to pursue in developing a "science of the mind"?). Answering the questions associated with this last problem will lead us to consider some of the work in artificial intelligence and the neurosciences.

Texts

Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, revised edition (M.I.T. Press, 1988).

David M. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind (Oxford, 1991).

Additional readings, available online.

Suggested: A. C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy 1: A guide through the subject (Oxford, 1998).

Books On Reserve

For those of you who are especially interested in a topic or who are having difficulty understanding a particular topic, I have put a number of ancillary works on reserve in the Central Library. The bibliographies in some of these works may be of special interest when writing your term papers.

Course Objectives

You will demonstrate an adequate understanding of the central figures and of the main philosophical problems discussed in this course. You will also acquire knowledge of key works in the field that will enable you to read the contemporary literature in this sub-disciplinary area with care and comprehension. You will display this latter ability — together with a knowledge of philosophical methods of analysis and the ability to write clear, effective, and thoughtful philosophical prose — in writing your term paper.

Evaluation of Students' Performance

Semester grades will be determined on the basis of your performance on a midterm take-home examination, a final (10- to 12-page) paper, a series of Reading Topic Paragraphs (RTPs), and class attendance. Your grades on the exam, paper, RTPs, and attendance will be weighted equally; that is, each will count as approximately 25% of your overall semester grade. More will be said about the nature and timing of the exam and the paper, as the semester progresses. I shall be taking attendance daily. You will begin with an 'A' in attendance and lose one-third of a letter grade for every day you miss. The resulting grade will account for that (25%) portion of your overall semester grade.

The RTPs are to be brief, one-paragraph, descriptions of each of the assigned readings. For each reading, you are to answer the following two questions in your RTP: (i) What is the main point or conclusion for which the author argues in this work? (ii) What is the main argument for that point? You are to turn in an RTP, during class, at the beginning of our discussion of each chapter or article. (The RTPs will be due at the beginning of our actualdiscussion of the relevant reading, which will not necessarily coincide with the beginning of our tentatively scheduled discussion of that material.)

List of Readings

INTRODUCTION

Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, Chapter 2, "The Ontological Problem (the Mind-Body Problem)" (1988).

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM

Hilary Putnam, "Brains and Behavior" (1968). [in Rosenthal]

J. J. C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes" (1962). [in Rosenthal]

Putnam, "The Nature of Mental States" (1967). [in Rosenthal]

Donald Davidson, "Mental Events" (1970). [in Rosenthal]

Jaegwon Kim, "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation" (1984). [in Rosenthal]

Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (1974). [in Rosenthal]

Colin McGinn, "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" Mind, 98 (1989): pp. 349-366. [in JSTOR]

Daniel C. Dennett, "Real Patterns," Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1991): pp. 27-51. [in JSTOR]

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE NEUROSCIENCES

(Churchland, Chapters 6 and 7.)

Dennett, "Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology" (1978). [on e-reserve]

J. A. Fodor, "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology" (1980). [in Rosenthal]

John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs" (1980). [in Rosenthal]

Patricia Smith Churchland and Terrence Sejnowski, "Neural Representation and Neural Computation" (1989). [on e-reserve]

Terence Horgan and John Tienson, "Representation without Rules" (1989). [on e-reserve]

THEORY, CONTENT, AND CONSCIOUSNESS

(Churchland, Chapters 5 and 3.)

Fodor, "Propositional Attitudes" (1978). [in Rosenthal]

Stephen Stich, "Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis" (1978). [in Rosenthal]

Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental" (1979). [in Rosenthal]

Paul Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes" (1981). [in Rosenthal]

Dennett, "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology" (1981) + "Reflections: Instrumentalism reconsidered" (1987). [in Rosenthal]

Horgan and James Woodward, "Folk Psychology is Here to Stay," The Philosophical Review, 94 (1985): pp. 197-226. [in JSTOR]

Ruth Garrett Millikan, "Thoughts without Laws; Cognitive Science with Content," The Philosophical Review, 95 (1986): pp. 47-80. [in JSTOR]

McGinn, Mental Content, Chapter 3, "The Basis of Content" (1989). [on e-reserve]

Millikan, "Biosemantics," Journal of Philosophy, 86 (1989): pp. 281-297. [in JSTOR]

Fodor, Excerpt from "A Theory of Content, II: The theory" (1990). [on e-reserve]

David Chalmers, "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" (1995). [on e-reserve]

Dan Sperber, Explaining Culture, Chapter 6, "Mental Modularity and Cultural Diversity" (1996). [on e-reserve]

Vittorio Gallese and Alvin Goldman, "Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading," Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2 (1998): pp. 493-501. [in online Library holdings]

Horgan and Tienson, "The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality" (2002). [on e-reserve]

Uriah Kriegel, "Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two views and an argument" (2003). [on e-reserve]