MACHIAVELLIANISM AND SELF-MONITORING: AS DIFFERENT AS "ME" AND "YOU"

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Although both Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) and self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) are characterized by the use of effective impression management, previous research has indicated that the scales measuring the two traits are not significantly correlated. One explanation for the divergence of these dimensions is that Machiavellianism is associated with a self-oriented, "assimilative" form of impression management, whereas self-monitoring is associated with an other-oriented, "accommodative" form of impression management (Barnes & Ickes, 1979). This explanation suggested the hypothesis that Machiavellianism would be associated in dyadic conversations with the use of first-person singular pronouns at the expense of second- and third-person pronouns, whereas self-monitoring would be related to the use of second- and third-person pronouns at the expense of first-person singular pronouns. By analyzing the conversations occurring in 40 unstructured dyadic interactions, we obtained support for these hypothesized differences, both in correlations computed across all dyads and in relevant within-dyad comparisons.

From a conceptual standpoint, there would appear to be some overlap between the dispositional constructs of Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) and self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974). Research and theory indicate that individuals high in Machiavellianism, like individuals high in self-monitoring, are skilled impression managers with good expressive control (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Exline, Thibault, Hickey, & Gumpert, 1970; Krauss, Geller, & Olson, 1976; Lippa, 1976, 1978; Milord & Perry, 1977; Novgodoroff, 1974; Shepard & Vidmar, 1980;

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Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Monson, 1975; see also Christie & Geis, 1970, and Snyder, 1979). From an empirical standpoint, however, Snyder (1974) has reported that self-monitoring, as assessed by his Self-Monitoring Scale, is uncorrelated (−.09) with Machiavellianism, as measured by Christie and Geis’s (1970) Mach V Scale. A similarly nonsignificant correlation (.12) between these two measures was later obtained by Barnes and Ickes (1979).

This lack of a significant correlation between Machiavellianism and self-monitoring poses an interesting question: If both of these traits give rise to similar surface behaviors (e.g., effective impression management and expressive control), what accounts for the empirical divergence of their respective trait measures?

Any attempt to answer this question requires us to consider some of the more subtle conceptual differences between Machiavellianism and self-monitoring. Although the research cited above provides substantial evidence for the expressive-control and impression-management skills of both high-Mach and high-SM individuals, the theories associated with these two constructs suggest that high-Mach persons may be more likely than high-SM individuals to “drop” whatever impression they have been trying to create as soon as it has served its instrumental purpose in getting them what they want. Thus, for high-Mach persons, impression management may typically be viewed as a means to some other end (Christie & Geis, 1970), whereas for high-SM persons, creating just the right impression may be more of an end in itself (Snyder, 1974, 1979). This distinction notwithstanding, it is probably true that both high-Mach and high-SM individuals seek to gain some personal advantages through their impression-management attempts—advantages that go beyond simply creating and sustaining the impression for its own sake.

Perhaps a more telling difference between the high-Mach and the high-SM individual is that captured by Barnes and Ickes’s (1979) distinction between “assimilative” and “accommodative” forms of impression management. According to these authors, assimilative impression management can be characterized as self-oriented. It represents the use of impression-management tactics to manipulate and control others by bringing their behavior into line with one’s own goals, purposes, and expectations. In contrast, accommodative impression management can be characterized as other-oriented. It represents the use of impression-management tactics to win approval from or avoid conflict with others by bringing one’s own behavior into line with whatever goals, purposes, and expectations these others appear to have.

To express this distinction in terms more familiar to students of the symbolic-interactionist perspective, the assimilative impression man-
ager is relatively likely to "altercast" others (i.e., to maneuver others into playing whatever role will complement and support the one that the impression manager is playing). In contrast, the accommodative impression manager is relatively more likely to accept being altercast by others (i.e., to identify and play whatever role will complement and support the one that the other is playing). Both the high-Mach and the high-SM individual may publicly play a role that they are willing to exploit in the service of ulterior motives. And both may actively undertake to play such a role as effectively as possible. Despite this apparent similarity, however, high-Mach persons may still prefer the type of role that lets them "call the shots," whereas high-SM persons may be more inclined to accept the kind of role that requires them to "go along in order to get along."

We suggest that the distinction between assimilative and accommodative impression management can be used to explain both the conceptual convergence and the empirical divergence of Machiavellianism and self-monitoring. Specifically, we propose that Machiavellianism is typically expressed in the form of self-oriented, "assimilative" impression management, whereas self-monitoring is typically expressed in the form of other-oriented, "accommodative" impression management. Thus, although high-Mach and high-SM individuals both make use of impression management, they may do so in characteristically different ways and for characteristically different reasons. At the risk of oversimplifying, high-Mach persons may be more likely to use impression management to control and manipulate others, whereas high-SM persons may be more likely to use impression management "to get along and be liked" by others (Snyder, 1974). This motivational and stylistic divergence in the type of impression management displayed by high-Mach versus high-SM individuals may account, at least in part, for the empirical divergence of the Mach V Scale and the Self-Monitoring Scale (Barnes & Ickes, 1979; Snyder, 1974).

Evidence consistent with the distinction we have proposed can be found in the respective literatures on Machiavellianism and self-monitoring. Christie and Geis (1970) repeatedly emphasize the manipulative, self-interested nature of the high-Mach individual's behavior (cf. Ong, 1973), whereas Snyder (1974, 1979) repeatedly emphasizes the chameleon-like nature of the high-SM individual, who attempts to "fit in" with whatever social situation he or she encounters. Similarly, the available empirical evidence reveals a sharp contrast between the high-Mach person's ability to focus on his or her own self-interests while remaining remarkably immune to the influence exerted by others (e.g., Christie & Geis, 1970; Feldman & Scheibe, 1972; Plax & Rosenfeld, 1980; Wilkinson, 1974), and the high-SM person's heightened respon-
siveness to social cues and apparent willingness to alter expressed attitudes or behavior to conform to social demands (e.g., Lippa, 1978; Snyder, 1974, 1976; Snyder & Monson, 1975; Snyder & Swann, 1976; Zuckerman & Reis, 1978). The accommodative, "other-oriented" impression-management style of the high-SM person is further suggested by the well-replicated finding of an other-directedness factor as one of the principal components of Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale (cf. Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980).

The theory and research just cited lead us to infer that Machiavellianism is associated with a focus on self during the course of interaction, whereas self-monitoring is associated with a focus on others. This inference derives in part from (1) the self-interested nature of the high-Mach individual's behavior and (2) the high-Mach individual's ability to keep attention focused on his or her self-interest even in social contexts providing strongly competing cues. It also derives in part from (1) the well-documented "other-directedness" component of the self-monitoring disposition and (2) the high-SM person's heightened responsiveness to social cues and ready acquiescence to social demands. These points of difference suggest to us a more fundamental difference in the type of figure-ground contrast experienced by high-Mach versus high-SM individuals during social interaction. In the high-Mach person's social encounters, the self may be experienced more often as "figure" and the interaction partner experienced more often as part of the "ground." In the high-SM person's social encounters, however, the partner may more often be "figure" and the self part of the "ground."

In the present study, we tested this hypothesized difference in attentional focus in the initial, unstructured interactions of 40 same- and mixed-sex dyads whose members were asked to complete both the Mach V Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970) and the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974). Employing Ickes's (1982, 1983) paradigm for the study.

1. A comparison of the respective literatures indicates that although high-Mach and high-SM individuals are clearly different in their susceptibility to social influence, they are clearly similar in their relative immunity to the type of self-influence studied in various role-playing paradigms, including "the forced-compliance paradigm" (e.g., Bogart, 1971; Bogart, Geis, Levy, & Zimbardo, 1970; Burgon, Miller, & Tubbs, 1972; Espein, 1969; Snyder & Tanke, 1976). Thus, despite their differences in susceptibility to outside influence, both high-Mach and high-SM individuals are able to maintain the sense of "role distance" (i.e., the ability to separate "self" from "role"; Goffman, 1961) that enables them to distinguish their more stable and enduring dispositions (attitudes, sentiments, values, etc.) from those that they are only temporarily espousing in order to create a desired impression. We propose that the distinction between social influence and self-influence will prove to be crucial in imposing order on what otherwise might appear to be a highly confusing set of findings relating Machiavellianism and self-monitoring to various influence phenomena.
of unstructured dyadic interaction, we assessed the dyad members’ focus of attention by determining the relative frequency with which they used first-person, second-person, and third-person pronouns during their conversations.

Empirical precedents in the use of personal-pronoun categories to assess differences in subjects’ focus of attention may be found in studies by Davis and Brock (1975), McDonald, Harris, and Maher (1983), and Wegner and Giuliano (1980, 1983). In the Davis and Brock (1975) study, subjects who guessed at the meaning of foreign-language pronouns in the presence of either a TV camera or a mirror—two stimuli commonly used to manipulate a state of objective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972)—displayed a greater focus of attention on self (i.e., more first-person pronoun use) than did subjects in appropriate control conditions. In the McDonald et al. (1983) and Wegner and Giuliano (1980, 1983) studies, subjects whose physiological arousal was increased by running in place displayed a greater self-focus (more first-person pronoun use in an English-language sentence-completion task) than did subjects who were not aroused. If personal-pronoun usage could be used to assess subjects’ focus of attention in structured laboratory tasks such as these, we expected that it would serve a similar function in spontaneous conversations as well.

We predicted that Machiavellianism would be associated with a pattern of personal-pronoun usage in conversation that emphasizes first-person singular pronouns (a focus on self) at the expense of second- and third-person pronouns (a focus on others). In contrast, we expected that self-monitoring would be associated with a pattern of personal-pronoun usage that emphasizes second- and third-person pronouns (a focus on others) at the expense of first-person singular pronouns (a focus on self). These predictions were tested both within dyads and across dyads, as described in the “Results” section of this paper.

**METHOD**

**SUBJECTS AND DESIGN**

The subjects were 40 male and 40 female undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology classes at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Because previous research with this population (Ickes, 1984) indicated that the subjects’ race was a powerful and potentially confounding variable, only dyads in which both members were of the same race (in this case, both Caucasian) were run. The pairing of the dyad members was essentially random within the general constraint that dyad types
of all sex compositions be represented in the study. In all, there were 20 same-sex dyads (10 male–male dyads, 10 female–female dyads) and 20 mixed-sex (male–female) dyads.²

Potential subjects were contacted by telephone and scheduled to participate at a convenient time. No subject was informed at this stage that another subject (i.e., the other dyad member) would be participating in the study with him or her.

SETTING AND EQUIPMENT

The observation room used as a setting for the study was furnished to look like a storage area that recently had been converted into a waiting room. (For schematic diagrams of the room arrangement, see Ickes & Turner, 1983.) As in earlier studies in this series (e.g., Ickes, 1984; Ickes & Barnes, 1977, 1978; Ickes, Patterson, Rajeczi, & Tanford, 1982; Ickes, Schermer, & Steeno, 1979; Ickes & Turner, 1983), a color video camera and videotape recorder were concealed behind boxes stacked on tables in a corner of the room across from a couch and coffee table. In addition, a directional microphone (providing the auditory input to the videocassette recorder) was concealed in the grating of a ceiling ventilation duct directly above the subjects' heads.

PROCEDURE

During the telephone solicitation, a research assistant (who feigned naiveté as to what the study was about) instructed the subjects to report to specific waiting areas within the psychology building. These areas were physically isolated from each other but were on the same floor as the observation room described above. At the beginning of each session and prior to meeting each pair of subjects, the experimenter activated the videotape equipment in the observation room and checked to see that it was well concealed and operating properly. She then collected the two subjects from their respective waiting areas. (Throughout the course of the study, the experimenter was kept blind with respect to the subjects' Mach V Scale and Self-Monitoring Scale scores.)

The experimenter led the subjects into the observation room and asked them to leave their belongings on a table by the door and sit down on the couch. She explained that the first part of the study in-

² The data from one dyad were subsequently dropped from the analyses, for the reason given in footnote 3.
volved filling out copies of a questionnaire, but that she had just run out of these and would have to obtain some more. Stating that she would return "in a minute or two," the experimenter left the room on this errand, closing the door behind her. She then consulted a digital watch to time the 5-minute interval in which the subjects were covertly audio- and videotaped.

At the end of this period, the experimenter returned, announced that the study was half over, and questioned the subjects for possible suspicion of the videotaping before proceeding further. Following this test for suspicion, the experimenter conducted a partial debriefing in which she explained that the first part of the study had been designed "to examine the behavior of two strangers during their initial interaction." She showed the subjects how the videotape of their interaction had been made, assured them that any data coded from the tapes would be used for statistical purposes only, and asked them to sign a release form giving their consent for the tapes to be used in this way.3

The experimenter then explained that the second part of the study involved assessment of the subjects' perceptions of the interaction in which they had just engaged. Accordingly, each subject was asked to fill out a posttest questionnaire designed to elicit perceptions of his or her own and the other's behavior during the interaction period. (Because the questionnaire data do not bear on the hypothesis tested in this study, they are not considered further here.) When the subjects had completed the posttest questionnaire, the experimenter administered the Mach V Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970) and the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974). After completing these measures and returning them to the experimenter (who was waiting outside in the hall), each subject was debriefed more fully, was asked not to discuss the study with potential future subjects, and was then released.

PERSONAL PRONOUN CODING

The videotapes of the dyad members' unstructured interactions were subsequently viewed by two independent raters who, like the experimenter, were kept blind to the subjects' Mach V Scale and Self-Monitoring Scale scores. Each rater coded the personal-pronoun usage

3. Only one subject did not agree to sign the release, asking that the videotape of his dyad's interaction be erased. When the experimenter complied, but expressed curiosity about his reason for not giving consent, the subject explained that he never allowed his image to be recorded in permanent form because he was "wanted by the police." We were reassured that his reason was clearly exceptional and had nothing to do with any ethical qualms about the videotaping procedure per se.
of one of the two dyad members, with one rater monitoring the conversation of the dyad member on the left side of the video screen while the other rater monitored the conversation of the dyad member on the right side of the screen. (On a second pass through the videotapes for the purpose of establishing interrater reliability, the two raters switched positions and coded the conversation of the partners of the dyad members they had monitored during the first pass.)

Personal-pronoun usage was coded by means of tally marks made on copies of a data-collection form that included the entire set of personal pronouns categorized (1) by person and number (i.e., first-, second-, and third-person singular and plural) on one dimension, and (2) by case (i.e., nominative, objective, possessive, reflexive) on another dimension. Each time the rater heard the person who was being rated use a particular personal pronoun (e.g., "we") in conversation, the rater would enter a tally mark for that pronoun usage in the appropriate space on the data-collection form. These tallies were later aggregated into measures of the total frequency of usage of each of the personal-pronoun categories. Then, in order to eliminate possible confounds due to differences in the total amount of talking done by the dyad members, the raw frequencies for each pronoun category were transformed to relative frequencies or percentage scores. These percentage measures, which were computed by dividing the raw frequencies for each pronoun category by the total number of personal pronouns used, were used to adjust for individual differences in amount of talking and to provide a common metric for assessing the degree to which the content of the subjects’ conversations reflected a focus on self (first-person pronouns) versus others (second- and third-person pronouns).4

When collapsed across the case variable (which is irrelevant to the purposes of this study), the interrater agreement rates were found to be uniformly high (ranging from 88% to 100%) within each of the person-number categories. The relatively few discrepancies that were revealed in the raters’ independent tallies were later resolved through mutual discussion and review of the videotaped conversations.5

4. Although the data-collection form permitted personal-pronoun usage to be classified in terms of case (nominative, objective, possessive, reflexive) as well as in terms of person and number (first-person singular, first-person plural, etc.), the case distinction proved to be an unimportant variable in the subsequent data analyses. For this reason, the data were collapsed over the case variable and analyzed only in terms of the person-number distinction. The person-number distinction was itself simplified by dropping the category of second-person plural pronouns from the analyses, because the incidence of use for this category was too low to justify its inclusion.

5. Agreement rates involving the second-person pronouns were somewhat lower than those for first- and third-person pronouns because of the raters’ necessity to classify by grammatical rule rather than by word sound alone.
RESULTS

The design of the study permitted the "self-oriented Machiavellian, other-oriented self-monitor" hypothesis to be tested in two conceptually distinct types of analyses. In the first type of analysis, which disregarded the subjects' pairings into dyads, correlations were computed across dyads for all subjects combined. This was done in order to test the hypothesis that Machiavellianism would be correlated with a pattern of personal-pronoun usage that emphasizes the self and de-emphasizes others, whereas self-monitoring would be correlated with a pattern of pronoun usage that de-emphasizes the self and emphasizes others. In the second type of analysis, which took account of the subjects' pairing into dyads, within-dyad F tests for correlated observations were computed in order to test the hypothesis that higher-Mach dyad members would display a more self-focused, less other-focused pattern of personal-pronoun usage than their lower-Mach partners, whereas higher-SM dyad members would display a less self-focused, more other-focused pattern of personal-pronoun usage than their lower-SM partners. The results of each of these two analyses are reported in the following sections.

OVERALL CORRELATIONS

The correlation between Mach V Scale and Self-Monitoring Scale scores was weak but statistically significant for the 80 subjects included in the present study \( r = .24, df = 78, p < .05 \). Although this weak correlation itself supports previous findings (Barnes & Ickes, 1979; Snyder, 1974) suggesting relatively minimal overlap in the constructs of Machiavellianism and self-monitoring, we sought to sharpen the distinction between these two constructs further by examining their relationship to personal-pronoun usage in unstructured conversation. Accordingly, correlations of Mach V Scale and Self-Monitoring Scale scores with the percentages of use of each of the person-number pronoun categories were computed across dyads for all of the subjects in the study (see Table 1). These data revealed that increased Machiavellianism was associated with an increase in self-focused conversation (i.e., increased use of first-person pronouns) at the expense of other-focused conversation (i.e., decreased use of second- and third-person singular pronouns). In contrast, increased self-monitoring was associated with a decrease in self-focused conversation (i.e., decreased use of first-person singular pronouns).

Because the predicted pattern of correlations should emerge even
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TABLE 1
Correlations of Mach V Scale and Self-Monitoring Scale Scores with the Percentages of
Usage of Pronoun Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRONOUN USAGE MEASURE</th>
<th>MACH V SCALE</th>
<th>SELF-MONITORING SCALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% first-person singular</td>
<td>.21* (.28**)</td>
<td>-.24* (-.30**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% first-person plural</td>
<td>.23* (.19*)</td>
<td>.17 (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% second-person singular</td>
<td>-.24* (-.28**)</td>
<td>.14 (.20*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% third-person singular</td>
<td>-.21* (-.22*)</td>
<td>.02 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% third-person plural</td>
<td>.06 (.03)</td>
<td>.12 (.12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The zero-order correlations (left member of each pair) are followed by the first-order partial correlations (right member of each pair) in which the variance common to Mach V Scale and Self-Monitoring Scale scores is statistically controlled (df's = 76 and 74, respectively).

*p < .05.

**p < .01.

more clearly when the variance common to the Mach V Scale and Self-Monitoring Scale scores is statistically controlled, we also computed the appropriate first-order partial correlations (Table 1, values in parentheses). As expected, the values of the predicted correlations were typically larger in this analysis, and their significance levels were enhanced in four out of six cases. In addition, the self-monitoring data provided clearer evidence that increased self-monitoring was associated with a decrease in self-focused conversation and a concomitant increase in partner-focused conversation.

To rule out the possibility that these correlations might be due to differences in the amount of talking by subjects who were high versus low on either of the personality dimensions studied, our dependent measures took the form of the percentages of use of particular pronoun categories (i.e., relative to the total number of personal pronouns used by the subjects in conversation). That this precaution may have been unnecessary is suggested by the fact that neither the subjects’ Mach V Scale scores nor their Self-Monitoring Scale scores were significantly correlated with either the total frequency or duration of their speaking turns (r's ranged from .00 to -.13, n.s.).

In summary, the correlational data for the percentages of usage of the various personal-pronoun categories are consistent with the assumption that Machiavellianism represents an essentially assimilative, self-

6. The interrater reliabilities of the total number and duration of speaking turns were .81 and .86, respectively.
oriented approach to social interaction, whereas self-monitoring represents an essentially accommodative, other-oriented approach to social interaction.

WITHIN-DYAD COMPARISONS

Two sets of within-dyad comparisons were computed in the form of $F$ tests for correlated observations. In the first set of comparisons, the personal-pronoun usage of the higher-Mach member of the dyad was compared with the personal-pronoun usage of the lower-Mach member for each of the person-number pronoun categories. In the second set of comparisons, the personal-pronoun usage of the higher-SM member of the dyad was compared with the personal-pronoun usage of the lower-SM member for each of the same categories. The data for both sets of comparisons are graphically represented in Figure 1, with the higher-Mach versus lower-Mach contrasts depicted in the upper bar graph and the higher-SM versus lower-SM contrasts depicted in the lower bar graph.

As the upper graph in Figure 1 reveals, the higher-Mach members of the dyads used a larger percentage of first-person singular pronouns ($M = 51.4\%$), than did their lower-Mach partners ($M = 41.9\%$), $F(1, 38) = 10.96, p < .002$. Because of the nonindependence of the percentages of usage of the various pronoun categories, the greater usage of first-person singular pronouns by the higher-Mach dyad members occurred at the expense of a reduced usage of other pronoun categories. Specifically, the higher-Mach members used a smaller percentage of second-person singular pronouns ($M = 12.2\%$) and third-person singular pronouns ($M = 17.9\%$) than did their lower-Mach partners ($M's = 16.2\%$ and $24.8\%$, respectively), $F's(1, 38) = 4.90$ and $16.48$, $p's < .04$ and < .0002. Given the nonindependence of these data, it is not appropriate to claim statistical significance for each of the individual comparisons just reported. It is appropriate, however, to claim significance for the difference in the overall pattern of personal-pronoun usage by the higher- versus lower-Mach dyad members. Thus, it is correct to say that, relative to their lower-Mach partners, higher-Mach dyad members were significantly more likely to use first-person singular pronouns in their conversations at the expense of second-person singular and third-person singular pronouns.

As the lower graph in Figure 1 reveals, the higher-SM members of the dyads used a smaller percentage of first-person singular pronouns ($M = 42.2\%$) than did their lower-SM partners ($M = 50.9\%$), $F(1, 38) = 8.79$, $p < .006$. While doing so, the higher-SM dyad members made corre-
FIGURE 1. Percentage usage of personal-pronoun categories according to the dyad members' relative rankings on Machiavellianism and self-monitoring.
spondingly greater use of third-person singular pronouns ($M's = 24.1\%$ vs. $19.4\%$), $F(1, 38) = 6.35, p < .02$. As before, the appropriate interpretation of these findings is that there was a significant difference in the overall pattern of personal-pronoun usage by higher-SM versus lower-SM dyad members. Relative to their lower-SM partners, higher-SM dyad members were significantly more likely to use third-person singular pronouns at the expense of first-person singular pronouns.

**GENERALITY OF THE FINDINGS**

To test the generality of the findings just reported, we reanalyzed all of the percentage-usage data in analysis-of-variance designs that treated the sex composition (male–male, female–female, male–female) of the dyads as a between-dyads variable. These extended analyses—one based on a within-dyad classification in terms of Mach V Scale rank, the other based on a within-dyad classification in terms of Self-Monitoring Scale rank—revealed no significant main or interaction effects involving sex composition on any of the percentage-usage measures. Thus, the reported relationships between Machiavellianism and personal-pronoun usage, as well as those between self-monitoring and personal-pronoun usage, appear to have generality across dyads of all three sex compositions.

**DISCUSSION**

In summary, the results of this study provided consistent and converging support for our "self-oriented Machiavellian, other-oriented self-monitor" hypothesis. This hypothesis was tested and supported at two conceptually distinct levels of analysis. Correlations computed across dyads for all subjects combined revealed that Mach V Scale scores were positively correlated with the use in conversation of first-person pronouns (both singular and plural) but were negatively correlated with the use of second-person singular and third-person singular pronouns. In contrast, Self-Monitoring Scale scores were negatively correlated with the use of first-person singular pronouns but were positively correlated with the use of second-person singular pronouns.

Even more clear-cut support emerged, however, in the within-dyad $F$ tests that (1) compared the personal-pronoun usage of the higher-Mach versus lower-Mach dyad members in one set of analyses, and (2) compared the personal-pronoun usage of the higher-SM versu...
lower-SM dyad members in a second set of analyses. The findings at this level revealed that, relative to their lower-Mach partners, the higher-Mach dyad members used proportionately more first-person singular pronouns in their conversations at the expense of second-person singular and third-person singular pronouns. In contrast, the higher-SM dyad members used proportionately fewer first-person singular pronouns than did their lower-SM partners, while using proportionately more third-person singular pronouns.

Taken together, the findings from both levels of analysis not only reinforce but also help to account for the divergent validity of the Machiavellianism and self-monitoring constructs. They do so by distinguishing the self-focus in conversation associated with Machiavellianism from the other-focus associated with self-monitoring. To put it simply, high-Mach individuals are likely to talk about themselves at the expense of others, whereas high-SM individuals are likely to talk about others at the expense of themselves.

A minor weakness of the present methodology is that subjects completed the Mach V and Self-Monitoring Scales after, rather than before, the 5-minute period in which they waited together. We think it is highly unlikely that their experiences during the observation period would have altered their scale responses in any systematic way, given (1) the substantial stability of both measures (i.e., test-retest correlations in the .73-.87 range—Snyder, 1974; Vleeming, 1979); (2) the fact that the actual constructs being measured are disguised in both scales; and (3) the subtlety of the hypothesized theoretical link between these disguised constructs and the relative use of certain personal-pronoun categories in conversation. Nevertheless, because this methodological weakness can be easily remedied, we recommend that the collection of personality measures be more clearly separated from the collection of conversational data.

The only unexpected finding to emerge in the present results was that Machiavellianism was positively correlated with the use in conversation of first-person plural pronouns (i.e., "we," "us," "our," "ours," "ourselves"). A plausible interpretation of this finding is that high-Mach individuals exaggerate the use of first-person plural pronouns in their conversation in order to manipulate others more effectively. For example, the high-Mach person may use the pronouns "we," "us," "our," and so on in such a way as to suggest (1) the implicit agreement of the interaction partner ("he's not the kind of person we want as our congressman"); (2) the right to speak for the interaction partner ("it looks like we'll just have to sit here and be bored until the experimenter gets back"); or (3) an implicit consensus of people in addition to the high-Mach person that his or her opinions, proposed ac-
tion, and the like are correct ("We athletes don't have much use for the computer freaks on campus").

To return to the predicted findings, however, there are at least three implications of these results that warrant further discussion. The first of these implications is methodological. It suggests that our simple technique of computing the relative frequency with which certain personal-pronoun categories are used in unstructured, naturally occurring conversation may be surprisingly effective in assessing the primary focus of the speaker's attention and interest. This technique, which is not only simple but highly objective and reliable as well, may provide a useful alternative to more complicated and subjective methods for coding the content of conversations (e.g., Stiles, 1978, 1980).

The second and third implications are theoretical in nature. The more obvious theoretical implication of the present findings is that high-Mach and high-SM individuals—which much they may resemble each other in their motivation and ability to engage in impression management—may nonetheless differ in the form and intent of their impression-management attempts. We have suggested that these differences, which presumably underlie the self-focus during conversation of high-Mach persons versus the other-focus of high-SM persons, are essentially the differences between assimilative and accommodative style of impression management (Barnes & Ickes, 1979). We believe that the distinction between assimilative and accommodative impression management is a basic one, with important heuristic implications for future research.

A less obvious but theoretically broader implication of our findings is that the characteristic motives associated with a range of personality dispositions, including but not limited to Machiavellianism and self-monitoring, may be reflected either directly or indirectly in individuals' thought and conversation during social interaction. This implication makes salient the importance and utility of employing an individual-difference approach to understand human social cognition and behavior. It also suggests that the content of conversation may at times be quite revealing of the speakers' personality, and that—in this sense at least—"you are what you say."

REFERENCES


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