INTRODUCTION

When the people of ancient Rome attended the theater, they watched actors who performed behind masks. Theatregoers knew that a performer who wore a particular mask, or persona, would be playing a character who displayed a consistent pattern of behavior and attitudes. Originally, the term persona designated only the theatrical mask. But as time went by, the term persona came to refer also to the character played by the wearer of the mask and eventually to the actor who played that character. The term persona is also the Latin root of the psychological term personality. And just as the term persona referred to regularities and consistencies in the characters created by actors on the stage, so too does the term personality refer to regularities and consistencies in the behavior of individuals in their lives. To the extent that such behavioral consistencies do exist, they are thought to distinguish individuals from other individuals, to render their actions predictable, and to determine their adjustment to their environments (cf. Allport, 1937).

In what ways might the regularities and consistencies that constitute personality be reflected and manifested in the behavioral phenomena and processes of concern to social psychologists? If, indeed, meaningful regularities do exist in the behavior of individuals in social contexts, what are their social and psychological origins? And what are their implications for social psychology’s theoretical understanding of the nature of social behavior? It is to questions of this form that students of personality and social behavior have sought answers. And it is the answers to such questions that are the central concerns of this chapter on personality and social behavior.

A historically convenient point of departure for any consideration of personality and social behavior is Kurt Lewin’s (1936) seminal proposition: “Every psychological event depends upon the state of the person and at the same time on the environment, although their relative importance is different in different cases” (p. 12). The
proposition that an individual's behavior in a social situation is determined both by characteristics of that individual (i.e., dispositional determinants of social behavior) and by characteristics of that situation (i.e., situational determinants of social behavior) is a fundamental tenet of most, if not all, strategies for conceptualizing and investigating personality and social behavior. Nevertheless, strategies for the study of personality and social behavior differ among themselves in the extent to which they attempt to identify, both theoretically and empirically, dispositional and situational sources of regularities and consistencies in the behavior of individuals in social contexts. Indeed, we have been able to define three major strategies that social psychologists may adopt for the study of personality and social behavior:

1. **The dispositional strategy**: The dispositional strategy for the study of personality and social behavior seeks to understand consistencies in social behavior in terms of relatively stable traits, enduring dispositions, and other propensities that are thought to reside "within" individuals. In particular, the dispositional strategy seeks to define those domains of social behavior within which it is possible to identify individuals who characteristically manifest the regularities and consistencies in social behavior that might reflect the influence of underlying dispositional features.

2. **The interactional strategy**: The interactional strategy for the study of personality and social behavior seeks to understand regularities and consistencies in social behavior in terms of the interactive influence of dispositional features and situational features. In particular, the interactional strategy seeks to identify those categories of traits, of behaviors, of individuals, and of situations within which such regularities and consistencies typically are to be found.

3. **The situational strategy**: The newly emerging situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior seeks to understand consistencies in social behavior in terms of the features of social situations. In particular, the situational strategy seeks to identify the personal antecedents and the social consequences of regularities and consistencies in the settings and contexts within which individuals live their lives.

Our intent in this chapter is to examine critically the strategies that we have defined for the study of personality and social behavior, to probe the conceptual and methodological underpinnings of each strategy, to present representative illustrations of each strategy in action, and to assess the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy. It also is our intent to place the discussion of strategies for the study of personality and social behavior within the larger theoretical framework of the social psychology of personality and, in doing so, to provide some guidelines for conceptualizing and investigating the individual in social psychology.

**THE DISPOSITIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR**

When social psychologists employ the dispositional strategy for the study of personality and social behavior, they are guided by a theoretical perspective that assumes that some meaningful amount of the regularities and consistencies in social behavior can be understood in terms of relatively stable and enduring propensities (e.g., dispositions, traits, needs, motives) that reside "within" individuals. The theoretical perspective of the dispositional strategy is accompanied by an empirical orientation that seeks to define domains of social behavior within which it is possible to observe the regularities over time and the consistencies across situations that are thought to constitute evidence of personality.

For example, were the dispositional strategy to be applied to the social psychological phenomenon of conformity, the user of this strategy would seek to determine whether or not there exists a conforming personality who reliably displays manifestations of conformity. If individuals who characteristically behave in a conforming fashion did exist, and if one could readily identify such individuals, then these characteristically conforming individuals would become the targets of intensive investigations of the phenomenon of conformity. In particular, by investigating the cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes by which characteristically conforming individuals cope with social situations, the practitioner of the dispositional strategy would hope to acquire an understanding of the nature of conformity. That is, by understanding the social psychology of conforming individuals, one could thereby come to understand the social psychology of conformity itself.

More generally, the logic of the dispositional strategy for the study of personality and social behavior dictates that the phenomena and processes of concern to
social psychologists can be understood by focusing one's investigative efforts on the individuals who characteristically manifest those phenomena and processes. After all, the logic of the dispositional strategy continues, one could hardly study any particular social psychological phenomenon or process in individuals who rarely or never manifest that particular phenomenon or process. Accordingly, by identifying those individuals who typically manifest the social psychological phenomenon or process of concern, one gains access to the ideal candidates for investigating the social psychology of that phenomenon or process in action. That is, the identification of those individuals who characteristically manifest the phenomenon or process of concern is undertaken not as an end in itself but rather as a means toward achieving the end of understanding an important social psychological phenomenon or process.

The dispositional strategy for the study of personality and social behavior has been applied to the identification and investigation of regularities and consistencies in a wide variety of social psychological phenomena and processes. These include authoritarianism (Adorno, et al., 1950; Dillehay, 1978), need for approval (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964; Milham and Jacobson, 1978), Machiavellianism (Christie and Geis, 1970; Geis, 1978), achievement motivation (McClelland et al., 1953; Weiner, 1974), extraversion (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1968; Wilson, 1978), repression-sensitization (Byrne, 1964), need for cognition (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982), self-motivation (Dishman, Ickes, and Morgan, 1980), dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960), locus of control (Lefcourt, 1972; Phares, 1973; Rotter, 1966), charisma (Friedman et al., 1980), cognitive complexity (Bieri, 1955; Crockett, 1965), empathy (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972), hypnotic susceptibility (Hilgard, 1973), field dependence (Goodenough, 1978; Witkin et al., 1962), attributional styles (Funder, 1980; Ickes and Layden, 1978), sex roles (Bem, 1974; Spence and Helmreich, 1978), sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 1978), power motivation (McClelland, 1975; Winter, 1973; Winter and Stewart, 1978), and self-esteem (Wylie, 1974). In addition, a variety of attempts have been made to use the dispositional strategy for the study of personality and social behavior in order to link various phenomena of concern to social psychologists to biological and morphological characteristics of individuals (e.g., Buss and Plomin, 1975; Kretschmer, 1926; Schachter and Rodin, 1974; Sheldon, 1942) and to differences in individuals' birth order (e.g., Schachter, 1959).

Needless to say, it would be impossible to provide an exhaustive review of theory and research on all of the entries in even this admittedly selected list [for a more comprehensive catalogue, see Blass (1977), London and Exner (1978), and Robinson and Shaver (1973)]. For this reason, we have chosen to focus on a small number of representative examples of the dispositional strategy in action: (1) theory and research on the authoritarian personality, (2) theory and research on the need for social approval, and (3) theory and research on Machiavellianism.

THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY

Few phenomena have captured the attention of social psychologists to the same extent as has the phenomenon of prejudice. The dispositional strategy for the study of prejudice has sought to answer three key questions. Do there exist individuals who regularly and consistently display prejudice? Do the backgrounds of prejudiced individuals provide clues to the origins of prejudice? Do the lives of prejudiced individuals reveal information about the consequences of prejudice? Foremost among the efforts to answer these questions is the attempt of Adorno et al. (1950) to identify and to understand The Authoritarian Personality. We consider now their answers to the key questions posed by the dispositional strategy for the study of prejudice and the methods by which they generated their answers.

Identifying Prejudiced Individuals

If characteristically prejudiced individuals exist, then they ought to be consistently and regularly accepting of those who are similar to them and rejecting of those who are different from them. Moreover, if there exists such a prejudiced personality, it ought to be possible to demonstrate that the individuals who harbor prejudicial attitudes toward one group (e.g., toward Jews) tend to be the same individuals who harbor prejudicial attitudes toward other groups (e.g., blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mormons, socialists, artists, foreigners). That is, from this perspective the empirical criterion for identifying the prejudiced personality is that within individuals prejudicial attitudes ought to be consistent across diverse potential targets of prejudice.

In accord with this strategy, Adorno et al. (1950) first identified a group of individuals who possessed anti-Semitic attitudes, and then they assessed the extent to which the possessors of anti-Semitic attitudes also pos-
sessed generally ethnocentric aversions for all people who diverge from white, middle-class American norms and values. Adorno et al. (1950) identified the anti-Semitism among a sample of over 2000 white, non-Jewish, native-born, middle-class American residents of California. To do so, they developed and used a highly reliable (both in terms of temporal stability and internal consistency), fifty-two-item, Likert-format measure of the extent to which individuals characterize Jews as offensive, threatening, immoral, clannish, intrusive, and deserving of exclusion, restriction, and discrimination. Among the items of this Anti-Semitism Scale are “No matter how Americanized a Jew may seem to be, there is always something different and strange, something basically Jewish underneath”; “I can hardly imagine myself marrying a Jew”; and “One trouble with Jewish businessmen is that they stick together and connive, so that a Gentile doesn’t have a fair chance in competition.”

To determine whether or not antagonistic attitudes toward Jews were part of the consistent pattern of prejudicial attitudes toward diverse potential targets of prejudice that would constitute empirical evidence for the existence of a prejudiced personality, Adorno et al. (1950) examined the relationship between scores on the Anti-Semitism Scale and scores on the Ethnocentrism Scale. The Ethnocentrism Scale is a highly reliable, thirty-four-item, Likert-format measure of antagonistic attitudes toward members of various cultural, ethnic, racial, national, political, or religious out-groups (e.g., “America may not be perfect, but the American Way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society”; “Negroes have their rights, but it is best to keep them in their own districts and schools and to prevent too much contact with whites”; “Certain religious sects who refuse to salute the flag should be forced to conform to such a patriotic action, or else be abolished”). The substantial relationship between individuals' scores on the Anti-Semitism Scale and their scores on the Ethnocentrism Scale (r = 0.80) suggested to Adorno et al. (1950) that hostility toward outsiders exists as a generalized attitudinal orientation, directed regularly and consistently toward diverse potential targets of prejudice. Apparently, according to the criterion of consistency across targets, a prejudiced personality does indeed exist.

The Origins of Prejudice
Having identified the existence of a syndrome of prejudice and ethnocentrism, Adorno et al. (1950) turned to intensive investigations of the lives of prejudiced and unprejudiced individuals to determine the social origins and the psychological functions of prejudice. Intensive, open-ended, unstructured interviews with relatively prejudiced individuals (upper quartile of the Ethnocentrism Scale) and with relatively unprejudiced individuals (lower quartile of the Ethnocentrism Scale) yielded a composite characterization of the developmental roots of prejudice.

Prejudiced individuals, according to Adorno et al. (1950), were the children of domineering fathers and punitive mothers who engaged in austere and punitive child-rearing practices. These practices involved a combination of threats, coercion, and the deliberate use of parental love and its withdrawal to promote obedience. The products of such socialization practices are children who are decidedly insecure and extremely dependent on their parents. Moreover, such children fear their parents and experience unconscious hostility toward them. Arguing from interview data and a psychoanalytic view of personality processes, Adorno et al. (1950) claimed that the insecurity and dependence that these individuals experienced during their childhood is translated in adulthood into submission and obedience to those in positions of power and authority. By the same token, the fear and hostility of their childhood years is translated in their adult years into hostility and antagonism toward members of minority groups and other people perceived to be less powerful than themselves.

These interviews also suggested to Adorno et al. (1950) that, as adults, highly prejudiced individuals should display the behavioral elements of a syndrome that has come to be known as authoritarianism. These elements include a rigid adherence to conventional values, a submissive attitude toward moral authorities, a tendency to condemn those who violate conventional values, an opposition to subjective or tender-minded phenomena, a tendency to think in stereotyped categories, a preoccupation with power and toughness, a vilification of human nature, a projection outward of emotional impulses, and an exaggerated concern with sexual happenings. To assess this possibility, Adorno et al. (1950) constructed a highly reliable, thirty-eight-item, Likert-format measure of the authoritarian syndrome (e.g., “Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn”; “If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off”; “People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong”; “Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict”). They named this measure the Implicit Antidemocratic Trends or Potentiality for Fascism Scale because they believed that the authoritarian
The Dispositional Strategy for the Study of Personality and Social Behavior

The Manifestations of Prejudice
How are the ethnocentric attitudes and authoritarian ideology of prejudiced individuals reflected and manifested in their beliefs, attitudes, and actions? The work of Adorno et al. (1950) and of subsequent investigators (for reviews, see, for example, Christie and Cook (1958); Christie and Jahoda (1954); Kirscht and Dillehay (1967); Titus and Hollander (1957)) has yielded considerable information about the lives of prejudiced individuals.

Within the cognitive domain authoritarians display considerable cognitive rigidity and intolerance for ambiguity (e.g., Block and Block, 1951; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Jones, 1954; Rokeach, 1948; Steiner and Johnson, 1963), as well as the firm belief that other people tend to think and feel as they do (e.g., Granberg, 1972; Scodel and Musser, 1953; Simons, 1966). Within the attitudinal domain authoritarians are rejecting of minorities and foreigners (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Campbell and McCandless, 1951; Martin and Westie, 1959), espouse conservative political and economic attitudes (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Leventhal, Jacobs, and Kurdirka, 1964), accept the attitudes of those in power (Izzett, 1971), and identify with authoritarian characters in television situation comedies (e.g., Chapko and Lewis, 1975). Within the behavioral domain authoritarians are more obedient to authority (e.g., Elms and Milgram, 1966), report that they vote for conservative and authoritarian candidates for public office (e.g., Higgins, 1965; Milton, 1952; Poiley, 1974; Wrightsman, 1965), and raise their own children in a traditional manner, i.e., with strong parental control over the children, traditional sex roles and division of labor for the parents, and limited opportunities for the children to dissent from the opinions and dictates of their parents (e.g., Levinson and Huffman, 1955). Evidently, prejudiced individuals do live their lives in accord with their ethnocentric attitudes and authoritarian ideology.

The Prejudiced Personality in Perspective
As graphic a portrait of the prejudiced personality that Adorno et al. (1950) were able to present, their investigation of the dynamics of prejudice has drawn its share of criticism (e.g., Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954). Their work has been faulted for, among other potential problems, a limitation of their sample to white middle-class Californians, the development of questionnaires susceptible to acquiescence response sets, the examination of the data of the interviews in advance of developing a coding system, the coding of multiple variables from the same interview content, and the consistent negative correlations between authoritarianism and measures of education, intelligence, and socioeconomic class.

In response to these potentially troublesome criticisms, subsequent researchers have attempted to compensate for the shortcomings of the original investigations. They have, for example, been able to unconfound authoritarianism and acquiescence response sets (e.g., Christie, Havel, and Selendig, 1958; Couch and Keniston, 1960). In addition, they have confirmed much of the portrait of the developmental origins of prejudice in subsequent investigations using different methodologies (e.g., Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949, 1954; Frenkel-Brunswik and Havel, 1953; Martin and Westie, 1959). The combined weight of these investigations [(of which there easily have been many hundreds; for reviews, see, for example, Christie and Cook (1958), Christie and Jahoda (1954), Kirscht and Dillehay (1967), Titus and Hollander (1957)] seem to support the conclusion that "the overall picture shows consistency of findings in many of the most intensively studied areas" (Christie and Cook, 1958, p. 189; see also Christie, 1978).

THE NEED FOR SOCIAL APPROVAL
Implicit, if not explicit, in most social psychological perspectives on the nature of social interaction and interpersonal relationships are the propositions that individuals value and seek the social approval of other people and that, consequently, they will engage in activities designed to achieve favorable evaluations from the people with whom they interact. When the dispositional strategy for the study of personality and social behavior is applied to the study of the need for social approval, it sets for itself these goals:

1. To identify that category of individuals who possess particularly intense needs for social approval.
2. To document that these individuals regularly and consistently engage in a wide variety of behaviors by which one might seek social approval in a wide variety of relevant situations.
3. To discover the social and psychological processes that underlie the approval-seeking orientation of these individuals to interpersonal relationships.

Prototypic of the dispositional strategy for the study of the dynamics of the quest for social approval are the programmatic investigations of Crowne and Marlowe (1964).

Assessing the Need for Social Approval
To differentiate individuals having a relatively strong need for social approval from those having a relatively weak need for social approval, Crowne and Marlowe (1960) developed the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, a set of thirty-three true-false, self-report items designed to measure the tendency to describe oneself in favorable, socially desirable terms. Individuals with high scores on this measure tend to agree with statements that (in the normative climate that prevailed when the measure was constructed) are socially desirable but probably untrue of most people; e.g., “I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble”; “I have never intensely disliked anyone”; “I always try to practice what I preach”; and “I am always courteous to people who are disagreeable.” At the same time individuals with high scores on this measure tend to disagree with statements that (again, according to the normative standards of the times) were socially undesirable but probably true of most people; e.g., “I can remember playing sick to get out of something”; “I like to gossip at times”; “On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life”; and “I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.”

The guiding logic of the construction of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale was straightforward: The tendency of some individuals to describe themselves in socially desirable terms may reflect a more general propensity to seek the social approval that these individuals believe is accorded to people who behave in a socially desirable and a culturally acceptable fashion. The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale is internally consistent and temporally stable (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964), and it is only modestly correlated with other measures of the tendency to endorse socially desirable statements (e.g., that of Edwards, 1957).

Behavioral Manifestations of the Need for Social Approval
Do the individuals identified by the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale as having a high need for social approval characteristically seek the approval of other people by displaying socially desirable behaviors? In a wide variety of social situations individuals who have a high need for social approval do give socially desirable responses. They conform to social and interpersonal pressures more readily than do individuals with a low need for social approval (e.g., Marlowe and Crowne, 1961; Strickland and Crowne, 1962), particularly when these pressures emanate from other individuals of prestige and expertise (e.g., Miller et al., 1965). Moreover, they are particularly persuasive, suggestible, and responsive to social and evaluative feedback (e.g., Marlowe, Stifler, and Davis, 1962; Milburn, Bell, and Koeske, 1970; Salman, 1962; Strickland, 1965; Strickland and Jenkins, 1964). Individuals with a high need for social approval are highly responsive to social reinforcement in the verbal conditioning procedural paradigm (e.g., Buckhout, 1965; Crowne and Strickland, 1961; Dixon, 1970; Marlowe, 1962; Marlowe et al., 1964; Strickland, 1962, 1970; Strickland and Crowne, 1962). Furthermore, in word association tasks they limit their responses to relatively common, popular, and conventional word associations (e.g., Horton, Marlowe, and Crowne, 1963). Those with a high need for social approval tend to be cautious about setting goals in risk-taking situations (e.g., Barthel, 1963; Thaw and Efran, 1967). In perceptual defense tasks individuals with a high need for social approval are less likely to report the dirty words to which they have been exposed than are those with a low need for social approval (e.g., Barthel and Crowne, 1962). Finally, individuals with a high need for social approval are particularly likely to perform altruistic and generous actions, especially when they know that their good deeds will be witnessed by other people (e.g., Satow, 1973).

The Dynamics of Seeking Social Approval
What are the psychological processes that underlie and generate the approval-seeking activities of individuals with a high need for social approval? Crowne and Marlowe (1964) have suggested that the dynamics of approval-seeking may involve attempts to defend and to protect a vulnerable self-esteem: “Approval-motivated persons are more dependent than others on the positive evaluations of others as a means of protecting a defensively enhanced picture of themselves” (p. 133). If this interpretation of the motivational underpinnings of approval seeking is correct, then individuals with a high need for social approval ought to have particular diffi-
culty with the recognition and expression of hostility, which typically involves the combined threats of unfavorable evaluations from others and of social rejection by others, both of which constitute threats to self-esteem. In accord with this derivation, individuals with a high need for social approval display no overt hostility to one who has double-crossed, insulted, and provoked them; in fact, in the face of this abusive treatment individuals with a high need for social approval somehow manage to remain friendly and sociable (Conn and Crowne, 1964; see also Fishman, 1965).

In further support of this interpretation of approval seeking as the defensive protection of a vulnerable self-esteem, Strickland and Crowne (1963) have reported that high need for social approval is associated with early termination of psychotherapy, an interpersonal situation that ought to produce considerable conflict between the desire to preserve vulnerable self-conceptions and the need to discuss personal problems. Individuals high in need for social approval who typically are judged by their therapists to be particularly defensive, perhaps partially because of their highly guarded responses to projective tests; e.g., see Tutko (1962)] apparently resolve this conflict by early flight from the psychotherapeutic situation. Finally, and also in accord with the proposed self-esteem protective origins of approval seeking, individuals with a high need for social approval are seen by their peers as rather defensive in their interpersonal relationships (Barthol, 1963). Perhaps the combination of this defensive appearance and their chronic dependence on others for reassurance and esteem makes individuals with a high need for social approval relatively unpopular in sociometric choices (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964).

Evidently, the regular and consistent approval-seeking behaviors of individuals with a high need for social approval are the product of attempts to defend and preserve a vulnerable self-esteem. Perhaps individuals with a high need for social approval believe that conformity and submission to the norms of socially approved conduct may involve few risks of the social rejection that would threaten their self-esteem. Perhaps, too, the same approval-seeking activities typically seen in individuals with chronically high needs for social approval may be elicited in all individuals, whatever their chronic levels of need for social approval, by those social situations and interpersonal relationships that provide significant threats to self-esteem. That is, the same processes of the defensive protection of self-esteem that seem to underlie and generate the approval-seeking behavior of individuals with a high need for social approval may also underlie and generate all approval-seeking activities in social interaction and interpersonal relationships.

**THE MACHIAVELLIAN PERSONALITY**

For centuries theorists have been fascinated by the question of how some individuals are able to successfully manipulate and take advantage of others (Christie and Geis, 1970, Chap. 1). Two books written circa 300 B.C. —one in China (The Book of Lord Shang), the other in India (the Arthasatra of Kautilya)—gave practical and often chillingly ruthless advice to rulers about the most effective ways to manipulate and control their subjects. In a more modern treatment of this theme (written in the early 1500s), Niccolo Machiavelli presented a collection of essays in *The Prince* and *The Discourses* that contained a philosophy of interpersonal manipulation as well as a practical guide to manipulative tactics. These essays were used by Christie, Geis, and their associates over four hundred years later as the basis for applying the dispositional strategy to the study of interpersonal manipulation. In their 1970 book *Studies of Machiavellianism* these authors sought to answer some basic questions about personality and manipulative interpersonal behavior. First, is there a class of individuals who regularly and successfully manipulate others? Second, what are the specific behavioral tactics whereby such manipulations are effected? And third, what are the psychological orientations and processes that differentiate manipulative and nonmanipulative individuals?

**Assessing Machiavellianism**

Starting with the assumption that individuals who endorse Machiavelli's philosophy of interpersonal manipulation might also behave in a similar fashion, Christie and his associates developed a Machiavellianism scale comprised of items that paraphrased statements found in *The Prince* and *The Discourses*. Through various psychometric refinements of an initial pool of seventy-one items, an internally consistent, twenty-item, Likert-format scale was created. This scale (Mach IV) measured the degree of subjects' endorsement of a wide range of Machiavellian statements. Individuals with high scores on this measure tend to agree with statements such as "The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear"; "Never tell anyone the real reason you did
something unless it is useful to do so’; and ‘The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught.’ At the same time, individuals with high scores on this measure tend to disagree with statements such as ‘Honesty is the best policy in all cases’; ‘Most people are basically good and kind’; and ‘Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.’

Significant correlations (in the −0.30 to −0.50 range) between Mach IV and Edwards’s (1957) Social Desirability Scale suggested the need to develop a measure of Machiavellianism that was relatively free from a social desirability/undesirability bias. The development of the Mach V, a forced-choice version of the Mach IV that pitted the endorsement of each Machiavellian statement against that of a buffer statement having a comparable level of social desirability, appeared to answer this need. Because scores on the Mach IV and Mach V proved to be highly correlated (r’s fell in the 0.60 to 0.70 range), Christie and his co-workers used scores on both of these measures to classify the individuals selected for most of their own validation research. Correlations of the Mach IV and Mach V scales with other measures indicate that Machiavellianism is unrelated to intellectual ability, psychopathology, or political preference and ideology. On the other hand, the data clearly indicate that Machiavellianism is related to a negative or cynical view of human nature.

Behavioral Manifestations of Machiavellianism

Are individuals who endorse Machiavelli’s philosophy of interpersonal manipulation more manipulative in their own interpersonal behavior than individuals who do not endorse such attitudes and beliefs? Research conducted by Christie, Geis, and other investigators has revealed that high-Mach individuals have a greater capacity for interpersonal manipulation and exploitation than have low-Mach individuals. This research has also shed light on some of the specific tactics high Machs use to advance their own interests at others’ expense.

One major difference between high and low Machs concerns their susceptibility to social pressure and influence. In comparison with low Machs, high Machs exhibit less opinion change in counterattitudinal advocacy situations (e.g., Epstein, 1969; Feiler, 1967), are more resistant to confessing complicity in a confederate’s cheating (Exline et al., 1970), and are more suspicious of others’ motives and definitions of the situation (e.g., Bogart et al., 1970). On the other hand, high Machs seem to be more adept than low Machs at influencing others by imposing their own definition and structure on interpersonal activities. They are more likely than low Machs to take over leadership functions and to mobilize resources in relatively unstructured groups (Geis, 1968; Geis, Krupat, and Berger, 1965), to persuade others to form coalitions with them (Geis, 1964, 1970) or to engage in unpleasant activities (Braginski, 1966), and to win debates when instructed to defend their own private beliefs (Novielli, 1968). High Machs also appear to differ from low Machs in their capacity for improvisational behavior. They can generate more innovative ways to disrupt another person’s performance (Geis, Christie, and Nelson, 1970), can bluff or lie more successfully in ambiguous situations (e.g., Exline et al., 1970; Geis and Moon, 1981, Nachamie, 1969), and appear to have a better sense of timing when they make exploitive moves in a competitive game situation (Geis, 1964, 1970).

The Psychology of Interpersonal Manipulation

Differences in the psychological orientations of high-versus low-Mach individuals contribute directly to our understanding of the psychology of interpersonal manipulation. From a psychological standpoint high Machs are characterized as being cool and detached. They are less likely than low Machs to become emotionally involved with other people (Durkin, 1970), with value-laden issues (Geis, Weinheimer, and Berger, 1970), or with attempts to save their own face in embarrassing situations (Exline et al., 1970). Although high Machs are apparently as emotionally sensitive as low Machs at the physiological level (Oksenberg, 1964), they exert more control over the public expression of their emotional states (Exline et al., 1970; Nachamie, 1969) and are better able to keep their covert feelings from affecting their overt behavior (Geis, 1964, 1970; Geis, Weinheimer, and Berger, 1970). The manipulative success of high Machs appears to be greatly facilitated by their cool, detached attitude. This psychological detachment not only reduces their susceptibility to the kind of social pressure that has an emotional (as opposed to a strictly rational) basis but also frees them “to focus on explicit, cognitive definitions of the situation and concentrate on strategies for winning” (Christie and Geis, 1970, p. 312). Indeed, the psychological detachment of high Machs appears to be so extreme that they are able to disregard even their own feelings, behaviors, beliefs, and self-images if the awareness of these elements might hinder them in the attainment of their goals.

The psychological orientation of low Machs is essentially the reverse of that characteristic of high Machs. In
instead of being cool and detached, low Machs are "soft
touches" (Christie and Geis, 1970, pp. 194–313). They
are highly influenceable and are frequently willing to do
what another person wants simply because he or she
wants it. Unlike high Machs, who can treat others as ob-
jects by disregarding their personal characteristics, feel-
ings, and other dispositions when they deem them to be
antithetical or irrelevant to achieving their goals, low
Machs tend to see other people as unique individuals and
respond to each of them in a unique and personal way
(Durkin, 1970). Because low Machs tend to become
highly involved with others, they feel more obliged than
high Machs do to reciprocate commitments that others
have made and to avoid taking advantage of others when
it is possible to do so (Geis, 1964, 1970). Low Machs also
appear to be more concerned than high Machs about con-
siderations of fairness and conventional morality, but
because of their susceptibility to social pressure, they still
may be induced to behave immorally or in a manner con-
trary to their own or others' interest (Exline et al., 1970;

In summary, if the high-Mach individual is the prototypic con
man, the low-Mach individual appears to be the prototypic mark. The value implications of these
two contrasting personality types may not be clear-cut;
however, as Christie and Geis (1970) have pointed out.
The high Machs' socially undesirable propensity for
exploiting and manipulating others may be countered by
their resistance to the more nonrational forms of social
pressure and by their seemingly "greater insight into and
honesty about themselves" (Christie and Geis, 1970, p.
339). By the same token, the low Machs' socially desir-
able capacity for empathic involvement with others may
be qualified by their apparent gullibility and inability to
avoid being exploited. Christie and Geis have speculated
that people in our culture may be becoming more
Machiavellian over time, as evidenced by an increase in
the mean scores on the Mach IV and Mach V scales in the
years since these measures were constructed. The advan-
tages and disadvantages to individuals and to society of
this change in interpersonal orientation have yet to be de-
termined, however.

**ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE
DISPOSITIONAL STRATEGY**
The representative examples just reviewed indicate that
there do indeed exist domains of social behavior within
which it is possible to identify individuals who character-
istically manifest the regularities and consistencies in
social behavior that are thought to reflect the operation
of underlying dispositional influences. When used effec-
tively, the application of the dispositional strategy in
these behavioral domains may constitute a two-stage
bootstrapping process. In the first stage of this process
contrasting personality types are identified, types who
presumably differ in the regularity and consistency with
which they display behaviors characteristic of the do-
main in question. Work conducted during this stage con-
cerns the development of an assessment instrument or
procedure, the refinement of such a measure, and subse-
quent attempts to establish its reliability and validity
through appropriate empirical tests. If the work
conducted during this assessment and validation stage is
successful, a second, bootstrapping stage begins in which
the newly validated measure is now used to expand the
researchers' conception of the particular social psychol-
ogical phenomenon that the measure was designed to
address.

In the bootstrapping stage, researchers are not con-
tent with merely validating their personality measure in
terms of criterion behaviors that have been specified a
priori (demonstrating, for example, that high Machs
manipulate others more often than low Machs in com-
petitive game situations). Instead, they explore a range of
previously unexamined behaviors to determine the
boundary conditions for the social psychological phe-
nomenon of interest or to examine the processes underly-
ing the phenomenon at a level of detail not permitted by
the relatively simplistic conception that guided the re-
searchers' earlier validation work. Thus Machiavellian-
ism researchers—once having established that their per-
sonality measures could reliably and validly identify
classes of individuals who were or were not predisposed
to manipulate others—subsequently began to study
other, previously noncriterial behaviors displayed by
these two classes of individuals to determine exactly how
such interpersonal manipulation was effected. In so
doing, they discovered previously unrecognized differ-
ences between high Machs and low Machs in their
improvisational skills, sense of timing, and degree of
detachment from emotional involvements, and thereby
expanded their conception of the process of interperon-
al manipulation as well as their understanding of the
manipulative personality.

As the example of Machiavellianism suggests, the
results of the bootstrapping process can be quite impres-
sive when the process is successfully realized. However, a
number of potential problems with and limitations of the
dispositional strategy may combine to make the realiza-
tion of this process more difficult in practice than in principle. These possible problems and limitations provide the basis for most of the criticisms that may be directed at the dispositional strategy—criticisms that may implicate both the theory underlying the strategy and the methods used to implement it.

**Conceptual and Theoretical Critique**

**The approach as relatively atheoretical and tautological.** The major theoretical criticism that may be applied to the dispositional strategy is that it is not theoretical enough. The implicit logic underlying this strategy, as we already have seen, is that one way to study the phenomena and processes of concern to social psychologists is to first identify individuals who regularly and consistently manifest those phenomena and processes in their behavior. Once these individuals have been identified, their behavior can be studied in a controlled, detailed manner. Their behavior also can be contrasted with the behavior of individuals who have been identified as rarely or never manifesting the phenomena or processes in question. Through such investigations the researcher may gain important insights regarding the natural occurrence of the phenomenon of interest, the processes that underlie it, and the respective psychologies of the contrasting personality types who very frequently or who only rarely manifest it.

This dispositional strategy tends, however, to be rather atheoretical almost by definition. The researcher who adopts this strategy need not start with a theory of the phenomenon of interest and then proceed to test it directly. Instead, often in a virtual admission of ignorance, the researcher may begin by simply trying to identify individuals who, by their own self-reports or the reports of others, frequently manifest the phenomenon in their own behavior. Although the researcher's successful identification and subsequent study of such individuals (and their contrasting counterparts) may indeed lead to the inductive development of a well-articulated theory regarding the phenomenon of interest, it is important to note that such theory typically is the endpoint of the application of the dispositional strategy and not its starting point.

Moreover, to the extent that the investigator initially is ignorant regarding the behavioral manifestations of the phenomenon in question, he or she may establish an overly narrow or even quasi-tautological relationship between the personality dimension of interest and the behavioral phenomenon to which it is intended to correspond. For example, a researcher who desires to study the phenomenon of conversational dominance may know little or nothing about the behavioral manifestations of this phenomenon except for one relevant behavior—the vocal intensity or “loudness” of the participants' verbalizations. If the researcher therefore developed a personality measure of conversational dominance comprised of items tapping this and only this aspect of the phenomenon, the researcher's subsequent validation work might reveal that individuals who score at the extremes of this measure differ only in how loud they talk when conversing with others and do not differ in any other respects. The researcher might then conclude that conversational dominance is based only on who talks loudest during a conversation, a conclusion that may be not only overly narrow but also virtually tautological from a conceptual standpoint.

But, one might argue, if the loudness variable is highly correlated with other behavioral indices of conversational dominance, such as talking more often and/or longer than others, interrupting more frequently, giving rather than receiving advice, directions, opinions, the researcher might discover differences in these other behaviors during the bootstrapping phase of the research. Although the researcher's conception of conversational dominance probably would be broadened in such a case, in other cases this outcome might fail to occur. For example, if the researcher does not have the insight to test for differences in these other variables (a distinct possibility given the researcher's initial ignorance of them), or if these variables indeed are all manifestations of conversational dominance but are uncorrelated or only weakly intercorrelated (also a distinct possibility whenever behaviors are functionally equivalent such that one can be substituted for another), the researcher still may reach the premature and overly narrow conclusion that conversational dominance is nothing more or less than one person talking louder than another person in conversation. As this example indicates, although bootstrapping often may broaden the investigator's conceptualization of the phenomenon of interest, there is no guarantee that it always will do so.

We suggest that the dispositional strategy will be applied most successfully when researchers begin their endeavors with some fairly sound and well-articulated theorizing about the various behavioral manifestations of the phenomenon of interest, construct and validate behaviorally an instrument or procedure of personality
assessment that taps the full range of these behaviors, and use their insight, intuition, and observational skills to test for differences on other, previously noncriterial behaviors during the bootstrapping phase of the research. By resisting an overly narrow conceptualization during the first (assessment and validation) stage, and by further broadening this conceptualization through creative extensions during the second (bootstrapping) stage, investigators can reduce the possibility that the dispositional strategy will frustrate their quest for understanding by leading them—in a circular, near-tautological manner—right back to their starting point.

The approach as overemphasizing dispositional factors and underemphasizing situational ones. The theoretical criticism that most readily be made of the dispositional strategy is that it gives too much emphasis to dispositional factors and not enough explicit emphasis to situational ones. This criticism implies that the dispositional strategy is relatively atheoretical not only with regard to the processes underlying the social psychological phenomenon of interest but also with regard to the types of situations in which the phenomenon is or is not likely to occur. This criticism is an important and many-faceted one, with numerous implications for the study of personality and social behavior. We consider some of these implications now, but we will reserve our consideration of others until we have developed an appropriate theoretical framework in which to discuss them.

There are two ways to respond to the criticism that the dispositional approach neglects the impact of situational influences on social behavior. One way to respond is to adopt alternative strategies to the study of personality and social behavior that give explicit attention to situational factors. And, indeed, we shortly will turn to discussions of the two major alternatives to the dispositional strategy. The other way to respond to this criticism, however, is to attempt to modify the dispositional strategy so that it can accommodate (at least implicitly) these concerns without requiring the researcher to forsake the logic and essential character of the dispositional strategy. In essence, this modification requires the identification, measurement, and validation of personality dispositions that are assumed to be specific to a particular situation or to a class of situations.

For example, the general disposition of anxiety could be subdivided into more situation-specific categories such as test anxiety, anxiety in social situations, or anxiety about future events. By focusing on dispositions that are restricted a priori to a specific class of situations, the researcher can presumably develop personality measures having a higher degree of predictive validity than measures that are not tied to particular sets of situations. Moreover, by developing and validating a number of different measures of the disposition—each specific to a different class of situations—the research can employ the full battery of these measures in research designed to identify the person × situation interactions that may typify most human social behavior.

Note, however, that this modification of the dispositional strategy requires that a large number of specific dispositions be identified, assessed, and validated (i.e., as many as the number of situational variants into which the more general disposition may be subdivided). This proliferation of dispositions often may frustrate the theorist's desire for theoretical parsimony and even may introduce an unwarranted degree of specificity in those cases in which a more general dispositional measure would yield an equivalent or superior level of predictive validity. The other side of this problem is experienced by the researcher who pursues the modified dispositional strategy only to discover that a situation-specific personality measure is still not specific enough or that it is not feasible to develop an assessment instrument of the desired level of specificity. Given these concerns, the researcher's decision to employ the situation-specific dispositional strategy should reflect a careful weighing of its potential gains in terms of predictive validity and person × situation specificity against its potential costs in terms of the loss of theoretical parsimony and the difficulty of conducting the necessary empirical work.

Methodological and Empirical Critique
The major methodological criticisms that potentially concern the dispositional strategy also reflect the relatively atheoretical nature of this approach. The first of these possible criticisms concerns the inadequate operational definition of consistency in the study of dispositional based behavior. The second possible criticism concerns the apparent failure of the dispositional strategy to account for much of the variability in the behaviors that have been studied.

The approach as failing to provide an adequate operational definition of consistency. The dispositional strategy is based on the assumption that some meaningful amount of the regularity and consistency in social
behavior is due to relatively stable and enduring propensities that reside within individuals. However, some confusion and disagreement long has been apparent regarding the appropriate criteria by which such regularity and consistency in social behavior should be defined [e.g., see Block’s (1968) analysis of the differences between phenotypic and genotypic consistency]. Unfortunately, the rudimentary logic underlying the dispositional strategy offers no clear basis for resolving this issue, but some resolution has begun to emerge from critical appraisals of the empirical literature. For example, Magnusson and Endler (1977) have reviewed the disagreements surrounding the operational definition of consistency and have summarized a number of important distinctions that have emerged from this controversy.

First, Magnusson and Endler have proposed that personality theorists and researchers need to distinguish between two categories of consistency, each associated with a different level of analysis. At the level of the process(es) that presumably precede and give rise to overt behavior (the mediating level), the investigator may be concerned with consistency in terms of the mediating variables that determine which behavioral reactions are displayed. At the level of overt behavior (the reaction level) the investigator may be concerned with consistency in terms of the behavioral variables that are measured and recorded.

Second, with regard to consistency at the behavioral reaction level, Magnusson and Endler (1977) have noted that the concept of consistency has been used in at least three different ways:

1. *Absolute consistency*, which is in evidence when “an individual displays a certain type of behavior to the same extent across situations... Its counterpart is individual variability, and it can be studied directly for one individual at a time” (Magnusson and Endler, 1977, p. 7). Operationally, it is defined for a specified behavioral variable by a distribution of ipsative data for that variable, collected from the responses of a single individual across situations (e.g., Bem and Allen, 1974; Zanna, Olson, and Fazio, 1980).

2. *Relative consistency*, which is in evidence when “the rank order of a set of individuals with respect to a certain behavior is stable across situations” (Magnusson and Endler, 1977, p. 7). It can be studied only by examining the behaviors of groups of individuals who are tested across different situations, and it is the type of consistency that typically has been examined in empirical studies of trait-behavior consistency.

3. *Coherence*, “which refers to behavior that is inherently lawful and predictable without necessarily being stable in either absolute or relative terms as discussed above” (Magnusson and Endler, 1977, p. 7). The emphasis here is on distinctive patterns of behavior that are both meaningful and predictable on an individual basis, despite their lack of stability in absolute (variability) or relative (rank-order) terms.

Although the dispositional strategy itself makes no clear-cut operational assumptions about consistency at the behavioral reaction level, most specific applications of the strategy appear to have been based on the operational assumptions of what Magnusson and Endler (1977) refer to as the *trait measurement model*. This measurement model specifically corresponds to trait psychology, a theoretical model of personality to which the dispositional strategy most typically has been applied. The assumptions of the trait measurement model, which are tied logically to trait psychology but not to the dispositional strategy per se, are that (1) a true trait score exists for each individual on a given personality dimension and (2) that a monotonic, linear relationship exists between individuals’ positions on personality dimensions and their positions on behavioral measures. From the combination of these two assumptions the prediction is derived that “there are stable rank orders of individuals across situations with respect to particular behaviors” (Magnusson and Endler, 1977, p. 13), i.e., that evidence will be found for *relative consistency*, as Magnusson and Endler have define it.

We have noted that the dispositional strategy itself is relatively atheoretical but that its use traditionally has been associated with the trait model of personality. Unfortunately, this association seems to have led many investigators to assume that the dispositional strategy is somehow equivalent to the trait model and, consequently, that it shares the assumptions of the corresponding trait measurement model as well as this model’s prediction of relative consistency. In fact, however, the dispositional strategy does not depend on the assumptions of any specific model of personality. Therefore it may be applied to the study of all types of dispositions, including those that cannot be conceptualized in terms of the trait model. Because the dispositional strategy can be
applied to dispositions compatible with other personality theories (e.g., cognitive, psychoanalytic), whose own measurement models may or may not coincide with the trait measurement model in their underlying assumptions or definitions of consistency, a relative consistency prediction will not always be appropriate when the dispositional strategy is employed. Thus the failure of this strategy to yield significant evidence of relative consistency need not always be seen as damning, since some dispositions will be interpretable only in terms of theories for which either absolute consistency or coherence results are implied, a point that has been made by, among others, Bem and Allen (1974), and Zanna, Olson, and Fazio (1980). For a more detailed discussion of this and related issues, the reader is referred to Magnusson and Endler's (1977) insightful analysis (see also Endler, 1982).

The approach as failing to account for much of the variance in social behavior. A number of influential critics have reviewed much of the personality literature that has employed the dispositional strategy and have concluded that dispositions account for only a small portion of the variance in human social behavior (e.g., Argyle and Little, 1972; Bem, 1972; Bowers, 1973; Fiske, 1974; Mischel, 1968, 1973; Peterson, 1965, 1968; Sarason, Smith, and Diener, 1975). Thus Mischel (1968), for example, has reviewed diverse sources of evidence that seemed to suggest that measures of consistency in personality (whether they are measures of consistency between test and non-test manifestations of traits or measures of behavioral consistency across situations) seldom yield correlations higher than 0.30. The implications of this state of affairs for the dispositional strategy seemed rather devastating: Dispositions would, in general, be expected to exhibit only weak predictive validity and only weak consistency across situations.

These conclusions recently have come under considerable scrutiny. One of the most intense responses has come from Epstein (1977, 1979), who has argued (and claimed to have demonstrated) that Mischel's "personality coefficients" of 0.30 are largely artifacts of unreliable measurement. According to this argument, because most of the studies on which these "low-consistency" conclusions were based employed single-occasion measures of behavior for which the error of measurement is extreme, the indices of predictive validity and stability obtained in these studies were necessarily of low magnitude. In a series of four studies Epstein (1979) demonstrated that when the error of measurement was reduced by averaging over a large sample of behaviors, measures of stability yielded very high values, frequently in the 0.80 to 0.90 range. Moreover, these measures yielded some evidence of enhanced predictive validity (but see also Mischel and Peake, 1982). A theoretical extension of this reasoning proposed by Jaccard (1977) supported the earlier observation by Hartshorne and May (1928, 1930) that prediction can be substantially improved by averaging across several different behavioral manifestations of the disposition being studied. For another demonstration of the effects of aggregation, see Cheek (1982).

After citing numerous other research examples in which improving the measures' reliability dramatically enhanced prediction (e.g., Block, 1971, 1977; Block and Block, 1980; Fishbein and Azjen, 1974; Hartshorne and May, 1928, 1930; Jaccard, 1974; Olweus, 1977; Tryon, 1973), Epstein (1979) concluded that "error of measurement appears to be the crucial consideration in demonstrating stability in personality and in relating self-ratings and ratings by others to objective data" (p. 1121). In other words, "given an adequate sample of behavior to begin with, it should be possible to 'predict most of the people much of the time'" (Epstein, 1979, p. 1124). These conclusions, if valid, would appear to refute the criticism that the dispositional strategy cannot be used to account for a substantial portion of the variance in human social behavior.

However, before we assume that the dispositional strategy can be used to "predict most of the people much of the time," we should first consider the arguments proposed by adherents of the interactional strategy for the study of personality and social behavior. Many of these writers also have taken issue with claims about the lack of utility of the dispositional strategy; however, they have proposed that the stability and predictive validity of dispositions can be defended only some of the time—i.e., for some people in some situations, and then only for some dispositions and for some criteria behaviors.

THE INTERACTIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

The interactional strategy for the study of personality and social behavior is guided by a theoretical perspective that assumes that a considerable portion of the variance in social behavior is due to the interaction of personal dispositions with situational factors. An additional assump-
tion of this strategy is that certain moderating variables can be identified that distinguish those instances in which dispositions will predict social behavior from those instances in which they will not. The theoretical perspective of the interactional strategy is accompanied by an empirical orientation that seeks to discover which moderating variables interact with which dispositional and situational variables to determine social behavior within particular domains.

Historically, the interactional approach to the study of personality and social behavior emerged as the attempted synthesis of a dialectical tension between the dispositional approach (the original thesis) and the situationist movement that developed in reaction to it (the antithesis). In a recent review of these and other developments in personality, Cantor and Kihlstrom (1980) have traced the historical emergence of interactionism (see also Endler, 1982). Beginning with Lewin's (1935) dictum that behavior is a function of both the person and the environment, and continuing through the formulations of Murray (1938), Kelly (1955), and Neisser (1967), theorists have argued for a view of personality that assigns a central importance to the individual's interpretation of the events that he or she experiences. The individual's interpretation of these events is assumed, in all these theories, to reflect the combined influence of both dispositional and situational factors.

Although different meanings have been attributed to the term interactionism, the meaning on which we will focus is the meaning that has been called mechanistic interactionism (Magnusson and Endler, 1977) or statistical interactionism (Cantor and Kihlstrom, 1980). According to the definitions that have been offered, "the mechanistic (or statistical) meaning of interaction is connected with a mechanistic measurement model for interactional behavior." The mechanistic model "implies a distinction between independent and dependent variables" (Magnusson and Endler, 1977, p. 18; brackets ours), and is "modelled on the multidimensional analysis of variance or multivariate correlation" (Cantor and Kihlstrom, 1980). In addition, the interactions are construed as unidirectional: persons and environments are considered to jointly influence behavior, but the possibility of reciprocal, feedback relations among persons, settings, and behaviors—with each influencing the others—is not addressed openly" (Cantor and Kihlstrom, 1980). Magnusson and Endler (1977) have proposed further that when the mechanistic model is applied at the behavioral reaction level, it may be used to identify four different categories of statistical interactions:

1. Interactions between individuals and modes of response (behavioral reactions);
2. Interactions between individuals and situations;
3. Interactions between situations and modes of response;
4. Three-way interactions of individuals, modes of response, and situations.

We have chosen to focus on what has been termed mechanistic or statistical interactionism, and the body of research associated with it, for two reasons. The first reason is that most of the research that has been guided by an interactionist perspective has been based upon the mechanistic or statistical measurement model. This preference is probably due to the second reason for giving careful consideration to this approach: the conceptual parsimony and psychometric economy promised by its assumption of linearity and unidirectionality of the hypothesized causal relationships.

To provide a general theoretical framework for our review and discussion of relevant data, we must present our own conception of the mechanistic or statistical version of the interactional approach. Our conception is, in many respects, similar to that of Magnusson and Endler (1977), particularly in its incorporation of the four categories of statistical interaction that they have described. Our conception is somewhat broader than their conception, however, in that it incorporates additional categories of statistical interaction not included in their analysis. Any discussion of these categories depends directly on the concept of moderating variables, a concept that provides the starting point for our analysis.

The concept of moderating variables has emerged in the work of a number of personality theorists (e.g., Alker, 1972; Bowers, 1973; Cronbach, 1957; Endler, 1973, 1976; Endler and Magnusson, 1976). There are various ways to define this term, but we believe that a functional definition has the greatest theoretical utility. Functionally, moderating variables in personality research are variables that shift the cause of behavior from a situational locus to a dispositional one or vice versa. In most cases this shift in the causal locus of behavior will be accompanied by a corresponding shift in the focus of the individual's (i.e., actor's) attention. However, because the degree to which such attentional shifts are fully conscious is problematic (cf. Langer, 1978; Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Schank and Abelson, 1977), our conception makes no definite assumption about their causal ne-
cessity versus epiphenomenality with regard to the processes mediating overt behavior.

What are essential to our definition of moderating variables are the notions that cues for behavior are available from both dispositional and situational loci and that moderating variables shift the cause of behavior from one locus to the other. Although the precise mechanism by which such shifts are effected frequently may be attentional in nature (cf. Carver, 1979), we do not assume that it need always be. Thus we are arguing for a general conception of moderating variables whose functional definition does not require the specification of a single, universal mechanism by which the defining function is effected.

We believe that three major classes of moderating variables are relevant to the mechanistic or statistical interactional strategy. The variables within each of our three classes all fit the functional definition of moderating variables, since they all operate to shift the cause of behavior from a situational locus to a dispositional one or vice versa. Our three classes of moderating variables are as follows:

1. Those relating to the predictor (i.e., to the particular trait or disposition being studied).

2. Those relating to the criterion (i.e., to the particular overt behaviors to which the predictor is being applied).

3. Those relating to the link between the predictor and the criterion (i.e., categories of situations for whom and categories of individuals for which such links typically are present or absent).

We believe that moderating variables in the first of these classes answer the question "Which traits?" by specifying the types of traits or dispositions that will or will not be good predictors of behavior. We believe that moderating variables in the second class answer the question "Which behaviors?" by specifying the types of behaviors that traits and dispositions are or are not likely to predict. And we believe that moderating variables in the third class answer the questions "Which people?" and "Which situations?" by specifying for which types of people and in which types of situations a given trait or disposition will or will not predict its criterion behaviors (see Table 1).

Let us now examine separately the four questions that moderating variables may be used to answer: Which

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<td>Specify the types of traits and dispositions that will or will not be good</td>
<td>Self-reported consistency of the predictor</td>
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<td>variables</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criterion moderating</td>
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traits? Which behaviors? Which people? Which situations? Let us also consider some representative examples of attempts to provide answers, both theoretical and empirical, to these questions.

FEATURES OF THE PREDICTOR: THE QUESTION OF "WHICH TRAITS?"

Do there exist types of traits or dispositions that typically are good predictors of an individual's social behavior? Do there exist other types of traits or dispositions that typically are poor predictors of an individual's social behavior? If these contrasting types of predictors indeed do exist, by means of what procedures can they be identified? Two of the predictor moderating variables that have been proposed and whose empirical utility has been documented are the self-reported consistency of the predictor (e.g., Bem and Allen, 1974) and the self-reported observability of the predictor (e.g., Kenrick and Stringfield, 1980). We consider each of these predictor moderating variables in turn.

Self-Reported Consistency
In an empirical investigation of the disposition of friendliness, Bem and Allen (1974) asked individuals the question "How much do you vary from one situation to another in how friendly and outgoing you are?" They then used the answers to this question as a moderating variable to separate respondents into those who reported high consistency and those who reported low consistency in their characteristic levels of friendliness. This simple procedure proved to be quite successful in differentiating those individuals whose actual behavior in the domain of friendliness was predictable from their scores on personality measures of the trait of friendliness [e.g., the extraversion-introversion scale of the Eysenck Personality Inventory; Eysenck and Eysenck (1968)] from those individuals whose friendliness was not predictable from the same trait measures. For those individuals who had reported high consistency in the friendliness domain, the correlation between assessed extraversion and actual friendliness behavior \( r = 0.51 \) was substantially larger than was the same correlation for those individuals who had reported low consistency in the friendliness domain \( r = 0.31 \). Moreover, those individuals who had reported high consistency in the friendliness domain also manifested substantial cross-situational stability in their behavior in the friendliness domain; by contrast, those individuals who had reported low consistency in the friendliness domain manifested minimal cross-situational stability in their behavior in the friendliness domain.

Although Bem and Allen (1974) were not nearly so successful in their attempt to use self-reported consistency as a moderating variable in the domain of conscientiousness [others have experienced similar difficulties in applying the Bem-Allen approach to searching for cross-situational consistency in conscientiousness; e.g., Mischel and Peake (1981)], other investigators have documented the utility of self-reported consistency as a predictor moderating variable in a variety of trait domains (e.g., Cheek, 1982; Kenrick and Stringfield, 1980; Turner and Gilliland, 1979; Underwood and Moore, 1981).

Self-Reported Observability
In an empirical investigation of the origins of behavioral consistency in diverse trait domains, Kenrick and Stringfield (1980) had individuals rate the extent to which their behavior in each of sixteen trait domains was publicly observable or available to verification by outside observers. For example, in the trait domain of emotional/easily upset-calm/stable, these individuals answered the question "How publicly observable is your behavior on the emotional/stable dimension? (If it is easy for others to tell how emotional you are all or almost all of the time, mark a high number; if others can never or rarely tell how emotional you are, mark a low number, and so on)" on a seven-point scale.

These ratings of public observability proved to be effective in identifying those trait domains within which behavior is readily predicted from self-ratings on trait measures. For those trait domains in which individuals assigned themselves high ratings on public observability, behavioral consistency (e.g., \( r = 0.68 \) for self-elected trait domains) was reliably greater than it was for those trait domains in which individuals assigned themselves low ratings on public observability (e.g., \( r = 0.49 \) for self-elected trait domains). For another demonstration, see Cheek (1982).

On the Nature of Predictor Moderating Variables
Self-reported consistency and self-reported observability appear to be two effective procedures for identifying, on an individual-by-individual basis, those domains within which measures of traits and dispositions will serve as reliable predictors of actual behavior and within which substantial cross-situational stabilities in social behavior
will occur. Although some aspects of these procedures have been called into question (e.g., Lutsky, Peake, and Wray, 1978; Mischel and Peake, 1981; Rushton, Jackson, and Paunonen, 1981; Tellegen, Kamp, and Watson, 1982), these procedures do hold out the promise of identifying, for a given individual, those trait domains in which that individual will display the behavioral regularities of personality.

Why should self-reported consistency and self-reported observability function as predictor moderating variables? We suggest that their success derives, in part or in whole, from the fact that each procedure directly solicits evidence of requirements that of necessity must be fulfilled before behavior can and will be predictable from measures of traits and dispositions. Behavior must be stable from situation to situation before measures of traits and dispositions collected in one situation will predict behavioral measures of those traits and dispositions collected in other situations. And public actions must be meaningful reflections of private traits and dispositions before measures of traits and dispositions will predict behavioral manifestations of those traits and dispositions.

From this perspective what is impressive to us is that individuals are sufficiently knowledgeable about their consistency and observability in diverse trait domains and are sufficiently willing to accurately report this knowledge to permit the simple procedures of asking individuals about consistency and observability to reveal the domains within which behavioral consistencies are to be found. We suspect that the success of other attempts to identify predictor-moderating variables may very well depend on their ability to tap knowledge of other prerequisites for and manifestations of correspondence between actions and underlying traits, dispositions, and other personal characteristics.

FEATURES OF THE CRITERION: THE QUESTION OF "WHICH BEHAVIORS?"

Do there exist types of behaviors that are maximally predictable from measures of potentially relevant underlying traits and dispositions of the individual? Do there exist other types of behaviors that are only minimally predictable from measure of traits and dispositions? If these contrasting types of behavioral categories exist, by means of what procedures can they be identified? Two of the criterion moderating variables that have been suggested and whose empirical performance has been assessed are multiple-act (versus single-act) measures of the behavioral criterion (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen, 1974) and the prototypicality of the behavioral criterion (e.g., Buss and Craik, 1980). We consider each of these criterion moderating variables in its turn.

Multiple-Act Measures of the Behavioral Criterion

The logic of the procedure of constructing multiple-act measures of the behavioral criterion may be illustrated by the work of Fishbein and Ajzen (1974) on the prediction of behavior from measures of attitudes. In one study, these investigators provided college students with lists of 100 behaviors, each of which dealt with religious activities (e.g., praying before meals, taking religious courses for credit) and asked them to indicate which of the behaviors they had performed. Each of the 100 responses provided by each individual constitutes a single-act criterion. The sum of the entire collection of 100 responses constitutes a multiple-act criterion.

The researchers then attempted to predict specific religious behaviors from measures of religious attitudes. Here the correlations between attitudes toward religion and each single-act criterion were minimal (about 0.10). In contrast, the correlation between attitudes toward religion and the multiple-act measure of the criterion of religious behavior was substantial (over 0.60). Other demonstrations of the greater predictability of multiple-act criteria over single-act criteria have been provided by Epstein (1979, 1980), Werner (1978), and Wiegel and Newman (1975).

The utility of multiple-act measures of the behavioral criterion has been demonstrated not only in investigations of the relationship between attitudinal predictors and behavioral criteria but also in investigations of the predictive relationship between measures of personality traits and behavioral manifestations of those traits (e.g., Epstein, 1979; Jaccard, 1974; McGowan and Gormly, 1976). In one such investigation Jaccard (1974) examined the relationship between measures of individual differences in the trait of dominance and self-reports of forty dominant behaviors (e.g., winning arguments, controlling conversations, etc.). On the average, the correlation between assessed dominance and each of the forty single-act criterion behaviors was in the neighborhood of 0.20. However, the correlation between measured individual differences in the trait of dominance and the multiple-act criterion of dominant behaviors (formed by summing across the forty individual self-reported behaviors) was
in the neighborhood of .60. Clearly, the multiple-act measure of the behavioral criterion outperformed the single-act measures (see Ajzen, 1982).

**Prototypicality of the Behavioral Criterion**

Although multiple-act measures of the behavioral criterion seem, in general, to outperform single-act measures, we nevertheless can identify certain single-act measures of the behavioral criterion that are better predicted from measures of stable traits and enduring dispositions than are other single-act measures of the behavioral criterion. Consider the empirical demonstration conducted by Buss and Craik (1980), who sought to predict behavioral dominance (i.e., the performance of behaviors thought to reflect and manifest dominance, such as issuing orders and controlling meetings) from dispositional dominance (i.e., psychometric measures of the personality disposition of dominance, such as those from the California Psychological Inventory and the Personality Research Form).

In their demonstration Buss and Craik (1980) found that specific self-reported behavioral acts of dominance were predictable from dispositional measures of dominance to the extent that those behavioral acts were prototypic of (i.e., best examples of, clearest cases of, central members of) the category of dominance. Behavioral acts that were high in their prototypicality of the category of dominance (e.g., monopilizing the conversation, taking command of the situation) were well predicted from psychometric measures of the disposition of dominance. For example, for males the correlation between scores on the dominance scale of the Jackson Personality Research Form and acts in the top quartile of prototypicality of self-reported dominant acts was 0.67. In contrast, behavioral acts that were low in their prototypicality of the category of dominance (e.g., flattering someone in order to get someone out on a date) were poorly predicted from the psychometric measures of the disposition of dominance. For example, for females the correlation between scores on the dominance scale of the California Psychological Inventory and acts in the bottom quartile of prototypicality of self-reported dominant acts was 0.05. In subsequent research Buss and Craik (1981) have replicated their findings for dominance and extended their approach to the successful prediction of self-reported prototypic acts of aloofness and of gregariousness (but not of submissiveness) from measures of relevant dispositions. In addition, Mischel and Peake (1981) have assessed the contribution of behavioral prototypicality to the temporal stability of behavioral indices of conscientiousness.

**On the Nature of Criterion Moderating Variables**

As criterion moderating variables, both multiple-act measures of the behavioral criterion and the prototypicality of the behavioral criterion may be used to identify those behaviors that are well predicted from measures of relevant traits and dispositions. True, most of the empirical evidence that has been offered in support of the utility of each of these criterion-moderating variables has involved only self-reports of the behavioral criteria under examination. Moreover, the prediction of self-reports of behavior may be more easily accomplished than the prediction of actual behavioral activities. Nevertheless, the potential of each criterion moderating variable seems to have been demonstrated.

Why should multiple-act measures of the behavioral criterion and the prototypicality of the behavioral criterion each perform well as criterion moderating variables? At the very least, multiple-act criteria may succeed because they provide more reliable samples of the behavioral domain than do single-act criteria. Also, prototypic measures of the behavioral criterion may succeed because they provide more valid measures of the behavioral domain than do nonprototypic measures. From this perspective any and all procedures that augment the reliability and validity of the assessment of behavioral criteria also should enhance the extent to which those behavioral criteria can be predicted from measures of relevant traits, dispositions, attitudes, and other characteristics of the individual. Although this conclusion may seem to go almost without saying, only recently have the implications of this conclusion begun to be systematically explored.

**FEATURES OF THE INDIVIDUAL: THE QUESTION OF “WHICH PEOPLE?”**

Do there exist categories of individuals who typically manifest the regularities and consistencies of personality in their social behavior, individuals whose social behavior is predictable from measures of their traits, dispositions, attitudes, and other personal attributes? Do there exist other categories of individuals whose social behavior is not predictable from such measures but instead is particularly sensitive to situational and interpersonal influences? If these contrasting categories of relatively
dispositional behaviors and relatively situational individuals exist, by means of what personal moderating variables can they be identified?

There have been many theoretical and empirical attempts to identify contrasting categories of relatively dispositional individuals and relatively situational individuals. Among the personal moderating variables that have been investigated are action control (Kuhl, 1981), anxiety (Grooms and Endler, 1960), ascription of responsibility (Schwartz, 1973), defensiveness (Kogan and Wallach, 1964), empathy (Hogan, 1969; Mills and Hogan, 1978), locus of control (Phares, 1976; Rotter, 1966), neuroticism (Endler, 1973), personal identity (Cheek, 1982; Hogan and Cheek, in press), psychological androgyny (Bem, 1975), repression-sensitization (Byrne, 1964), self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss, 1975), and self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974). Representative of programmatic attempts to identify such individuals are theory and research on self-monitoring (for a review, see Snyder, 1979b) and theory and research on self-consciousness (for reviews, see Buss, 1980; Carver and Scheier, 1981).

Self-Monitoring

According to the theoretical formulation of self-monitoring (Snyder, 1979b), an individual in a social setting actively attempts to construct a pattern of social behavior appropriate to that particular context. Diverse sources of information are available to guide this choice, including cues to situational or interpersonal specifications of appropriateness and information about inner states, personal dispositions, and social attitudes. Furthermore, according to the self-monitoring formulation, individuals differ in the extent to which they rely on either source of information in regulating their behavior in social contexts.

For those individuals who monitor and regulate their behavioral choices on the basis of situational information (high self-monitoring individuals), the impact of situational and interpersonal cues to social appropriateness ought to be considerable. These individuals ought to demonstrate considerable situation-to-situation specificity in their social behavior. Moreover, for these high self-monitoring individuals the correspondence between social behavior and underlying traits, dispositions, attitudes, and other personal attributes ought to be minimal.

By contrast, and of particular relevance to the search for categories of individuals who characteristically manifest the regularities and consistencies of personality in their social behavior, individuals who monitor or guide their behavioral choices on the basis of information from relevant inner states (low self-monitoring individuals) ought to be less responsive to situational and interpersonal specifications of behavioral appropriateness. Their social behavior ought to manifest substantial cross-situational consistency and temporal stability. Furthermore, for these low self-monitoring individuals the covariation between social behavior and underlying traits, dispositions, attitudes, and other personal attributes ought to be substantial.

Empirical evidence has provided documentation for these theoretical propositions (for reviews, see Snyder, 1979a, 1979b). Individual differences in self-monitoring are measured by the Self-Monitoring Scale, an internally consistent and temporally stable set of twenty-five true-false, self-descriptive statements [for details of the psychometric construction of the Self-Monitoring Scale, as well as demonstrations of its convergent and discriminant validity, see Snyder (1974)]. High self-monitoring individuals (who endorse such Self-Monitoring Scale items as “When I am uncertain how to act in social situations, I look to the behavior of others for cues”; “In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons”; and “In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what other people expect me to be rather than anything else”) are both attentive and responsive to situational specifications of behavioral appropriateness. Accordingly, their self-presentational social behaviors manifest considerable situation-to-situation specificity (e.g., Caldwell and O’Reilly, 1982; Danheiser and Graziano, 1982; Lippa, 1976, 1978a; Rarick, Soldow, and Geizer, 1976; Shaffer, Smith, and Tomarello, 1982; Snyder and Monson, 1973). Moreover, these individuals typically manifest minimal consistency between their social behavior and potentially relevant underlying personal attributes (e.g., Snyder and Swann, 1976; Snyder and Tanke, 1976).

By contrast, the social behavior of low self-monitoring individuals [who endorse such Self-Monitoring Scale items as “My behavior is usually an expression of my true feelings, attitudes, and beliefs”; “I can only argue for ideas which I already believe”; and “I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) to please someone else or to win their favor”] characteristically manifest the consistencies and regularities in social behavior that constitute personality. In contrast to the
Social behavior of high self-monitoring individuals, that of low self-monitoring individuals is rarely molded and tailored to fit their situational surroundings (e.g., Snyder and Monson, 1975). Moreover, we have good reason to believe that low self-monitoring individuals manifest marked situation-to-situation stability and consistency in their social behavior in such behavioral domains as altruism, honesty, and self-restraint (e.g., Snyder and Monson, 1975), as well as within the domain of nonverbal behaviors expressive of, for example, sociability, anxiety, and sex role identity (e.g., Lippa, 1976, 1978a, 1978b; Lippa and Mash, 1979).

Additional evidence suggests that low self-monitoring individuals display considerable temporal stability in their behavior (e.g., Luksy, Woodworth, and Clayton, 1980). Furthermore, low self-monitoring individuals typically manifest substantial correspondence between their private attitudes and intentions and their public behaviors and actions (e.g., Ajzen, Timko, and White, 1981; Becherer and Richard, 1978; Luksy, Woodworth, and Clayton, 1980; Snyder, 1982; Snyder and Kendzierski, 1982a; Snyder and Swann, 1976; Snyder and Tanke, 1976; Zanna and Olson, 1982; Zanna, Olson, and Fazio, 1980; Zuckerman and Reis, 1978), between mood states and self-presentation (e.g., Ickes, Layden, and Barnes, 1978), between various personality attributes and corresponding expressive behaviors (e.g., Lippa, 1978a, 1978b; Lippa, Valdez, and Jolly, 1979), and between self-ratings on diverse personality dimensions and ratings by their acquaintances (Tunnell, 1980). This correspondence between personal attributes and social behavior is accompanied by (and may be a reflection of) low self-monitoring individuals’ particularly well-articulated knowledge of their characteristic selves within a wide variety of domains of self-conception (e.g., Snyder and Cantor, 1980). Evidently, when it comes to correspondence between private dispositions and public actions, low self-monitoring individuals seem to constitute one category of individuals who characteristically manifest the regularities and consistencies that constitute personality.

Of what consequence are the differing behavioral orientations of high self-monitoring individuals and low self-monitoring individuals? In regulating their social behavior, high self-monitoring individuals are relatively situationally guided individuals. They are particularly sensitive to social and interpersonal cues to situational appropriateness; however, their attitudes and behaviors are virtually uncorrelated with each other. To predict and understand their actions, one would seek information about characteristics of their situations. It is as if the psychology of high self-monitoring individuals is the psychology of their social situations and interpersonal surroundings.

By contrast, in regulating their social behavior, low self-monitoring individuals are relatively dispositionally guided individuals. Their social behavior typically is a reflection of corresponding social attitudes, affective states, and personal dispositions. At the same time they are relatively unresponsive to situational specifications of behavioral appropriateness. Accordingly, one would adopt a rather different strategy for understanding the social behavior of low self-monitoring individuals. One should be able to predict their future behavior from measures of relevant present attitudes, traits, and dispositions. It is as if the psychology of low self-monitoring individuals is the psychology of their attitudes, dispositions, and other salient and relevant inner states.

Self-Consciousness
Another category of individuals whose social behavior often reflects corresponding personal characteristics are those who are high in private self-consciousness, as identified by their relatively high scores on the private-self-consciousness factor of the Self-Consciousness Scale developed by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975). According to Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss, “the consistent tendency of persons to direct attention inward or outward is the trait of self-consciousness” (1975, p. 522). To measure this trait, they constructed a twenty-three-item inventory that elicits self-reports of behaviors and experiences within three domains: private self-consciousness (ten items that assess attention to one’s inner thoughts and feelings; e.g., “I reflect about myself a lot”), public self-consciousness (seven items that assess awareness of the self as a social object; e.g., “I’m self-conscious about the way I look”), and social anxiety (six items that assess discomfort in the presence of others; e.g., “It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations”). Scores on the private-self-consciousness, public-self-consciousness, and social anxiety factors of the inventory have been shown to be relatively independent of each other (Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss, 1975; Turner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes, 1978).

For our present purpose the private-self-consciousness factor of the inventory is of particular importance. High scorers on the private-self-consciousness factor assert that “I’m always trying to figure myself out” and “I’m constantly examining my motives.” At the same
time they deny that "generally, I'm not very aware of myself" and "I never scrutinize myself." The private-self-consciousness factor possesses considerable temporal stability (Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss, 1975) and internal consistency (Turner, 1978). For evidence of the validity of the private-self-consciousness factor as a measure of the propensity to direct one's attention inward toward and to reflect upon one's own inner thoughts, feelings, and other personal attributes, see Buss (1980), Carver and Scheier (1978) and Hull and Levy (1979). For evidence of its discriminant validity, see Carver and Glass (1976) and Turner et al. (1978).

The outcomes of diverse empirical investigations suggest that high scorers on the private-self-consciousness factor of the Self-Consciousness Scale are individuals whose social behavior is particularly responsive to their enduring dispositional properties and to their transient affective states. Within the domain of enduring dispositional properties, Scheier, Buss, and Buss (1978) have reported that the correlation between measured aggressive dispositions and observed aggressive behaviors is substantially larger for individuals high in private self-consciousness than for individuals low in private self-consciousness. Similarly, Turner (1978) has reported that measures of the dispositional dominance are substantially better predictors of the behavioral expression of dominance for individuals high in private self-consciousness than for individuals low in private self-consciousness (although in this investigation individuals low in public self-consciousness also manifested substantial covariation between dispositional dominance and behavioral dominance).

Within the domain of transient affective states, Scheier (1976) has demonstrated that, following provocation, angry individuals who are high in private self-consciousness display more behavioral manifestations of their anger than individuals who are low in private self-consciousness. Similarly, Scheier and Carver (1977) have shown that individuals high in private self-consciousness are more responsive to a variety of transient affective states (e.g., the mildly positive and the mildly negative affects produced by observing pleasant and unpleasant slides) than are individuals low in private self-consciousness.

Evidently, individuals who are chronically attentive to their dispositional properties and affective states also are individuals whose social behavior characteristically reflects their dispositional properties and their affective states. Clearly, these individuals who are high in private self-consciousness constitute another category of individuals whose social behavior typically reflects corresponding personal characteristics. To the extent, then, that one examines the social behavior of these individuals, one should witness the regularities and consistencies that are thought to constitute personality. In particular, one ought to be able to predict their behavior from knowledge of their attitudes, affective states, traits, and dispositions.

On the Nature of Personal Moderating Variables
With the aid of personal moderating variables such as self-monitoring and private self-consciousness, one can identify categories of individuals whose social behavior characteristically reflects relevant underlying dispositions, attitudes, and other personal attributes (i.e., relatively dispositional individuals) and other categories of individuals whose social behavior is particularly sensitive to situational influences (i.e., relatively situational individuals). The successful identification of such categories of individuals permits the specification of when predictions of the dispositional determination of social behavior will be confirmed and when predictions of the situational determination of social behavior will be confirmed. But from the perspective of theory and research on personal-moderating variables, if one does not distinguish between the categories of relatively dispositional individuals and relatively situational individuals, the ability of either dispositional or situational variables to predict social behavior will be considerably diminished.

In investigations of the moderating influences of self-monitoring, for example, the relationships between dispositional predictors and social behavior typically have been of, at best, modest magnitude. So too have been the relationships between situational predictors and social behavior. Only by considering the moderating influences of self-monitoring has it been possible to identify that category of individuals for whom dispositional predictors of social behavior perform well (i.e., low self-monitoring individuals) and that category of individuals for whom situational predictors of social behavior perform well (i.e., high self-monitoring individuals). In statistical terms, the moderating effects of self-monitoring appeared as interactions between self-monitoring and appropriate dispositional or situational predictor variables. More generally, the moderating influences of personal moderating variables appear as interactions with appropriate dispositional or situational independent variables.
What are some of the criteria that seem to characterize successful attempts to identify personal moderating variables? To the extent that we can generalize from the case of self-monitoring and from the case of private self-consciousness (two of the more extensively researched personal moderating variables), it would appear that a psychological construct will perform successfully as a personal moderating variable to the extent that it reliably and validly taps those processes by which information about the self and information about social situations are attended to and utilized in guiding social behavior. From this perspective, self-monitoring and private self-consciousness may succeed because their associated measuring instruments reliably and validly identify those individuals who believe, respectively, that “My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes, and beliefs” and “I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings,” and because these individuals live their lives according to the dictates of these critical aspects of their conceptions of self.

This is not to suggest that the measure of self-monitoring and the measure of private self-consciousness are identifying the same individuals. In fact, the correlation between the two measures is a very modest +0.15 (Turner et al., 1978), and the precise conceptual relations between the two constructs await a full and detailed specification (see Schneiderman, Webb, and Davis, 1981). Rather, we suggest only that self-monitoring and private self-consciousness both may have succeeded for the same reasons that we believe that any personal moderating variable will succeed. We believe that any personal moderating variable will succeed to the extent that it focuses on the person’s preferential attentiveness and responsiveness to dispositional or situational information as guides to action in particular behavioral domains. A precise demarcation of the behavioral domains appropriate to particular personal moderating variables (including self-monitoring and private self-consciousness) must await the availability of a more extensive catalogue of successful attempts to identify personal moderating variables.

**FEATURES OF THE SITUATION: THE QUESTION OF “WHICH SITUATIONS?”**

Do there exist types of situations in which measures of traits and dispositions will serve as particularly good predictors of individuals’ social behavior? Do there exist other types of situations in which such measures will fail to serve as good predictors of social behavior? If these contrasting types of situations indeed do exist, by means of what situational moderating variables can they be identified?

**Strong Versus Weak Situations**

Situational moderating variables, like the other types of moderating variables that we have reviewed, operate to shift the cause of behavior from a situational locus to a dispositional one or vice versa. Viewed in these terms, the most important situational moderating variable can be conceptualized as the “strength” versus “weakness” of situations as they are experienced by the individual. In general, psychologically “strong” situations tend to be those that provide salient cues to guide behavior and have a fairly high degree of structure and definition. In contrast, psychologically “weak” situations tend to be those that do not offer salient cues to guide behavior and are relatively unstructured and ambiguous. The distinction between strong and weak situations has been elaborated by Mischel (1977, p. 347):

Psychological “situations” (stimuli, treatment) are powerful to the degree that they lead everyone to construe the particular events in the same way, induce uniform expectancies regarding the most appropriate response pattern, provide adequate incentives for the performance of that response pattern and require skills that everyone has to the same extent.... Conversely, situations are weak to the degree that they are not uniformly encoded, do not generate uniform expectancies concerning the desired behavior, do not offer sufficient incentives for its performance, or fail to provide the learning conditions required for successful genesis of the behavior.

Because strong situations should shift the cause of behavior from a dispositional locus to a situational one, measures of traits and dispositions should typically predict behavior better in weak situations than in strong ones. The distinction between strong and weak situations has clear and important implications for the empirical study of personality and social behavior. As Mischel (1977) and Monson and Snyder (1977) have indicated, most clinical and experimental treatments are intended to be strong situations in which the influences of personality variables on behavior will be minimized, if not eliminat-
ed completely. The logic underlying this intent should be fairly obvious, at least in the case of experimental treatments. Because the experiment historically evolved as a procedure for “isolating and measuring the effects” of situational variables, its application in psychology typically has been one in which “the independent variable (a situational manipulation) is designed and programmed to occur in a fixed and constant fashion, independently of the behavior of the subject” (Monson and Snyder, 1977, p. 97).

A somewhat different perspective on the experiment as a strong situation is provided by writers who have analyzed social psychological experiments from a role theory perspective provided by sociology (e.g., Alexander and Knight, 1971; Alexander and Lauderdale, 1977; Touhey, 1974). These authors have proposed that many, if not most, social psychological experiments present the subject with a well-defined, highly structured situation containing salient cues that indicate the most socially desirable and situationally appropriate mode of responding. The experiment is seen as very much like a theatrical production having its own scenario, plot line, stage props, and actors. Of these actors (whose numbers at each session or “performance” may include one or more experimenters, confederates, and subjects), only the subjects’ lines and actions are not scripted in advance; all other parts are pre-scripted and relatively inflexible.

According to this view, the task of the subject in the experiment is to infer what role he or she is expected to play and then play it in the most appropriate and socially desirable manner possible. This task can be viewed either as one of selecting the most appropriate “situated identity” (Alexander and Knight, 1971; Alexander and Lauderdale, 1977) or “self-image” (Turner, 1968) to display in the situation, or as one of deciding which of many possible scripts should be enacted (Abelson, 1976; Langer, 1978; Schank and Abelson, 1977). In any case, the experiment is no longer regarded as a scientific context in which independent variables are manipulated and dependent variables measured. Instead, it is seen as a quasi-dramaturgical context in which one of the actors (the subject) is obliged to improvise his or her lines and actions in response to the pre-scripted lines and actions of the remaining actors and the settings in which these actions take place. Clearly, to the degree that such quasi-dramaturgical contexts constitute what we have called strong situations (i.e., are highly structured and un-

ambiguously scripted), all subjects should tend to respond to them in a fairly uniform manner. The influence of dispositional factors on behavior thus should be quite attenuated, if not eliminated completely, since the behavior is determined by the situation and not by the subjects’ own dispositions (cf. Ickes, 1978b, 1982, 1983a, in press a).

This type of strong-situation procedure makes sense when the researcher is attempting to study the impact of situational factors on behavior, since it ideally maximizes the variance in behavior due to the particular situational factor(s) under investigation while minimizing the “error” variance due to individual differences in personality. On the other hand, when the researcher is attempting to study the influences on behavior due to individual differences in personality, the strong-situation procedure of the experiment may often be highly inappropriate (Ickes, 1978a, 1978b, 1982, 1983a, in press a). Because the personality researcher presumably is interested in identifying the variance in behavior that is due to individual-difference factors, he or she generally should be very reluctant to employ strong-situation paradigms that treat such variance as experimental error and seek to minimize, if not eliminate, it.

Ironically, however, the most cursory examination of the published literature in personality suggests that the overwhelming majority of personality studies are conducted in highly structured, psychologically strong laboratory situations in which salient and relatively unambiguous cues are provided to guide behavior. Conversely, only a small minority of personality studies are conducted in psychologically weak, unstructured situations in which individuals are forced to rely primarily on their own internal traits and dispositions to guide their behavior. “The irony is that personality researchers, by carefully structuring their experimental situations, may thereby eliminate much of the same individual difference variance they are in fact purporting to study!” (Ickes, 1982, p. 333).

That the ostensible failure of personality factors to predict behavior might be due in part to the use of highly structured, strong situations is illustrated by a set of studies designed to identify the influence of personality and role-related variables on behavior occurring in an ambiguous and relatively unstructured interaction situation (Ickes, 1982, 1983a, in press a). In these studies two individuals with no past history of interaction are left alone together in a waiting room where they are free to interact
or not, as they choose. Because the individuals have not been instructed to interact, and because other external cues to guide their behavior are lacking, they essentially are forced to depend on internalized dispositions to guide their spontaneous interaction behavior.

The effectiveness of this paradigm in eliciting strong dispositional influences on social behavior has been demonstrated repeatedly in studies concerned with dispositional variables such as self-monitoring (Barnes and Ickes, 1979; Ickes and Barnes, 1977), gender and sex role orientation (Ickes, 1981, in press b; Ickes and Barnes, 1978; Ickes, Schermer, and Steeno, 1979; LaFrance and Ickes, 1981; Lamke and Bell, 1981), locus of control (Hajecki, Ickes, and Tanford, 1981), birth order (Ickes 1983b, Ickes and Turner, 1983), and the dispositional of whites to approach or avoid interaction with blacks (Ickes, in press c). The dispositional influences found in these studies are quite clearcut and powerful. They generally yield larger mean differences and F-ratios than those obtained in studies using more structured interaction paradigms (cf. Duncan and Fiske, 1977), and such differences are typically evident across a wide range of behavioral and self-report measures. Moreover, their generalizability to real-world social interaction is likely to be enhanced by the spontaneous, unconstrained nature of the behavior that is observed. For an overview of the research conducted with Ickes's unstructured interaction paradigm, and for a detailed discussion comparing the features of this paradigm with those of more traditional ones, see Ickes (1982, 1983a).

In addition to the findings of Ickes and his colleagues, the results of an independent line of research conducted by Monson and his colleagues (Monson, Hesley, and Chernick, 1982) have provided even more direct evidence that the relationship between trait and behavioral measures depends on the strength of situational pressures. In a questionnaire investigation, Monson, Hesley, and Chernick found that individual differences on the introversion-extraversion dimension correlated more highly with predicted behaviors when situational pressures were weak (r = +0.42) than when they were moderate (r = +0.32) or strong (r = +0.13). In a follow-up study examining actual behaviors, introversion-extraversion scores were found to predict behavior more effectively in a getting-acquainted conversation when situational pressures were weak (r = +0.63) than when there were either strong situational pressures encouraging introversion (r = +0.36) or strong situational pressures encouraging extraversion (r = +0.25).

In a more recent paper (Monson et al., 1983) Monson and his colleagues have proposed another reason (apart from the relative salience of the disposition) why the correlations between traits and their criterial behaviors should be attenuated in highly structured situations. This reason, which appears blindingly obvious in retrospect, is the simple statistical fact that the magnitude of any correlation is attenuated to the degree that the range of either or both of the correlated variables is restricted. In typical studies of personality conducted in the field, trait-behavior correlations are obtained in naturalistic situations to which subjects have often self-selected because of the congruence between the structure of these situations and their personalities. To the degree that these naturalistic situations are structured to promote such self-selection, the ranges of both the dispositional predictor variable and the behavioral criterion variable will be restricted, and any resulting correlation will necessarily be relatively low. Similarly, in typical studies of personality conducted in structured laboratory settings, the structure of the task will generally impose normative constraints on behavior that restrict the range of appropriate behavior on the criterion variable and also limit the magnitude of the trait-behavior correlation. Thus in both of the traditional settings for personality research, the statistical artifact of restricted range operates to virtually guarantee that trait-behavior correlations will be attenuated. The optimal research setting for avoiding this artifactual attenuation is epitomized by Ickes's paradigm—a paradigm in which the experimenter can ensure that the entire range of personality scores is represented on the predictor variable and that the unstructured nature of the test situation permits a wide range of responses on the behavioral criterion variable to be displayed.

Taken collectively, the studies by Ickes and his colleagues and those by Monson and his colleagues offer converging evidence that individual differences may have their strongest impact on behavior in relatively unstructured, psychologically weak situations. By implication, these studies also suggest that researchers should consider the alternative of the unstructured situation before committing themselves to those psychologically strong test situations that may actually eliminate the very individual differences in behavior that the researchers are attempting to study.

If it is true that traditional strong-situation paradigms are generally less well suited than weak-situation paradigms to the study of personality and social behav-
ior, why have researchers persisted for decades in using them? Clearly, the orthodoxy of training graduate students in the experimental approach and the historical lack of alternative operational models account for some of this persistence. It is probably also true, however, that at least some strong-situation paradigms really do work; otherwise, their use would have been subject to extinction long ago. Even if we acknowledge that most of the past research in personality has yielded only tenuous and inconsistent evidence of its impact on social behavior [see Argyle (1969), Mehrabian (1972), Mischel (1968), and Shaw (1971, 1977) for some rather discouraging reviews], it still seems likely that some of the strong-situation paradigms employed in this research were better than others. If this assumption is correct, we should be able to pursue our discussion of situational moderating variables a bit further. To be specific, we should be able to identify some other situational moderating variable(s) that will enable us to distinguish between strong situations in which dispositional measures can be used to accurately predict social behavior and strong situations in which dispositional measures cannot be used for this purpose.

Precipitating Versus Nonprecipitating Situations

Of the strong-situation paradigms used in personality research, the most effective appear to be those that establish situations in which behavioral manifestations of the relevant dispositional differences are maximized. These situations may be termed precipitating situations because they not only shift the cause of behavior to a dispositional locus but also precipitate or polarize differences in the behavioral manifestations of the particular disposition being studied. The criteria that appear to define a precipitating situation are as follows:

1. It is relevant to the particular disposition being studied.

2. It makes the disposition salient as a guide to behavior.

3. It permits (as situationally appropriate) specific, alternative modes of responding that individuals should select differentially as a function of their location on the dispositional dimension.

As the third criterion suggests, the precipitating situation is, in essence, a kind of behavioral forced choice that ideally can be resolved only by appeal to the particular disposition to which it is relevant.

A useful example of research employing the precipitating situation is Bem and Lenney's (1976) study of sex typing and the avoidance of cross-sex behavior. In this study stereotypically sex-typed individuals (i.e., "masculine" males and "feminine" females) were instructed to make a series of forced choices regarding which of two behaviors (one masculine sex-typed, one feminine sex-typed) they were willing to perform. So that the cause of a sex-role correspondent choice could be attributed to their own sex-typing disposition, these individuals were offered slightly more money to choose the cross-sex behaviors than they were offered to choose the paired, sex-role correspondent ones. This situation evoked clearcut behavioral manifestations of the individuals' assessed dispositions, even though it was highly structured and it severely constrained the range of appropriate responses. The situation effectively precipitated disposition-based differences in behavior because the behavioral forced choices it required were relevant to the sex-typing disposition being studied, made this disposition salient as a guide to behavior, and permitted specific alternative modes of responding that individuals could select differentially as a function of their sex typing.

Many of the strong-situation paradigms commonly used in personality research may share some, but not all, of the criteria that define the precipitating situation. To the degree that all of these criteria are met, these paradigms will probably provide relatively good evidence for dispositional influences in social behavior. However, to the degree that none of these criteria are met, the resulting test situations should be nonprecipitating and should provide relatively poor evidence for dispositional influences in social behavior.

Of the three criteria we have used to define the precipitating situation, perhaps the best-investigated criterion has been the second one, the criterion that the situation should make the appropriate disposition salient as a guide to behavior. The research relevant to this criterion suggests that situations can be characterized as self-focusing or non-self-focusing according to the degree that they direct the individual's attention "inward" (toward the self) or "outward" (toward the environment).

Most of the studies contrasting self-focusing and non-self-focusing situations were designed to test derivations from Duval and Wicklund's (1972) theory of objective self-awareness. The theory is complex and many-faceted, but one of its simplest and most pervasive themes is that self-awareness enhances the impact on
behavior of “internal” sources of information by increasing their salience relative to “external” sources of information (Shaver, 1976). In other words, the more attention an individual gives to a particular stimulus (e.g., source of information), the more likely it is that his or her subsequent behavior will be influenced by that stimulus. In situations that have been structured to direct the individual’s attention inward, onto the self, such internal sources of information as attitudes, traits, and values will tend to become salient and exert a primary influence on the individual’s behavior. However, in situations that have been structured to direct the individual’s attention outward, onto aspects of the environment, the relative salience of these external stimuli will cause them to be used as the primary guides to the individual’s behavior. This reasoning suggests that a given disposition may predict overt behavior quite strongly in conditions in which it is salient, but it may predict the same behavior only weakly or not at all in conditions in which it is not salient.

From an operational standpoint, a self-focusing situation can be established in a variety of ways. In explicitly social contexts, the presence of other people may be sufficient to direct an individual’s attention toward himself or herself, particularly to the degree that these other people are perceived as being different from the individual (e.g., Duval, 1976; Morse and Gergen, 1970; Taylor and Fiske, 1975, 1978) or as having the capacity and/or motivation to evaluate the individual’s behavior (e.g., Scheier, Fenigstein, and Buss, 1974). In implicitly social contexts, a heightened self-focus can be created by recording some aspects of the individual’s behavior in a manner that serves as an obvious reminder that other people potentially can evaluate these behaviors in the future. Procedures of this type frequently have relied on video-recording or audio-recording equipment to create a strong self-focus in conditions in which such elements are present and a weak self-focus in conditions in which they are not present. Even in contexts that are neither explicitly social nor implicitly social, one can alter the degree of self-focus by means of such stimulus elements as a large mirror (e.g., Ickes, Wicklund, and Ferris, 1973), a spotlight (e.g., Taylor and Fiske, 1975, 1978), or any other stimulus that increases the salience of the self relative to the environment.

Studies in which self-focusing and non-self-focusing situations are contrasted consistently have revealed that internal sources of information exert a stronger influence on behavior in the first type of situation than in the second type. In studies in which causality for a given event or outcome is ambiguous, the self is ascribed a relatively greater causality role in self-focusing situations than in non-self-focusing ones (e.g., Arkin and Duval, 1975; Buss and Scheier, 1976; Duval and Wicklund, 1973; Federoff and Harvey, 1976; Taylor and Fiske, 1975; Wegner and Finstuen, 1977). Similarly, in studies in which internalized standards are relevant to the display of particular behaviors, the impact of these standards on behavior is generally greatest in situations of high self-focus (e.g., Beaman et al., 1980; Carver, 1975; Diener, 1980; Diener and Sull, 1979; Diener and Wallbom, 1976; Gibbons, 1978; Rule, Nesdale, and Dyck, 1975; Scheier, 1976; Scheier, Fenigstein, and Buss, 1974; Vallacher and Solodky, 1979; Wicklund, 1982; Wicklund and Duval, 1971; Wicklund and Ickes, 1972).

Of particular relevance to students of personality and social behavior are the demonstrations that relatively stable and enduring personal attributes such as self-esteem (e.g., Brockner, 1979; Brockner and Hulton, 1978; and sociability (e.g., Pryor et al., 1977) exert powerful influences on behavior in self-focusing situations but exert little or no influence in non-self-focusing ones. And even when internal sources of information take the form of relatively transient and unstable dispositions such as expectancies, arousal, and/or mood states, the impact of these dispositions is also most evident in situations of heightened self-focus (e.g., Carver, Blaney, and Scheier, 1979a, 1979b; Gibbons et al., 1979; Scheier and Carver, 1977; Scheier, Carver, and Gibbons, 1981). Finally, evidence suggests that the individual’s self-concept may itself undergo a transformation in self-focusing situations, becoming more unique, concrete, and highly individuated, and displaying a greater degree of differentiation as well (Ickes, Layden, and Barnes, 1978; Turner, 1978). A transformation of this sort may help to account for the enhanced salience of those particular aspects of self having greatest relevance to the situation at hand.

As impressive as this evidence may be, it would be premature to conclude that meeting the salience criterion is, by itself, sufficient to establish a precipitating situation. In most, if not all, of the studies just cited, the test situation also met the two remaining criteria, since they had been designed to be relevant to the particular disposition being studied and to permit alternative modes of responding that would reflect differences on the dispositional dimension. It seems unlikely that simply making a disposition salient would substantially increase its influ-
ence on behavior in test situations that are completely irrelevant to the disposition in question and that do not permit such alternative modes of response. Although the salience criterion may be a necessary condition for establishing a precipitating situation, it probably is not a sufficient one.

Contrasts Between the Two Types of Situational Moderating Variables
Interestingly, the strengths of the strong-precipitating situation paradigm correspond to the weaknesses of the weak-situation paradigm and vice versa. The precipitating situation typically lends itself to a high degree of experimental control. It permits the experimenter to establish a definitive behavioral forced choice in which the dispositional influence can be manifested most clearly. And it permits relatively powerful and sensitive tests of specific theoretical propositions. On the other hand, because of its high degree of structure, it is generally not well suited to the study of spontaneous, face-to-face interaction behavior. It permits only a limited number of behaviors to be studied at once. And its results may not have much generalizability outside the precipitating situation itself.

A contrasting picture may be drawn of the weaknesses and strengths of the weak-situation paradigm. The weak situation permits relatively little experimental control. Its unstructured nature allows individuals to engage in a wide variety of possible behaviors that the experimenter cannot easily constrain. And it limits the experimenter's ability to force a test of specific theoretical propositions to the degree that such a test requires the imposition of additional structure on the situation. On the other hand, it generally is well suited to the study of spontaneous, face-to-face interaction behavior. It permits a wide range of behaviors to be studied at once. And its results may be broadly generalizable.

In summary, our analysis of situational moderating variables suggests that researchers concerned with personality and social behavior would be well advised to conduct more of their studies in the context of psychologically weak situations. When psychologically strong situations are employed, they should satisfy insofar as possible the criteria for precipitating situations. By becoming aware of the role that the strong/weak and precipitating/nonprecipitating moderators play in defining the types of situations in which dispositional influences are manifested behaviorally, researchers can maximize (rather than minimize) the links between personality and social behavior that they seek to identify and understand in their empirical investigations.

PERSONAL AND SITUATIONAL MODERATING VARIABLES: SOME COMPARISONS
As we have indicated, the classes of personal and situational moderating variables are similar because they both define the presence or absence of a link between the predictor (i.e., a dispositional measure) and the criterion (i.e., a behavioral measure). The presence or absence of this link presumably determines whether or not the predictor will be found to be related to the criterion.

It is at this point, however, that the major difference emerges between personal and situational moderating variables. In the case of personal moderating variables, the link between the predictor and the criterion takes the form of relatively stable and enduring attributes of individuals. These attributes (e.g., self-monitoring, private self-consciousness) are ones that differentiate individuals on the basis of their preferential attention and/or responsiveness to dispositional or situational information as guides to action in particular behavioral domains. By contrast, in the case of situational moderating variables, the link between the predictor and the criterion takes the form of more transient states. These states are ones in which attention and/or responsiveness is differentially accorded to dispositional or situational information as a function of the structure of the situation in which behavior is observed.

A provocative implication of this distinction is that a personal moderating variable defined by the "Which people?" question may have as its counterpart a corresponding situational moderating variable defined by the "Which situations?" question. For example, the personal moderating variable of private self-consciousness may have as its counterpart the situational moderating variable of objective self-awareness. Evidence for this correspondence has been found repeatedly in studies designed to demonstrate the functional equivalence of dispositionally measured self-consciousness and situationally manipulated self-awareness as moderating variables. Behaviorally, the responses of individuals who are dispositionally high in private self-consciousness resemble those of individuals in whom a state of self-awareness has been induced by means of a mirror. Converse-
ly, the responses of individuals who are dispositionally low in private self-consciousness resemble those of individuals in whom a state of self-awareness has not been situational induced (e.g., Buss and Scheier, 1976; Carver and Scheier, 1978; Scheier, 1976; Scheier and Carver, 1977; Scheier, Carver, and Gibbons, 1981).

Researchers have further speculated that the personal moderator of measured public self-consciousness is analogous in function to the situational moderator of situationally induced public self-consciousness (Buss, 1980; Carver and Scheier, 1981). However, with regard to this public mode of self-consciousness, the appropriate state must be evoked not by the presence or absence of a mirror but by the presence or absence of such situational variables as an evaluative audience or a television camera. Presumably, the stimulus elements needed to evoke public self-consciousness are those that imply an externally evaluative view of the self.

In a similar vein, theoretical analyses of self-monitoring processes have proposed that social situations and interpersonal contexts may vary in the extent to which they promote the interpersonal orientation of the high self-monitoring individual or that of the low self-monitoring individual (Snyder, 1979a). Thus researchers have suggested that individuals may be particularly likely to regulate their behavioral choices on the basis of information about their attitudes, dispositions, and other relevant personal attributes in environments that encourage a reflective, contemplative orientation to action (cf. Snyder and Swann, 1976), that enhance either one's sense of commitment or one's personal responsibility for one's actions (cf. Kiesler, 1971; Schwartz, 1973), that heighten one's awareness of self as a potential cause of behavior, as in studies of objective self-awareness (cf. Carver, 1975; Pryor et al., 1977; Wicklund, 1975), that cut short the processes of avoiding and reinterpreting commitment (cf. Kiesler, Roth, and Pallak, 1974) and therefore make it impossible to define one's beliefs and attitudes as irrelevant to one's actions, or that provide normative support for congruence between behavior and belief (cf. Kiesler, Nisbett, and Zanna, 1969). In such low self-monitoring environments, social behavior should manifest the substantial correspondence with attitudes and dispositions that is chronically displayed by low self-monitoring individuals.

By contrast, individuals may be particularly likely to monitor their behavioral choices on the basis of available situational cues in environments that are novel, are unfa-

miliar, and contain relevant sources of social comparison (cf. Festinger, 1954; Sherif, 1937), that make individuals uncertain of or confused about their inner states (cf. Schachter and Singer, 1962), that suggest that one's attitudes are socially undesirable (cf. Dutton and Lake, 1973) or deviant (cf. Freedman and Doob, 1968), that sensitize one to the perspective of others and motivate concern with social evaluation and conformity with reference group norms (cf. Charters and Newcomb, 1958; Zimbardo, 1969), or that motivate individuals to adopt a strategic impression management or ingratiation orientation to self-presentation (cf. Jones, 1964; Snyder, 1977, 1981). In such high self-monitoring environments social behavior should manifest the substantial sensitivity to social and interpersonal specifications of behavioral appropriateness that is chronically displayed by high self-monitoring individuals.

Other cases of correspondence between personal and situational moderating variables should also exist. For any given personal moderating variable that differentiates individuals on the basis of their preferential attention and/or responsiveness to dispositional or situational cues (e.g., internal control versus external control, field independence versus field dependence), one should be able to identify corresponding situational moderators of psychological states in which an analogous differentiation occurs. A complicating factor in this analysis is that the particular stimulus elements needed to create manipulations of the situational moderators may vary according to the particular behavioral domain being studied. For example, although the presence or absence of a mirror may be used successfully to manipulate private self-consciousness, it cannot be used to manipulate public self-consciousness. Similarly, although the presence or absence of an evaluative audience may be required to manipulate public self-consciousness, the assignment of tasks determined either by skill or by chance may be required to induce feelings of either internal control or external control.

This complicating factor may be less troublesome than it first appears to be. When viewed in the context of our earlier discussion, the different stimulus elements needed to evoke different moderating states can be seen as defining psychologically strong precipitating situations for the particular behavioral domains being studied. Specifically, they serve to evoke states that are uniquely relevant to the particular disposition being studied and/or that make that disposition salient as guides to
behavior. In some cases such stimulus elements may also serve to establish the third criterion of the precipitating situation—the delineation of specific, alternative modes of responding that individuals should select differentially as a function of their location on the dispositional dimension.

In contrast to the situational variation of stimulus elements that are relevant only to specific behavioral domains, the situational variation of the strong versus weak moderator may be expected to generalize across domains of social behavior. As the series of studies by Ickes and his colleagues suggests, the influence of a wide range of dispositions (e.g., locus of control, self-monitoring, sex role orientation) may be greater in psychologically weak situations than in psychologically strong ones, regardless of the particular domains of social behavior to which each disposition relates. For this reason, the strong versus weak variation should be the situational moderator of choice whenever the stimulus elements needed to establish the criteria for a precipitating situation cannot be specified a priori (Ickes, 1982; Ickes and Robertson, in press).

ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE INTERACTIONAL STRATEGY

The representative examples that we have presented provide strong evidence that social behavior is determined by interactions involving both dispositional and situational factors. They also suggest that such interactions result from the operation of three major classes of moderating variables, all of which share the same defining function: that of shifting the cause of behavior from a situational locus to a dispositional one or vice versa. These three classes of moderating variables (which are summarized in Table 1) are those relating to the predictor (i.e., to the particular trait or disposition being studied), those relating to the criterion (i.e., to the particular overt behaviors to which the predictor is being applied), and those relating to the presence or absence of a link between the predictor and the criterion. Moderating variables in this third class can be further subdivided into personal moderating variables (i.e., those distinguishing individuals whose behavior is typically disposition-based from individuals whose behavior is typically situation-based), and situational moderating variables (i.e., those distinguishing situations in which a given disposition will determine an individual's behavior from the situations in which it will not).

By acknowledging that social behavior is determined by both dispositional and situational factors, the interactional strategy defines what at first may appear to be a more modest goal for the student of personality than that defined by the dispositional strategy. Instead of attempting to predict the social behavior of "all of the people all of the time" on the basis of their assessed dispositions, the interactional strategy attempts such prediction only for some of the people some of the time (i.e., in some situations, and then only with regard to some dispositions and behaviors). We should note, however, that the apparently modest goal of the interactional strategy is somewhat deceptive and that the application of this strategy actually enhances the overall prediction of behavior. It does so by specifying a priori which type of independent variable predictors (disposition-based versus situation-based) should be used in any given case. Thus the researcher who employs this strategy not only can make better disposition-based predictions in conditions in which dispositional factors determine behavior but also can make better situation-based predictions in conditions in which situational factors determine behavior. In pursuing the interactional approach, the researcher must alternate between acting as a personality psychologist and as an experimental social psychologist, but he or she benefits greatly by acquiring the predictive and explanatory insights associated with each of these roles.

When used effectively, the interactional strategy may also facilitate the bootstrapping process. In fact, the first goal of bootstrapping (to determine the boundary conditions for the social psychological phenomenon of interest) is guided explicitly by the logic of the interactional strategy and by the various types of moderating variables that it subsumes. As the researcher proceeds to establish the boundary conditions for the phenomenon in terms of these moderating variables, he or she is able to determine what types of dispositions can or cannot be used to predict the phenomenon, what types of overt behaviors (criteria) will or will not be indicative of it, what types of individuals will or will not manifest it, and in what types of situations it will or will not occur.

Moreover, it is not unreasonable to assume that in the course of establishing the boundary conditions for a given phenomena in terms of these classes of moderating variables, the researcher will gain considerable insight into the processes underlying the phenomenon. This
specification of underlying processes (which is the second goal of bootstrapping) is therefore also likely to be facilitated by the interactional strategy, although in a somewhat indirect way. In summary, then, the interactional strategy should provide a more structured and logical approach to bootstrapping than that provided by the dispositional strategy.

Having said all of these things in praise of the interactional strategy, we must now consider its possible problems and potential limitations. As in the case of the dispositional strategy, our critical analyses encompass both theoretical and methodological concerns.

Conceptual and Theoretical Critique

Unlike the dispositional strategy, the interactional strategy cannot be readily criticized as being relatively atheoretical and tautological. Nor can it be criticized as overemphasizing dispositional factors and underemphasizing situational ones, since it assumes that both sets of factors are important. If the interactional strategy manages to avoid the two major conceptual weaknesses of the dispositional strategy, on what grounds might it be viewed as conceptually deficient?

One possible conceptual weakness is revealed by comparing and contrasting the interactional strategy with situationist modifications of the dispositional strategy. Just as situational specificity can be introduced into the dispositional strategy by identifying, measuring, and validating situation-specific dispositions, so can situational specificity be introduced into the interactional strategy by delimiting precisely the set of situations in which a dispositional measure either will or will not predict its criterial behaviors. In fact, the situationist modification of the dispositional strategy is logically complemented by the interactional strategy in that the former attempts to define situation-specific dispositions, whereas the latter attempts to define disposition-specific situations.

Given this complementarity, we should not be surprised to discover that the interactional approach, like the situationist modification of the dispositional approach, may be plagued by an apparent lack of theoretical parsimony. Clearly, the interactional strategy requires much of the researcher who seeks to apply it to the study of personality and social behavior. In addition to possessing the required skills in test construction, measurement, and validation, the researcher employing this strategy also has to contend with four conceptually distinct types of moderating variables in order to specify a priori the conditions of greatest disposition-behavior correspondence. From an empirical standpoint the prospects of validating this strategy by testing the effects of all four types of moderating variables in a single factorial design are probably formidable enough to deter all but the most obsessive-compulsive of Ph.D candidates in personality/social psychology!

On the other hand, we acknowledge that the complexity of the interactional strategy may be warranted by the even more complex reality that it seeks to mirror. Complicated problems seldom yield to simple solutions, and this premise may be especially true of the study of personality and social behavior, as Carson (1969) has suggested. A further defense of this approach is that its apparent complexity may be mitigated by its potential to provide a general theoretical framework for specifying the domains of applicability for virtually all personality factors and individual-difference variables. No matter what disposition one chooses to study, one should be able (in theory, at least) to delimit that disposition's domain of applicability by specifying, first, which trait measures best predict the particular disposition-behavior correspondence; second, which criterial behaviors best reveal or manifest it; third, which people are most likely to demonstrate it; and fourth, which situations are most conducive to its display.

To the degree that the interactional strategy permits such theoretical generality in the treatment of all classes of dispositional variables, it represents an important theoretical advance over the dispositional strategy. It also is conceptually superior to the situationist modification of the dispositional strategy. The reason for this conceptual superiority is that the interactional strategy, as we have characterized it, provides a general model that can be applied broadly to identify the conditions of maximum disposition-behavior correspondence for virtually any disposition. In contrast, the situationist modification of the dispositional strategy provides only the simple heuristic assumption that many general dispositions can be further subdivided into a number of situation-specific ones if the researcher applies his or her intuitions to this task on an individual, case-by-case basis.

Although the conceptual adequacy of the interactional strategy compares favorably with that of the dispositional strategy, it has its points of theoretical vulnerability. In particular, one may direct criticism at its assumption that the causal link between personality and social behavior is always unidirectional, with personality influencing behavior but not vice versa. Also, one may
reject the assumption that dispositions and situations have the status of true independent variables, both of which influence behavior but neither of which are influenced by behavior or by each other. Finally, one may question the assumption that whatever functional relationships occur in personality research are necessarily linear, or at least monotonic in form.

One possible solution to the limitations of these admittedly simplifying assumptions is provided by a more dynamic version of the interactional strategy that stresses an interaction process in which persons and situations form an inextricably interwoven structure (Magnusson and Enderle, 1977, p. 18). In this dynamic version of the interactional strategy, the causal links connecting dispositions, situations, and behavior are thought to be complex and reciprocally cyclical over time. Although some proponents of dynamic interactionism have assumed these relationships to be linear or at least monotonic in form, many have not, arguing instead for the occurrence of processes that are multitedered and multitedering, sometimes linear in form and sometimes not. And as if this view of things weren’t complicated enough, some writers further assume that this interwoven structure of dispositions, situations, and social behaviors is complicated by the various mutual influences that interacting individuals exert upon each other. The problems of correctly “punctuating” (Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson, 1967) social interaction sequences (i.e., correctly segmenting and structuring them in causal terms) present tremendous practical and theoretical challenges to the proponents of a dynamic version of the interactional strategy for the study of social behavior. In other words, it is already apparent that this dynamic “solution” to the limitations of statistical interactionism is fraught with its own set of problems, many of which have only begun to be addressed.

Methodological and Empirical Critique
Methodological criticisms of the interactional strategy also reveal its superiority to the dispositional strategy while suggesting its own deficiencies and limitations. Like the dispositional strategy, the interactional strategy may fail to provide an adequate operational definition of disposition-based consistency in behavior. Unlike the dispositional strategy, however, the interactional strategy should not be faulted for failing to account for much of the variance in social behavior. In fact, the efforts of various investigators to improve the predictive power of the dispositional strategy have succeeded only insofar as they have simultaneously advanced the development of the interactional strategy. Thus, as the different classes of moderating variables were identified by Bem and Allen (1974), Epstein (1979), Ickes (1982), Snyder (1976), and others, it became possible to demonstrate that dispositions could account for over 80 percent of the variance in their criterial behaviors when the optimal conditions for disposition-behavior correspondence were established (for an informative empirical example, see Kenrick and Stringfield, 1980).

Despite the enhanced predictive power of the interactional strategy, it may have its methodological limitations. Its mechanistic, statistical assumptions generally may lead investigators to adopt research designs based on the same type of assumption—i.e., linear, fixed-effect designs in which the dispositional and situational factors of interest are always treated as the independent variables and in which the behaviors of interest are always treated as the dependent variables. Operationally, such designs are typically implemented as experiments or quasi experiments in which the relevant dispositional and situational independent variables are systematically varied, if not manipulated directly, by the experimenter. The typical result of such attempts at experimental control using a fixed-effects design is generally a highly constrained procedure bearing only a faint resemblance to the type of social interaction that individuals normally experience in their lives. In a manner rather contrary to real life the participants in such investigations have virtually no choice regarding the settings in which they find themselves or the people with whom they are expected to interact. Moreover, they typically are able to exert only a weak influence on the situation as it is operationally defined, and then only within a narrow range of behavioral options that have been prescribed and pre-scripted by the researcher.

These considerations may leave students of personality and social behavior the horns of a very real dilemma. On the one hand, they may be quite reluctant to relinquish the type of experimental control that for many investigators is the hallmark of rigorous scientific inquiry. On the other hand, the use of such control frequently imposes artificial constraints that may distort or even eliminate the very behaviors that they are attempting to study. We now turn to a consideration of a strategy—which we have chosen to label the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior—that is emerging from attempts to escape this dilemma.
THE SITUATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

Clearly, the preceding development of ideas suggests that we are about to turn to a discussion of the dynamic version of the interactional strategy for the study of personality and social behavior. Yet as we contemplated this approach, we realized that its complex, many-faceted nature made it difficult to describe in a thematically unified way. The dynamic version of the interactional strategy is, in terms of its assumed causal relationships, something of a Gordian knot that is likely to frustrate even the most patient of would-be unravelers. Although we might have been able to pick up the various threads of these causal relationships and attempt to trace their interweavings, we decided that such an exercise might frustrate the readers' patience even more than our own.

Accordingly, our solution to this problem has been to choose only one of these causal strands and, insofar as possible, to trace its intertwinings with other causal strands. The one that we have chosen—the reciprocal causal relationship between situations and personality—is particularly useful for revealing many of the phenomena of personality that are uniquely implicated by the dynamic interactional approach. By tracing this one strand throughout this section, we hope to provide a thematically unified perspective on dynamic interactionism that gradually will reveal the scope and complexity of this approach. We therefore begin by considering how a situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior, focusing on the influence of individuals on their situations, leads us to examine a set of phenomena that essentially are precluded by the assumptions and methodologies of other strategies for the study of personality and social behavior.

THE ORIGINS OF THE SITUATIONAL STRATEGY

If, as suggested by theory and research generated by the interactional strategy, the regularities and consistencies in social behavior that constitute personality are questions of “Which traits?”, “Which behaviors?”, “Which individuals?” and “Which situations?”, students of social behavior who seek evidence of such behavioral consistencies ought to direct their efforts toward discovering “those traits,” “those behaviors,” “those individuals,” and “those situations.” As promising as the interactional strategy may be for providing precise specifications of the conditions in which behavioral consistencies are to be found, we suspect that it is also quite limiting in an important and often unrecognized way. Specifically, it may cause investigators of social psychological phenomena and processes to overlook or fail to recognize other important manifestations of consistency in personality that lie outside its theoretical bounds.

These additional phenomena of personality are quite clearly implicated by the dynamic version of the interactional approach to the study of personality and social behavior. However, because most researchers, regardless of their theoretical orientations, are still committed to the mechanistic assumptions and methodological conventions of statistical interactionism, the inherent constraints of this methodology have correspondingly limited the scope of their awareness as well as their inquiry. The prototypic model of this methodology is, of course, the experiment.

We have suggested that the social psychological experiment, with its defining characteristics of the creation of differing social situations by means of experimental manipulations and the random assignment of participants to these differing social situations, may be a methodology that provides minimal opportunities for investigators to witness manifestations of personality while providing maximal opportunities for investigators to witness manifestations of the impact of social situations on individuals’ behavior (e.g., Ickes, 1982; Ickes and Robertson, in press; Snyder, 1979b, 1981b; Wachtel, 1973). By definition, investigators conduct experiments to determine the impact of manipulated independent variables on measured dependent variables. In practice, if not in principle, it is easier to control and manipulate characteristics of situations than it is to manipulate and control attributes of individuals. Accordingly, the independent variables in social psychological experiments typically are manipulations of social situations. Moreover, investigators typically exercise great care to make sure that the different levels of the independent variable (i.e., the different social situations that they create by means of their experimental manipulations) are sufficiently distinct from each other to guarantee noticeably different effects on the different groups of participants assigned to each condition of the experiment. Typically, to reduce variability in their participants’ interpretations of the experimental manipulations, investigators also tailor their manipulations to fit personal, social, and
demographic attributes shared by their participant populations. Moreover, investigators tend to recruit their participants from fairly homogeneous participant populations (in particular, college students, who are much less variable in personal, intellectual, social, and demographic attributes than are members of the population at large).

All of these procedures tend to increase the extent to which the social behavior of participants in social psychological experiments will be particularly sensitive to situationally manipulated independent variables (cf. Cook and Campbell, 1976). Effectively, the stage has been set to maximize the extent to which social behavior in these experimentally created situations will be a reflection of the manipulated independent variables and to minimize the extent to which social behavior in these experimentally created situations will be a reflection of the personal attributes (e.g., attitudes, traits, dispositions, self-conceptions) of the individual participants.

Of even greater importance, however, experiments (as they typically are conducted) virtually eliminate one major vehicle by which personal attributes of the participants might manifest themselves. Experiments, by definition, are designed to document the impact of the independent variable. Investigators therefore manipulate and control that independent variable to occur in fixed and preprogrammed fashion and subject their participants to one or another level of the independent variable. This procedure effectively prevents participants from doing at least two things. First, they cannot choose whether or not to be exposed to the treatment or experimental situation to which they have been randomly assigned. And second, they can exert only minimal influence on the experimentally created interpersonal situation in which they find themselves. Participants can do very little to alter those events that define the manipulated independent variable. Typically, they can only react, respond, and attempt to cope with the surrounding situation into which they have been thrust.

This, of course, is precisely how it must be if investigators are to be able to make confident statements about the impact of situational independent variables on the behavior of individuals. Yet life situations often do not involve predetermined stimulus events about which individuals have no choice and over which individuals have no influence. In the natural course of their lives, individuals typically have considerable freedom to choose where to be, when to be there, and with whom to be there. Accordingly, unlike the situations to which an individual is assigned in a social psychological experiment, the real-world situations in which an individual finds himself or herself may be partially, if not entirely, of his or her own choosing. Moreover, once in a social situation—whether or not of the individual's own choosing—much of what transpires in that situation is determined by that individual's own actions. In particular, in the social situations of one's life, unlike the situations of social psychological experiments, how other people treat the individual is often determined to considerable extent by the individual's own actions. Quite understandably, these processes of choosing and influencing social situations are eliminated in traditional experimental procedural paradigms. The elimination of these processes helps ensure the internal validity of experimental investigations of the effects of experimentally manipulated features of social situations on the behavior of individuals assigned to those situations (cf. Aronson and Carlsmith, 1968; Campbell and Stanley, 1963).

Of what import might be the processes of choosing and influencing social situations? Some have argued that one's choices of the settings in which to live one's life and one's influences on the interpersonal situations of one's life may reflect features of one's conceptions of self, one's characteristic dispositions, one's attitudes and values, and other attributes of personality (e.g., Snyder, 1981b). For example, individuals may choose whenever possible to enter and to spend time in situations that elicit competitive behaviors precisely because they are by disposition competitive individuals. Moreover, whenever such individuals find themselves in situations that typically do not foster competitive behaviors, they may attempt to transform those situations into competitive situations precisely because they are competitive individuals. From this perspective, competitive individuals are defined as those who choose whenever possible to enter competitive situations and who act whenever possible to maximize the competitive character of their situations. In so doing, competitive individuals construct for themselves social worlds particularly conducive to the expression and manifestation of their competitive dispositions.

Not incidentally, as a direct consequence of choosing and influencing their social situations in ways that create competitive worlds within which to live, competitive individuals would provide themselves with opportunities to display competitive behaviors with high frequency and great regularity across situations and over time. In other words, these individuals would come to display the cross-situational consistency and temporal
stability that traditionally are regarded as the defining features of a personality trait of competitiveness. From this perspective, the regularities and consistencies in these individuals’ competitive behavior are to be regarded as the product of regularities and consistencies in the competitive social situations within which they live their lives.

Closely associated with the theoretical orientation that individuals and their personalities are to be understood in terms of their social settings is what we have chosen to call the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior. Guided by this theoretical orientation, practitioners of the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior have sought not only to identify regularities and consistencies in social situations but also to understand their origins and their consequences.

Consider, as an illustrative example, the application of the situational strategy to the study of the social psychological phenomenon of competition. The user of the situational strategy would seek first to determine whether a category of social situations exists that, more so than other social situations, typically elicits competitive behaviors. The user of the situational strategy would seek next to determine whether there exists a category of individuals who typically are to be found in these situations that elicit competition. Having identified those situations and those individuals, the user of the situational strategy then would seek to determine whether those individuals who are to be found in those situations that typically elicit competition are individuals who characteristically behave in a competitive fashion.

That is, the user of the situational strategy for the study of competition would pose, as his or her fundamental question, “Are competitively disposed individuals those individuals who typically are to be found in competitively oriented situations?” By so framing the fundamental question, the user of the situational strategy for the study of competition seeks a fundamentally social psychological interpretation of the origins of competitive dispositions. From this perspective, individuals with competitive personalities are those individuals who live their lives in competitive social settings and interpersonal situations.

Moreover, the user of the situational strategy for the study of competition would seek to understand why it is that some individuals characteristically find themselves in precisely those social situations that lead them to behave in competitive ways. Thus the user of the situational strategy would seek to determine the extent to which competitively disposed individuals actively choose to enter and to spend time in situations that foster a competitive orientation but to avoid those situations that foster a cooperative orientation. For example, do these individuals seek out situations with competitive reward structures? Moreover, the user of the situational strategy would seek to determine the extent to which competitively disposed individuals influence the social situations in which they find themselves in ways that increase the likelihood that those situations will become settings for the display of competition. For example, do these individuals attempt to inject competitive reward structures into situations that initially lack them? In so doing, the user of the situational strategy for the study of competition would seek to understand the processes by which competitively disposed individuals find themselves in the situations that foster the characteristic display of competitive actions.

Central to the theoretical perspective associated with the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior is the proposition that characteristic dispositions of individuals are reflected in the processes by which individuals choose to enter and to spend time in social situations and in the processes by which individuals influence the character of the social situations in which they find themselves. Research paradigms for the investigation of these processes require, of necessity, casting features of the individual (e.g., self-conceptions, values, attitudes, traits, motives, dispositions, etc.) in the role of independent variable and features of the situation (e.g., choice of social situation, influence on social situation) in the role of dependent variable. Within such paradigms, researchers have been able to document the manner in which characteristics of individuals are reflected and manifested in the social settings within which they live their lives. We consider, first, investigations of the choice by individuals of their social situations; then, investigations of the influence of individuals on their social situations; and finally, investigations of the impact of personality processes on the dynamics of ongoing social interaction and interpersonal relationships.

CHOOSING THE SITUATIONS OF ONE’S LIFE

Do individuals systematically choose to enter and to spend time in social situations that provide them with opportunities to act upon their characteristic traits, dispositions, attitudes, and self-conceptions? Do individuals systematically choose to enter and to spend time in
social situations that will dispose them to engage in behaviors that will reflect features of their personalities? That individuals can and do engage in such processes of choosing the situations of their lives presupposes that they know or can assess what behavioral opportunities are provided by what social situations. Thus, for example, if socially extraverted individuals are to choose systematically to enter situations that foster and encourage the expression of their socially extraverted dispositions, they must be able to identify those socially extraverted situations. Accordingly, we first examine individuals' knowledge of social situations.

Several lines of research, taken together, suggest that individuals can assess the extent to which particular social situations are conducive to the behavioral expression of their personal attributes. Considerable evidence indicates that individuals can reliably assess both the appropriateness of particular behaviors for particular situations and the constraints that particular situations place on the behaviors that may be expressed in those situations (e.g., Price, 1974; Price and Bouffard, 1974; Smith-Lovin, 1979). With this knowledge of social situations, individuals ought to be able to determine which social situations will promote the expression of their own characteristic traits, dispositions, attitudes, and self-conceptions. In fact, individuals seem to be well able to assess the personal identities that can be expressed readily and appropriately in particular social situations (e.g., Alexander and Knight, 1971; Alexander and Lauderdale, 1977). Researchers have also been able to identify some of the dimensions of social situations that contribute to inferences about the personal attributes and social behaviors that can be expressed readily in particular social situations (e.g., Forgas, 1979; Wish, 1975; Wish and Kaplan, 1977; Wish, Deutsch, and Kaplan, 1976). Finally, some empirical procedures have been developed for assessing the personalities of social situations (e.g., Bem, 1982; Bem and Funder, 1978; Bem and Lord, 1979; Funder, 1982; but see also Mischel and Peake, 1982, 1981).

Evidently, individuals do possess the knowledge of social situations that would permit them to gravitate toward those situations that foster and encourage the behavioral expression of their traits, dispositions, attitudes, and other personal attributes. But do individuals actually choose preferentially to enter and to spend time in such social situations? Empirical investigations have examined the choices of situations of individuals who differ in, among others, arousal seeking (Mehrabian, 1978; Mehrabian and Russell, 1974), authoritarianism (Stern, Stein, and Bloom, 1956), birth order (Hoyt and Raven, 1973; Schachter, 1959; Wrightsman, 1960), extraversion (Furnham, 1981), gender (Deaux, 1978; Deaux, White, and Farris, 1975; Eddy and Sinnett, 1973; Lippa and Beauvais, 1980; Reis, Nezlek, and Wheeler, 1980; Wheeler and Nezlek, 1977), locus of control (Kahle, 1980), need for achievement (Atkinson, 1957), neuroticism (Furnham, 1981), repression-sensitization (Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss, 1973; Olson and Zanna, 1971), sensation seeking (Segal, 1971; Zuckerman, 1974), self-monitoring (Snyder and Gangestad, 1982; Snyder and Kendzierski, 1982b), sex-role orientation (Deaux, 1978; Lippa and Beauvais, 1980; Spence and Helmreich, 1978), social skills (Bryant and Trower, 1974), and success/failure orientation (Nisan, 1972).

In addition, several studies have demonstrated the links between various social attitudes and choices of situations (Barlett, et al., 1974; Brock and Balloun, 1967; Kahle and Berman, 1979; Snyder and Kendzierski, 1982b) and the links between various features of self-conception and choices of social situations (Berglas and Jones, 1978; Jones and Berglas, 1978; Snyder et al., 1979) and at least one has demonstrated the links between morphological characteristics and choices of social situations (Reis, Nezlek, and Wheeler, 1980). Furthermore, attempts have been made to investigate the settings within which individuals choose to conduct particular types of relationships (e.g., Argyle and Furnham, 1980; Jellison and Ickes, 1974). Finally, various attempts have been made to identify the personal origins of choices of leisure situations (e.g., Bishop and Witt, 1970; Furnham, 1981; Tinsley, Barrett, and Kass, 1977; Zuckerman, 1974), of choices of educational situations (e.g., Pervin, 1967a, 1967b, 1968; Pervin and Rubin, 1967; Stern, 1969; Stern, Stein, and Bloom, 1956), and of choices of occupational situations (Davis, 1965; Holland, 1976; Mortimer and Lorence, 1979; Rosenberg, 1957; Vroom, 1964). In the following section, we consider some representative examples of empirical investigations of the links between personal attributes and choices of social situations.

Characteristic Dispositions and Choices of Situations

Representative of the empirical attempts to document relationships between characteristic dispositions and the choice to enter and to spend time in particular social situations is that of Furnham (1981) on extraversion. Participants for whom the measures of dispositional extraversion provided by the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire...
Conceptions of Self and Choices of Situations

Within the domain of conceptions of self, empirical investigations suggest that individuals actively may seek out social situations that preserve and sustain existing and cherished conceptions of self. In particular, Jones and Berglas (1978; Berglas and Jones, 1978) have focused on conceptions of self-competence. They have proposed that individuals who regard themselves as competent, intelligent people strive to protect, preserve, and sustain their images of self-competence by actions that make it easier for them to externalize (i.e., explain away) their failures and to internalize (i.e., take credit for) their successes. In an empirical demonstration of such “self-handicapping strategies” in action, Berglas and Jones (1978) found that males who had reason to anticipate that they might not perform well on a problem-solving task chose to take drugs that would interfere with their subsequent performance, presumably in an effort to provide themselves with a readily available explanation (one that would in no way threaten their images of self-competence) for any possible failure. In addition to this evidence that individuals may choose performance settings that prevent failure from threatening their images of self-competence, some evidence also suggests that individuals may leave performance settings that become threatening to their self-competence images (e.g., Conolley, Gerard, and Kline, 1978).

More generally, Jones and Berglas (1978) have proposed that, to the extent that individuals are concerned with maintaining images of self-competence, they will try to choose settings and circumstances for their performances that maximize the implications of success for enhancing their self-competence images at the same time that they minimize the implications of failure for threatening their self-competence images. To the extent that individuals’ choices of life settings meet these criteria, they will manage to live their lives in social worlds that protect and enhance both their private self-conceptions and their public images of competence.

Social Attitudes and Choices of Situations

Within the domain of social attitudes, some evidence indicates that individuals preferentially choose to enter and to spend time in social situations that provide opportunities to act upon these attitudes. Thus, for example, individuals with favorable attitudes toward particular candidates for elected political office actively seek out situations in which they will be exposed to messages favorable to their preferred candidate (Kahle and Berman,
1979). Similarly, individuals with favorable attitudes toward affirmative action are particularly eager to enter and to spend time in social situations that provide strong normative supports for the behavioral expression of their attitudes, although this finding seems to be characteristic only of individuals with low scores on Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder and Kendzierski, 1982b). Finally, if one is willing to regard the choice to expose oneself to particular sets of information as a form of choice of situation, then those empirical investigations that have succeeded in demonstrating that individuals will selectively expose themselves to information congruent with and supportive of their existing attitudes (e.g., Barlett, et al., 1974; Brock and Balloun, 1967) constitute further evidence of the links between social attitudes and choices of social situations, although there is some suggestion that selective exposure phenomena may be limited to individuals classified as repressors by Byrne's (1964) Repression-Sensitization measure (Olson and Zanna, 1979).

Of what consequence are such links between individuals' attitudes and their choices of the social settings within which to live their lives? To the extent that individuals actively gravitate toward social situations and interpersonal settings that provide opportunities and supports for acting in ways that would reflect their attitudes, they may enhance and enforce correspondence between their private attitudes and their public actions. That is, the consistency between attitude and behavior that is one defining feature of personality may be generated by the choice of social situations that dispose individuals to perform the actions implied by their attitudes. Indeed, the active choice of the situations of one's life may constitute one major source of consistency between attitudes and behavior.

Some Exceptional Cases: Choosing Dispositionally Incongruent Situations

We have marshaled many hypothetical and empirical examples to illustrate the proposition that individuals are particularly likely to enter and to spend time in situations that support their current conceptions of self and allow them to act upon their characteristic attitudes, traits, and dispositions. Are there, however, other hypothetical or empirical examples that do not conform to the pattern just described? A little reflection suggests that there may, in fact, be two major categories of exceptions to our rule governing individuals' choice of situations. Both of these categories represent cases in which individuals choose to enter situations that appear to be inconsistent with their current conceptions of self or with the display of their characteristic attitudes, traits, and dispositions. It can be seen, however, that despite their essential phenotypic similarity, the categories differ genotypically according to the individuals' apparent motives for entering such situations. These underlying motives appear to be either to use the personality-shaping properties of such situations in order to change oneself or to exert one's influence on and on such situations in order to change the situation itself or to change other people.

Choosing incongruent situations to change oneself. If individuals typically choose to enter only those situations that facilitate the expression of their characteristic dispositions, why do we observe shy people in swinging singles' bars, snake phobics in the reptile house, paunchy sybarites in a wilderness survival course, and sinners in the front row of church? Of course, individuals of these types might be more often not found in the situations just described than found in them, but because these exceptional cases do occur, they warrant some accounting. The most likely motive for the behavior of these individuals is that they all desire to change themselves through direct exposure to those situations most likely to effect the type of change that they want to occur. Thus shy people might expect to gain social confidence and poise by involving themselves in situations particularly likely to elicit, shape, and reinforce the skills that underlie these attributes. Similarly, snake phobics might seek a situation in which they can safely confront and overcome their fears; paunchy sybarites might seek an ideal environment in which to become lean ascetics; and sinners might seek an environment supportive of repentance and spiritual change.

In all of these cases, the situations that our hypothetical characters enter are incongruent with their current dispositions and attributes, i.e., with "who they really are" at the time they enter these situations. Probably, however, these situations are not incongruent with the dispositions and attributes these individuals would like to possess, i.e., with "who they ideally would like to be" at some time in the future. Indeed, the ease with which one can generate examples of this type suggests the prevalence in our society of the belief that involving oneself in certain situations incompatible with one's current dispositions can cause, or at least facilitate, relatively dramatic and enduring changes in one's character or personality. Many, if not most, of the clinical, service, and education-
al institutions in our culture, including the entire clinical-applied arm of the field of psychology, seem to be founded directly on this premise.

When seen as instances in which situations are sought out and entered because of their congruence with a future, "ideal" self instead of a current, "real" one, these examples do not discredit our earlier argument that individuals tend to enter only dispositionally congruent, self-confirming situations. These examples do, however, suggest some of the complexity inherent in a dynamic interactional approach to the study of personality and social behavior by revealing that situations are sometimes chosen not to suit oneself but to change oneself instead. They also suggest that the individual's conception of his or her personality is sufficiently complex and differentiated to permit situations to be incongruent with a current, "real" self-concept and yet be quite congruent with a potential, "ideal" self-concept. Finally, they suggest that the interdependence and mutual determination of personality and situation is a phenomenon well-recognized by laypersons, even if it is largely ignored by psychologists. Because individuals can recognize that their personalities both determine and are determined by the situations they select, they are able to apply this insight by deliberately choosing to enter the situations most likely to help shape their personalities in desired ways.

Other cases in which individuals choose incongruent situations in order to change themselves have been characterized by such value-differentiated terms as "slumming" and "broadening one's perspective." Although both of these terms refer to cases in which the changes desired by the individual generally take the form of increased knowledge, novel experience, or an altered level of sensory stimulation, it is possible that more fundamental changes in personality might also be the goal of these situational choices.

Choosing incongruent situations to change the situation or to change other people. A second category of cases in which people voluntarily enter situations that seem at odds with their own dispositions is exemplified by the preacher in the house of ill repute, the temperance lady in the local tavern, and the Yippie in the Pentagon. The most likely motive for these individuals' behavior is their desire to exert influence in and on the situation in order to change the situation itself or to change other people. People whose choice of incongruent situations is determined by this motive tend to cast themselves in the role of social reformer on a scale that may vary greatly in ambition and in degree of influence. Missionaries, proselytizers, social workers, reformers, revolutionaries, and radical activists provide relatively dramatic examples, but more mundane examples (e.g., the slum-reared gate-crasher of a high-society social affair) can also be identified. At times the incongruence of these individuals' personalities and the situations they enter may be so striking that their mere presence on the scene is sufficient to produce the changes they desire (e.g., the naked streaker at commencement exercises). At other times, however, such individuals may have to commit themselves to months or even years of patient work in a situation they abhor in order to effect the intended changes (e.g., health and hygiene specialists working in a filthy, rat-infested ghetto area).

A comparison of these examples with those provided for the first category of incongruent situational choices suggests an intriguing theoretical similarity in the desired ends, despite a characteristic difference in the means to those ends. In both cases people choose to enter and to tolerate situations that are currently incongruent with their own dispositions, and in both cases they do so for the sake of realizing a potential or future congruency that does not currently exist. However, in the first case the individuals seek to realize this congruency by choosing situations that will change them, so that their personalities will eventually come to suit the situations; whereas in the second case the individuals seek to realize this congruency by choosing situations that they can change so that the situations will eventually come to suit their personalities.

When seen as instances in which situations are sought out and entered because of their potential, rather than their current, congruence with the self, these examples also fail to discredit our argument that individuals tend to enter only dispositionally congruent, self-confirming situations. Instead, they suggest a further complexity of the dynamic interactional approach by revealing that some situations that initially are not suited to one's personality may be changed to be that way. Because individuals can recognize that their personalities both determine and are determined by the situations they select, they can apply this insight by deliberately changing situations to create the desired congruence with their own dispositions. This particular aspect of the reciprocal causal relationship between personality and situation is important enough to discuss at some length, so we will conclude this section on choosing situations and give further consideration to the question of influencing them. Before doing so, however, we should note that
other theorists have been interested in the problems of
the congruency or incongruency between self and situ-
ation that have been our concern in this section. In par-
ticular, Secord and Backman's (1961, 1965) congruency
theory provides an excellent theoretical framework for
addressing these and related issues. This theory will be
discussed in considerable detail in the following two sec-
tions.

INFLUENCING THE SITUATIONS OF
ONE'S LIFE

A striking example of the influence that individuals' personali-
ties can exert on situations is provided by John
Updike's (1975) description of his encounters with other
writers (pp. 23-24):

All of the writers I have met...carry around with
them a field force that compels objects in the vicinity
to conform to their literary style. Standing next to
E. B. White, one is imbued with something of the
man's fierce modesty, and one's sentences haltingly
seek to approximate the wonderful way his own
never say more than he means... A room contain-
ing Philip Roth, I have noticed, begins hilariously to
whirl and pulse with a mix of rebelliousness and con-
striction that I take to be Oedipal. And I have seen
John Cheever, for ten days we shared in Russia, turn
the dour world of Soviet literary officials into a
bright scuttle of somehow suburban characters,
invented with marvellous speed and arranged in sud-
den tableaux expressive, amid wistful neo-Tsarist
trappings, of the lyric desperation associated with
affluence... My most traumatic experience of
gravitational attraction came with John O'Hara.
... Within the few seconds of this encounter I had
been plunged into a cruel complex of stoic pain and
social irony... These not entirely fanciful remin-
cences... mean to suggest that writers, like everyone
else, see a world their personalities to some extent
create.

If personality can influence situations in as forceful
a manner as these examples suggest, how does such influ-
ence occur and what forms is it likely to take? In other
words, what are the processes mediating personality's in-
fluence on situations, and what are the possible outcomes
of these processes? Our attempt to answer these ques-
tions first considers how the influence of personality on
situations is mediated by its impact on the individual's
orientation toward situations in general and its impact on
the individual's cognitive and affective reactions to spe-
cific situations. We then consider the various ways in
which the resulting mediated personality influences can
be expressed in the individual's behavior to alter the situ-
ation in objective, as well as subjective, terms.

General Orientation Toward Situations

Considerable evidence suggests that differences in per-
sontality are associated with corresponding differences
in individuals' general orientations toward situations.
These differences in situational orientation mediate dif-
fences in the individuals' subsequent behavior that can
directly alter the situation in which they are involved.
One of the best-known and most extensively studied per-
sontality measures—locus of control (Rotter, 1966)—
could easily be described as providing a fairly direct as-
seessment of differences in situational orientation. Specif-
ically, individuals with an internal locus of control are
those whose behavior should be relatively expressive of
their attitudes, traits, and other dispositions but should
be relatively unconstrained by situational influences. In
contrast, individuals with an external locus of control are
those whose behavior should be relatively insensitive to
their own dispositions but highly sensitive to situational
factors.

Recent reviews of the locus-of-control literature
(Lefcourt, 1976; Phares, 1976) reveal considerable evi-
dence supporting these hypothesized differences in
situational orientation—differences that appear to gen-
eralize across a range of situations, subject populations,
and dependent-variable measures. Although much of
this research is validational and simply reveals the
expected differences on various criterial measures of
locus of control, many studies in this literature further in-
dicate that individuals whose locus of control is internal
typically exert more disposition-based influence in and
on their situations than do individuals whose locus of
control is external (e.g., Bialer, 1961; Brown and
Strickland, 1972; Felton, 1971; Gurin et al., 1969; Kahle,
1980; Lao, 1970; Lefcourt, 1967; MacDonald, 1970;
Tseng, 1970; Williams and Nickels, 1969). These and
other studies suggest that individuals differ in their gen-
eral predisposition to either influence or be influenced by
the situations that they encounter.

Personality measures such as private/public self-
consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975), self-monitoring
(Snyder, 1974), or inner-other directedness (Kassarjian,
should also influence individuals' orientations toward situations in a manner roughly comparable to locus of control. And, in general, individuals high in private and low in public self-consciousness seem to exert more disposition-based influence in and on situations than do individuals low in private and high in public self-consciousness (Buss, 1980; Carver and Scheier, 1981). Similarly, low self-monitoring individuals appear to exert more disposition-based influence on situations than do high self-monitoring individuals (e.g., Snyder and Campbell, 1982; Snyder and Gangestad, 1982). The data for other, conceptually similar variables are expected to reveal a similar pattern, although sufficient data may not be available now to support such a claim.

What are the origins of these individual differences in situational orientation? Although the origins of the orientations associated with the self-consciousness and self-monitoring variables have not been explored, we have some relevant data for locus of control. Phares's (1976) discussion of the familial and social antecedents of the two locus-of-control orientations has associated internal control with having parents who were warm, involved, and accepting (e.g., Davis and Phares, 1969; Shore, 1967) and who were consistent in their use of reinforcement and punishment as well as in the standards they set for their children's behavior (e.g., Levenson, 1973; MacDonald, 1971; Reimanis, 1971). Internality-externality also has been associated with social class and ethnicity, such that minority status and low social class both contribute to feelings of external control (e.g., Batte and Rotter, 1963; Gruen and Ottinger, 1969; Lessing, 1969; Pedhazur and Wheeler, 1971).

Cognitive and Affective Reactions to Specific Situations
How does personality affect the individual's cognitive and affective reactions to the specific situations that he or she encounters? Perhaps the best approach to use in answering this question is provided by Secord and Backman's (1961, 1965) congruency theory. According to this theory, individuals are motivated to maintain an equilibrium state of congruency among the following elements: (1) an aspect of the individual's self-concept, (2) the individual's interpretation of his or her behavior relevant to that aspect, and (3) the individual's perception of how another person behaves toward and feels about him or her with respect to that aspect. Congruency is said to exist when the behaviors of the subject (S) and the other person involved . . . (O) imply definitions of self congruent with relevant aspects of S's self-concept. For example, if S regards himself as intelligent, if his problem-solving ability is quick and efficient, and if O asks him for help in solving a difficult problem, these three components are congruent" (Secord and Backman, 1965, pp. 91-92).

Because the other person can be viewed as an aspect of the individual's current situation, we suggest that Secord and Backman's theory can be extended to deal with both the animate and the inanimate features of the situations that the individual confronts. Accordingly, the three elements of theoretical interest can be redefined as (1) an aspect of the individual's self-concept (a self-ascribed attitude, trait, value, etc.), (2) the individual's interpretation of his or her behavior relevant to that aspect, and (3) the individual's perception of whether or not the features of the current situation imply a definition of self congruent with that aspect. This slightly revised version of the theory would retain Secord and Backman's (1965) other assumptions with little or no change. It would assume that the tendency to seek and to maintain congruency is motivated by a need for predictability in the individual's relationship to himself or herself, to other people, and to the situations he or she encounters. More importantly, it would also assume that (Secord and Backman, 1965, p. 92)

when the features of the situation are incongruent with an individual's self-concept or his own behavior, he is likely to feel uncomfortable, and various affective, perceptual, and cognitive processes may come into play to restore congruency. Under some circumstances, however, congruency may only be restored if he changes his self-concept, behavior, or both. Thus the congruency or incongruency . . . has consequences both for stability and change.

According to Secord and Backman, a variety of factors contribute to the stability or instability of self and behavior. These include factors pertaining to the structure and organization of the self-concept, constitutional factors such as energy level and body type, and institutional and subinstitutional factors such as norms, role relationships, and cultural and subcultural stereotypes. Of particular interest for our purposes, however, are the stabilizing influences of processes that operate to maintain the type of congruency described above. We assume that the individual strives to achieve congruency by a variety of processes, five of which have been specified by Secord and Backman (1965). We have revised the de-
scription of each of these processes slightly, in line with our proposed extension of the theory (Secord and Backman, 1965, p. 97; brackets ours):

1. **Cognitive restructuring**: S may misperceive features of the situation so as to achieve congruency with aspects of his behavior and self-concept. He may also misinterpret his own behavior so as to achieve maximum congruency with an aspect of his self-concept and his perception of the situation.

2. **Selective evaluation**: S maximizes congruency by evaluating more favorably . . . [situational features] that are congruent; he minimizes incongruency by devaluing those [features] that are incongruent.

3. **Selective exposure and interaction**: S maximizes engagement in congruent situations by choosing to enter and participate in situations requiring a minimum change in behavior from previous congruent . . . situations in which S had engaged.

4. **Evocation of congruent features**: S maintains congruency by developing techniques that evoke congruent [features] from [the situations he enters].

5. **Congruency by comparison**: When [the situation] confronts S with an incongruent evaluation, S may accept the evaluation but minimize the effect of incongruency by attributing the [apparent] trait to significant others [or to features of the situation]. Thus, its presence in himself is lessened by comparison: he has no more of it or no less of it than other people [or else it is attributed primarily to an external (situational) cause].

Of these five processes, we have already devoted considerable attention to the third—the individual's tendency to choose situations because of their perceived congruency with some aspect of his or her personality. Of the remaining four processes, the first, second, and fifth are related in that they define the various ways that personality can affect the individual's construction (i.e., cognitive representation) of the situation he or she encounters. These three cognitive processes typically mediate the influence of personality on situations in an indirect manner by affecting the individual's perceptions so that they, in turn, affect his or her subsequent behavior within the situation. In contrast to these mediated effects, the effects of the fourth process—the evocation of congruent features—are often manifested in the individual's behavior in a more direct, unmediated way.

In the remainder of this section we consider how each of these processes can result in personality influencing the relatively nonpersonal features of the situations individuals encounter. Then, in the following section on personality and ongoing social interaction, we consider how each of these processes can result in personality influencing both the personal and interpersonal features of social situations. Examples for each case are drawn from Cervantes' *Don Quixote de la Mancha*, a book that richly illustrates the power of a romantic individual's personality to transform the situations he encounters. To supplement these literary examples and provide empirical support for the processes assumed to underlie them, we have also included citations of a few representative empirical investigations for each of the processes discussed.

**Cognitive restructuring**. Cervantes provides many wonderful examples of how an individual's personality can affect his perception of and behavioral reactions to the situations he confronts. Don Quixote's romantic disposition is so strong that it compels him to see a world that is congruent with his perception of himself as a knight-errant. In the Third Book, for example, Don Quixote and his squire Sancho Panza stop to rest at an inn that Don Quixote perceives to be a castle. All of the elements within this situation are cognitively redefined and restructured to conform to this perception, and all of Don Quixote's subsequent behaviors are predicated on this unique perspective. In the course of acting on his perceptions, he manages to change the situation so that, in many respects, the scene actually does come to resemble the features and activities of a medieval castle more than those of a simple country inn.

Empirical research evidence also reveals the impact of personality on the individual's cognitive restructuring of and subsequent behavioral reactions to his or her situation. For example, studies have demonstrated the influence of individual differences in field dependence (e.g., Witkin et al., 1962), learned helplessness (e.g., Alloy and Abramson, 1979), locus of control (e.g., Sosis, 1974), and obesity (e.g., Schachter and Rodin, 1974) on perceptions and judgments about various objective, nonpersonal aspects of situations.
Selective evaluation. The romantic vision associated with Don Quixote's personality leads him to evaluate favorably those features of his situation that are congruent with this vision, while evaluating unfavorably those elements that are incongruent with it. Thus a barber's humble metal basin is perceived as the treasured "golden helmet of Mambroino," whereas a group of harmless windmills are perceived as menacing giants. These evaluations affect Don Quixote's behavior with regard to the elements in question, and this behavior in turn influences the situation he confronts. A number of empirical studies also demonstrate the influence of personality on an individual's selective evaluation of and response to various situational features. For example, Ickes and Layden (1978) have found that individuals with the attributional style most characteristic of high self-esteem view all situations having a negative outcome as significantly less likely to occur in their experience than do individuals with the attributional style associated with low self-esteem.

Selective exposure and interaction. Don Quixote's unique vision also leads him to enter and actively participate in situations that individuals with different temperaments and personalities would experience passively or even tend to avoid. For example, individuals of a different temperament and personality would probably not seek out opportunities to attack a flock of sheep with a lance or to engage in swordplay with a collection of wine bags. For Don Quixote, however, these situations are ideally suited to the behavioral expression of his self-perceived valor and prowess as a knight-errant. Thus he selectively chooses to enter and participate in situations that others might consider to be a waste of their time, dispositions, and energy. His participation in these situations, and the stirrings for congruency that underlie his behavior, tend to alter the character of these situations in a manner reflective of his personality.

Because we have already presented, in the previous section, many empirical examples of the influence of personality on an individual's choice of situations, we will not attempt to recount them here. We should note, however, that the processes governing an individual's choice of situations and the processes governing his or her construal of situations are highly interrelated. The individual does not simply choose to enter a situation to which he or she then reacts in a completely passive manner, taking the situation at face value and going with the flow. Instead, the individual chooses to enter the situation with a set of preconceived goals and expectations already in mind. These expectations provide a context for additional cognitive assimilation and restructuring in the form of selective perception and selective evaluation of the situational features at hand. In other words, the individual's cognitive and behavioral orientation is coherently organized and directed toward a mode of engagement with the situation that is likely to reflect the impact of his or her personality on all of the interrelated processes with which we are presently concerned.

Evocation of congruent features. By acting upon his perceptions in the situations he confronts, Don Quixote frequently is able to evoke certain features or reactions from the situation that are congruent with the view of it imposed by his personality. For example, the blow that he receives from the moving arm of the windmill in his attempt to joust with it is congruent with the blow that he expected to elicit from the "giant." Similarly, in a subsequent battle with other "giants" (i.e., large bags of red wine), the "blood" that so freely flows in response to his sword thrusts is a congruent feature of the situations that his own actions again have evoked. These evoked features and reactions are, by definition, alterations of the situation that reflect the imprint of Don Quixote's personality.

The research literature also provides evidence that personality can affect situations through the evocation of congruent features. Several investigations have demonstrated the processes by which individuals evoke events that confirm and validate features of their conceptions of self and social identities (e.g., Andersen and Bem, 1981; Coyne, 1976a, 1976b; Skrypnik and Snyder, 1982; Swann, 1983; Swann and Hill, 1982; Swann and Read, 1981).

Congruency by comparison or by reattribution. In Cervantes' account, Don Quixote frequently is confronted with an incongruent evaluation of himself that he must defend against in some way. Often his mode of defense is to minimize the negative evaluation and the associated implication of a negative trait (e.g., foolishness) by attributing his behavior to a special feature of the situation that, if perceived by others, would lead them to act in the same way. For example, after Don Quixote's ill-fated attack on the sheep (which resulted in the shepherds pelting him with stones), Sancho confronts him with the discrepancy of his action by saying, "Did I not bid you, sir knight, return, and told you that you
went not to invade an army of men, but a flock of sheep?" Don Quixote's defense is to attribute to his malignant adversary the power to alter the appearance of things, so that the "enemy's squadrons" only appeared to be sheep and would soon revert to their usual appearance as men. According to this new attribution, Don Quixote's foolishness was no greater than that of anyone else who had been similarly deceived by his adversary. Empirical illustrations of congruency by comparison or by reattribution can also be found (e.g., Hakmiller, 1966; Secord, Bachman, and Eachus, 1964; Wheeler, 1966).

Having considered how each of these processes serves not only to maintain congruency between personality and situations but also to mediate the influence of personality on situations, we are now prepared to examine the operation of each of them in ongoing social interaction. As will become evident, the connections between personality and social behavior appear in their most subtle and complex forms in the context of ongoing social interaction. It is in this context, therefore, that some of the more interesting causal relationships posited by the situational strategy (and by the dynamic interactionism of which it is a part) can be identified and analyzed.

PERSONALITY AND ONGOING SOCIAL INTERACTION

In even the simplest and most prototypic type of social interaction—a dyadic encounter involving two strangers—the influences of personality on social behavior can become quite complicated. In general, the complicating factors may be stated as follows:

1. Now the influence of two personalities must be taken into account.

2. Each participant's personality typically constitutes an important part of the other participant's immediate situation.

3. The need of both participants to maintain congruency can precipitate a variety of interactional processes yielding different behavioral and cognitive outcomes.

4. Beliefs about the other participant's personality and dispositions may independently determine such processes and outcomes, regardless of whether or not these beliefs are really accurate.

Let us briefly elaborate on these factors. In even the simplest type of ongoing social interaction, we are forced to consider the influence of two personalities instead of one. Each participant becomes an important (indeed, perhaps the most important) element in the other participant's immediate situation; and, to the extent that each person's behavior is a manifestation of his or her personality, the situation each participant confronts is largely defined by the other's personality. In addition, each participant is, to some degree, motivated to achieve congruency among the three elements central to Secord and Backman's (1965) theory: a self-attributed aspect of his or her personality, an interpretation of his or her behavior relevant to that aspect, and a perception of how the other person behaves and feels toward him or her with respect to that aspect. This need to achieve and maintain congruency may result in each participant's personality having a direct influence on his or her own behavior and cognitions, thereby having an indirect influence on the other person's behavior and cognitions as well. In other words, a true "interaction of personalities" may occur that leaves neither of the participants completely unaffected or unchanged. Moreover, to complicate matters still further, each participant's beliefs or expectations about the other's personality may independently influence the subsequent behavior of both participants, even if the original beliefs were false and without foundation. These independent influences due to one participant's beliefs about the other's personality can either augment or counteract the more direct, unmediated influences of personality on social behavior and thereby produce some rather subtle and complex effects. Finally, the resulting changes in each participant's behavior and/or cognitions may create a new congruency dynamic that in some cases may result in a relatively permanent change in one or both of the participants' personalities as a consequence of their having interacted with each other.

As the preceding paragraph suggests, the attempt to unravel the influences of personality in ongoing social interaction leads one inevitably to the very heart of the Gordian knot of causal relations implied by the dynamic interactional approach. To simplify and impose some structure on our attempted unravelings, let us separately consider how each of the five processes delineated by Secord and Backman (1965) operates to maintain congruency in ongoing social interaction. How, in other words, do participants' personalities influence the course and consequences of their interaction through the interrelated processes of cognitive restructuring, selective
evaluation, selective exposure and interaction, the evocation of congruent features, and congruency by comparison or reattribution?

Cognitive Restructuring
In the context of ongoing social interaction, cognitive restructuring occurs whenever S misperceives O’s attributes or behavior “so as to achieve congruency with aspects of his behavior and self-concept. He may also misinterpret his own attributes or behavior so as to achieve maximum congruency with an aspect of his self concept and his perception of O” (Secord and Backman, 1965, p. 97). A striking example of cognitive restructuring in Don Quixote’s perception of another person can be found in his reactions to the “Asturian wench,” Maritornes. As Cervantes pitilessly describes her, Maritornes is “broad-faced, flat-pated, saddle-nosed, blind of one eye, and the other almost out;...while her body supplied all the other defects.” However, in Don Quixote’s romantic view she appears to be a “princess,” “a high and beautiful lady,” “the goddess of love.” Unfortunately for Don Quixote, however, neither Maritornes nor anyone else shares his perception of her—a lack of congruence that sets the stage for considerable interpersonal conflict later on.

Some of the early research documenting the process of cognitive restructuring in interpersonal perception has been summarized by Secord and Backman (1965, pp. 97-98). Included here are correlational studies by Miyamoto and Dornbusch (1956), Reeder, Donohue, and Biblarz (1960), Backman and Secord (1962), and Moore (1963). These studies indicate that the “correspondence between self as seen by the individual and as he thinks others see him is greater than the actual correspondence between self-concept and the views held by other persons” (Secord and Backman, 1965, p. 97). Other studies further reveal that individuals either tend to distort the evaluations they receive from others in a congruent direction (e.g., Harvey, 1962; Harvey, Kelley, and Shapiro, 1957), believe that highly incongruent evaluations are invalid (Harvey, 1962), or deny that highly incongruent evaluations were actually made (Harvey, 1962); for a review, see Shrauger and Schoeneman (1979).

More recently, studies have demonstrated the effects of individual differences in sex role identity (e.g., Bem, 1981) and of individual differences in self-schemata (e.g., Markus and Smith, 1981) on the processing and structuring of information about other people (see also Tunnell, 1981). In addition, studies indicate that individuals attend more to self-confirmatory feedback than to self-disconfirmatory feedback, and they are motivated to encode and preferentially recall the former type of feedback more than the latter (Swann, 1983; Swann and Read, 1981). These studies are complemented by others demonstrating that feedback discrepant with individuals’ self-conceptions is often dismissed as invalid (Cary, 1966; Korman, 1968; Markus, 1977). Finally, some studies have explored the possible role that reconstructive remembering of information about other people (e.g., Snyder and Cantor, 1979; Snyder and Uranowit, 1978) and about oneself (e.g., Snyder and Skrypnek, 1981) might play in the cognitive restructuring of social situations.

A particularly encouraging note is that some of the recent theory and research on interpersonal perception has focused explicitly on dyadic interaction and has considered the implications of the congruency or incongruency of the participants’ interpersonal perceptions for the success or failure of the dyad. An insightful and comprehensive theoretical perspective on these issues has been provided by Laing, Phillipson, and Lee (1966). These authors have proposed that congruency or incongruency in interpersonal perception can exist at any of three levels, defined in terms of (1) a direct perspective (e.g., S’s perception of O), (2) a metaperspective (e.g., what O thinks S’s perception of O is), and (3) a meta-meta-perspective (e.g., what S thinks O thinks S’s perception of O is). According to this formulation (Laing, Phillipson, and Lee, 1966, p. 38),

1. **understanding** can be defined as the conjunction between [i.e., congruence of] the metaperspective of one person and the direct perspective of other;

2. **being understood** is the conjunction between the meta-meta-perspective of the one person and the metaperspective of the other;

3. the **feeling** of being understood is the conjunction of one’s own direct perspective with one’s own meta-meta-perspective.

Laing and his colleagues have developed the Interpersonal Perception Method (IPM) as a means of assessing, within a dyadic relationship, the congruencies and incongruencies that may exist on the various levels of experience. Their administration of the IPM to groups of distressed and nondistressed married couples revealed
"many fewer disjunctions [i.e., incongruencies] in all phases of the interactions" of the nondistressed couples relative to those of the distressed couples. A more recent IPM study by Knudson, Sommers, and Golding (1980) further indicates that the attempt by married couples to deal openly with conflict is associated with an increase in congruent interpersonal perceptions, whereas the attempt to avoid such conflict is associated with a decrease in congruent perceptions. These and other studies (e.g., Harvey, Wells, and Alvarez, 1978; Orvis, Kelley, and Butler, 1976; Sillars, 1981) suggest that the meshing or clashing of two personalities is mediated, at least in part, by the influence that each personality exerts on the individual’s perceptions of self and partner and, thus, on the nature and magnitude of the dyadic congruencies or incongruencies resulting from these perceptions.

Selective Evaluation
In the context of ongoing social interaction, selective evaluation occurs whenever "S maximizes congruency by evaluating more favorably those interpersonal system components that are congruent [or minimizes] incongruency by devaluing those components that are incongruent" (Secord and Backman, 1965, p. 97). This process is nicely illustrated in Don Quixote’s changeable relationship with his squire, Sancho Panza. Whenever Sancho supports his employer’s conception of himself as a knight-errant—a heroic and chivalrous individual—Don Quixote commends Sancho and regards him with favor. However, whenever Sancho attempts to challenge or question his employer’s professed identity, Don Quixote curses him for a fool and berates him for his stupidity. Throughout Cervantes’ novel, the positivity of Don Quixote’s evaluation of Sancho varies according to the degree to which Sancho’s words and actions are perceived as congruent with Don Quixote’s romantic conception of himself.

Secord and Backman (1965) cite a number of early studies that illustrate the various ways selective evaluation can affect interpersonal perception. Some of their own research suggests, for example, that individuals in residential groups are attracted to others whom they believe to hold congruent views of them (Backman and Secord, 1962), and that individuals who report having strong and distinct needs tend to perceive their friends as having complementary needs which the individuals’ self-congruent behaviors are appropriate to meet (Secord and Backman, 1964). Other studies reveal that as another person’s evaluation of the individual becomes increas-

ingly incongruent, the individual becomes more likely to devalue the other in order to minimize the need for change (Deutsch and Solomon, 1959; Harvey, 1962; Wilson, 1962). This congruency effect does not always occur, however, and often yields to a positivity effect when the other’s evaluation is incongruent but in a positive direction (e.g., Deutsch and Solomon, 1959). As Secord and Backman point out, the theoretical resolution of the problem presented by these two types of effects may require “a more sophisticated view of congruency” that recognizes that an evaluation from another person may be incongruent with certain aspects of the self-concept but quite congruent with others. The same mode of theoretical resolution was later endorsed by Jones (1974) and Mettee and Aronson (1974) in their comprehensive reviews of this literature.

The effects of selective evaluation in interpersonal contexts are, of course, complicated by the fact that at least two individuals are involved, both of whom are attempting to maintain congruent relations among their self-images, their own behavior, and the behavior of their partner. And just as the individuals’ personalities can affect the degree of congruency or incongruency in their perceptions of each other through the process of cognitive restructuring, so can their personalities affect the degree of congruency or incongruency in their evaluations of each other through the process of selective evaluation. Similarly, just as incongruent interpersonal perceptions typically eventuate in some form of conflict or misunderstanding, so do incongruent evaluations typically result in conflict or misunderstanding as well. Such well-known (but surprisingly little-studied) phenomena as unrequited (i.e., unreciprocated) love or other unilateral feelings (e.g., of respect, admiration, identification, pity, disgust, hatred) have their roots in the incongruency of the interactants’ evaluations of each other.

Selective Interaction
Secord and Backman (1965) assert that within the social context (pp. 104–105), interpersonal congruency may also be maintained through selectively interacting with certain persons and not with others. An individual is most likely to interact with those persons with whom he can most readily establish a congruent state. This tendency is most directly expressed when the individual is among a group of other persons and can freely choose to interact with a select few. Selection may
also occur in a broader sense: a person may adopt social roles that call for role behavior congruent with the individual's self concept and that require role partners to behave toward him in a congruent manner.

Don Quixote's attempts to maintain congruency through selective interaction with others can easily be traced throughout his adventures. When, early in the novel, he realizes that his niece and his elderly servant will not accept his identity as a knight-errant, he decides to leave his home (and them) without even telling them that he is going. Once he has chosen not to interact any longer with people whose behavior will not support his current conception of self, he subsequently limits his company primarily to that of his horse, Rozinante, and his squire, Sancho Panza, the two beings he considers least likely to discredit his identity. His encounters with other people are typically brief, characterized by a strong imaginary component, and are generally terminated as soon as his self-concept is threatened. Apparently, the lesson Cervantes would have us draw is that isolation and increasing alienation from others may be the price of attempting to maintain a vulnerable and easily discredited conception of self.

Early studies cited by Secord and Backman indicate the utility of selective interaction in maintaining interpersonal congruency. In a study of sorority members, Backman and Secord (1962) found that individuals interacted most frequently "with those other members whom they thought perceived them in the most congruent fashion and whose perceptions actually were more congruent" (Secord and Backman, 1965, p. 104). In a conceptually related study, Broxton (1963) found that college women who requested a change of roommates perceived their new roommates to have a more congruent view of them than their old roommates had. Other studies extend these findings by indicating that selective interaction also operates to maximize the congruency of individuals' personalities and self-concepts with their chosen occupational roles (e.g., Hoe, 1962; Merenda, Musiker, and Clarke, 1960; Stern and Scanlon, 1958).

More recent findings have been concerned with the ways in which conceptions of self may influence not only one's choices of interaction partners but also the form, breadth, and scope of the interpersonal activities that follow from such choices (e.g., Snyder and Campbell, 1982). Finally, a number of clinically oriented theorists have made explicit the point that is implicit in Cervantes' account of Don Quixote: that the maintenance of a socially deviate or consensually nonvalidated self-concept may require one to display extreme selectivity in one's interactions. Socially deviate individuals may thus require their interactions be restricted primarily to a subgroup composed of individuals who are similarly deviant or stigmatized (e.g., Goffman, 1963). Individuals whose experience is highly delusional and idiosyncratic may require that relations with others either be curtailed completely (Jones and Nisbett, 1971) or limited to a superficial, token kind of interaction in which a false social self is displayed publicly while the real self is kept hidden (Laing, 1960, 1961).

Evocation of Congruent Responses
As important as the process of selective interaction may be, it is not the only means by which individuals are able to ensure that they will be able to relate to others in ways that are not incongruent with their own personalities and self-concepts. In many cases selective interaction will operate to ensure that one's relationships will be limited to certain ideal interaction partners for whom one's own self-congruent responses will be need fulfilling and vice versa. Quite often, however, such ideal interaction partners are not available, and individuals instead must attempt to evoke congruent responses from individuals whose personalities may not predispose them to make such responses. To do so, individuals must employ behavioral techniques whose success depends on the constraining power of the general processes underlying social interaction rather than on the specific personality dispositions of their interaction partners (Goffman, 1959; Rausch, Barry, Hertel, and Swain, 1974; Schell, 1960; Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson, 1967).

In an attempt to illuminate some of these more general interaction processes, Carson (1969, Chap. 4) has written a thoughtful integrative review of various theoretical formulations that have related personality to the evocation of congruent responses in interpersonal situations. Following an extensive discussion of the relevant literature, Carson proposed that the two-factor (dominance versus submission and hate versus love) circumplex model advanced by Leary (1957) and his associates could be used as an empirically defensible taxonomy of the varieties of interpersonal behavior (see Fig. 1). This model is primarily concerned with the eight categories of interpersonal behavior represented in the outermost ring of Fig. 1. According to the Leary framework (Carson, 1969, p. 112),
interpersonal behaviors are viewed as being, in part, security operations (a Sullivanian term) employed by persons to maintain relative comfort, security, and freedom from anxiety in their interactions with others. The purpose of interpersonal behavior, in terms of its security-maintenance functions, is to induce from the other person behavior that is complementary to the behavior preferred. It is assumed that this induced, complementary behavior has current utility for the person inducing it, in the sense that it maximizes his momentary security. Leary suggests that we learn how to “train” others to respond to us in security-maintaining ways by acquiring the requisite behavioral “techniques,” and that each of the eight categories of interpersonal behavior may be viewed as a distinctive set of learned operations for prompting desired behavior from others.

Generally speaking, there are two major processes by which security-maintaining (i.e., self-congruent, in Secord and Backman’s 1965 parlance) responses are pre
sumably evoked from others in the form of complementary behavior. The first process, which occurs with respect to the dominance-submission axis, reflects the adoption of a complementary role by the other on the basis of an assumed status difference. Thus dominance on the part of one person tends to evoke submission on the part of the other and vice versa. The second process, which occurs with respect to the hate-love axis, reflects the operation of the reciprocity (i.e., social exchange) norm in the exchange of interpersonal affect. Thus hate evokes hate, and love evokes love. In cases in which different processes occur (e.g., dominance evokes dominance, love evokes hate), the resulting relationships tend to be antagonistic rather than complementary and frequently create instability in the self-concepts of one or both of the participants.

Because some categories of interpersonal behavior can initiate both processes simultaneously (i.e., can induce the other to adopt a complementary, status-based role as well as to reciprocate a particular affect), individuals may be able to evoke fairly subtle and complex patterns of complementary behavior from their interaction partners more or less independent of their partners' own personality dispositions. In other words, individuals can maximize the congruence between their personalities and self-concepts and the behaviors they receive from others by implicitly defining their status and affective relationships to the other through their own interpersonal behavior (see also Bowers, 1973, 1977; Foa, 1961; Wachtel, 1973). Once the nature of the relationship has been implicitly defined for the other in this way, the desired complementary behaviors are likely to be evoked. These subtle, often dimly perceived interpersonal manipulations have a gamelike quality and have been extensively analyzed from a games perspective by Berne (1961, 1964) and others. They have also been discussed by sociologists under the rubric of altercasting processes (e.g., Davis and Schmidt, 1977; Weinsteint and Deutschberger, 1963).

And the critical contributions of strategic self-presentational activities to these processes have been discussed by, most notably, Goffman (1959) and Jones and Pittman (1982).

These considerations suggest that in the context of a dyadic relationship each participant's personality will tend to define, and therefore constrain, the nature of the participants' relationship and the course of their subsequent interaction. The complicating fact that the situation now bears the imprint of two personalities requires that the two individuals negotiate the nature of their relationship through a complex process of mutual response evocation. And to complicate matters still further, each participant's preinteraction beliefs about the other's personality may independently constrain the subsequent behavior of both participants, even if these preinteraction beliefs were originally false and without foundation. The various studies documenting the self-fulfilling prophecy or behavioral confirmation process (e.g., Jones and Panitch, 1971; Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; Merton, 1948; Rosenthal, 1966; Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968; Skrypnuk and Snyder, 1982; Snyder, 1981b; Snyder and Swann, 1978a, 1978b; Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid, 1977; Word, Zanna, and Cooper, 1974; Zanna and Pack, 1975) reveal that individuals' expectations about others may themselves be sufficient to motivate them to behave in ways that evoke the expected behaviors (and personalities) from others. Other studies (e.g., Bond, 1972; Ickes et al., 1982; Swann and Snyder, 1980) suggest that under some conditions individuals may try to evoke behaviors from others that are inconsistent with the personality dispositions the other is assumed to possess, and they may succeed in eliciting such apparently disconfirming behaviors without changing their original beliefs about the others' personalities. Such independent influences due to each participant's beliefs about the other's personality can either augment or counteract the more direct influences of personality on social behavior that Leary (1957), Berne (1961, 1964), and Carson (1969) have described.

In addition to the congruent-response-evoking processes just considered, Swann (1983) has proposed that individuals also use the strategic display of signs and symbols of who they are to ensure that the beliefs and behaviors of their interaction partners will validate their self-conceptions. Not only has Swann offered examples of such superficial and easily altered signs and symbols of self-identity as clothing and cosmetics, but he also has considered more dramatic alterations in body structure (e.g., through weight loss, muscle building, plastic surgery) as a means of continuing to obtain self-validating reactions from others when time (and gravity) begin to take their toll. The role of signs and symbols in the manufacturing of social identities is, of course, one that has been analyzed, with depth and insight, by Goffman (1959).

Of what consequence are the changes in each participant's behavior and/or cognitions that occur through the operation of the various response-evoking processes we
have just discussed? According to a dynamic interactionist perspective, a very important potential consequence of such interaction-based change is the creation of a new congruency dynamic that in some cases may result in a relatively permanent alteration in one or both of the participants’ personalities. These postinteractional changes in personality are particularly likely to occur when individuals interact with others who are effective in evoking responses from them that are congruent with the others’ personalities but are incongruent with their own. If individuals are unable to reduce the discrepancy between their interaction behavior and their self-concepts through the various forms of cognitive adjustment (i.e., cognitive restructuring, selective interaction, congruency by comparison or reattributions) or through avoidance of these others in the future (i.e., selective interaction), their self-concepts and personalities may change instead to reflect the changes in their interaction behavior.

An illustration of this process can be found in Sancho Panza’s relationship to Don Quixote and in the effects that this relationship has on Sancho’s personality. As their relationship develops, Don Quixote becomes increasingly successful in evoking responses from Sancho that are congruent with Don Quixote’s own romantic personality and worldview. The reasons for his increasing success are not difficult to find. Because of the status difference between Sancho and Don Quixote, Sancho must follow Don Quixote’s orders and be willing to act on his judgments. He must therefore be attentive to Don Quixote’s point of view and give more serious regard to Don Quixote’s interpretation of events than his own interpretation receives in return. Moreover, because Sancho is required to share Don Quixote’s company almost constantly but has little opportunity to interact with anyone else, he is compelled to spend most of his time living out the identity that his master has bestowed on him. Thus Sancho’s behavior becomes increasingly determined by Don Quixote’s cognitive reconstructions, selective evaluations, and reattributions of the events that occur, while at the same time Sancho is relatively insulated (through selective interaction) from the perspective that interaction with others might provide.

As a consequence of these factors, it becomes progressively easier for Sancho to see himself in the way that Don Quixote appears to see him. And because this new self-image is more noble, romantic, and worthy of respect than the self-concept Sancho started out with, its congruence with aspects of his ideal self probably also facilitates his acceptance of it. Thus, although Sancho’s transformation into a slightly more romantic personality begins with Don Quixote’s attempts to evoke responses from him congruent with Quixote’s own personality, a number of other supportive and interrelated processes also operate to further this outcome. These processes reflect not only the congruency-maintaining needs of both individuals but also the congruency dynamics that emerge at the dyadic level because of the nature of their relationship.

**Congruency by Comparison or Reattribution**

Sancho, of course, initially resists Don Quixote’s efforts to change his (Sancho’s) personality through an “altercasting,” desired-response-evoking process. His resistance takes the form of attributing the discrepancy between his view of himself and Don Quixote’s view of him to an idiosyncratic disposition of his master. By attributing the faulty view of reality to Don Quixote rather than to himself, Sancho is able to dissociate himself from the imputation of a negative trait (i.e., being out of touch with reality) and therefore preserve his original self-concept. Sancho’s continued use of this congruency-maintaining strategy throughout his travels with Don Quixote accounts for the fact that their interaction produces only a limited degree of change in Sancho’s personality and self-concept. Some excellent empirical examples of congruency by comparison are provided by the work on attributional ambiguity (for a review, see Snyder and Wicklund, 1982). In one such study by Snyder et al., (1979) individuals whose desire to avoid a handicapped person was incongruent with their self-image attempted to maintain congruency by reattributing their avoidance to another, non-ego-threatening aspect of the situation (here a preference to see a different movie than the one seen by the handicapped person).

As Carson (1969) has noted, the process of attributing to others those traits and dispositions that one is unwilling to see in oneself is essentially the same process of ego-defense that Freud (1928) and his followers have labeled projection. Empirical investigations of this form of congruency by comparison have been reported by, among others, Secord, Bachman, and Echau (1964) and Brame (1962).

With our discussion of the application of the theory of interpersonal congruency to understanding the role of personality in ongoing social interaction, our consider-
ations of the impact of the individual on the social world is complete. Therefore we turn now to a critical analysis of the theoretical perspective and the methodological orientation associated with the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior.

**ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE SITUATIONAL STRATEGY**

The core features of the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior are the propositions that properties of individuals (including stable traits, enduring dispositions, social attitudes, and conceptions of self) are reflected in the processes by which individuals choose to enter and to spend time in social situations and in the processes by which they influence the character of the social situations in which they find themselves. The underlying theme of the situational strategy for understanding individuals and their behavior in social contexts is the proposition that, as consequences of their transactions with their social worlds, individuals construct for themselves social worlds that are suited to expressing, maintaining, and acting upon their conceptions of self, their social attitudes, and their characteristic dispositions.

Central to the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior are the following:

1. Its concern with the reciprocal influences and the mutual interplay of individuals and social situations.

2. Its definition of personality in terms of processes that actively link individuals and their social situations.

3. Its identification of the antecedents of these processes in individuals’ conceptions of self, social attitudes, and characteristic dispositions.

4. Its identification of the consequences of these processes in the structure of the social worlds within which individuals live their lives.

As we have seen in our examination of representative examples of the situational strategy in action, researchers have been able to document the manner in which properties of individuals are reflected and manifested in the choice by individuals of their social situations, in the influence of individuals on their social situations, and in the dynamics of ongoing social interaction and interpersonal relationships.

To be sure, much remains to be accomplished by the practitioners of the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior. For example, to our knowledge, an investigation possessing each and every one of the features of the hypothetical example that we used to illustrate the implementation of the situational strategy (i.e., the application of the strategy to the study of the social psychological phenomenon of competition; see p. 916) has yet to be conducted. Nevertheless, the converging pattern of the empirical evidence that we have surveyed leads us to suspect that the outcomes of such an investigation would fulfill the promise of the situational strategy. We should note, however, that research generated by the situational strategy has tended to focus on cases in which individuals come to live in social worlds that match their personalities (e.g., extraverts gravitate toward extraverted situations, authoritarian gravitate toward authoritarian environments) to the relative neglect of cases in which individuals come to live in social worlds that differ from features of their identities (e.g., liberals who deliberately choose to live in conservative communities for the purpose of making these communities more liberal). We hope that by having devoted some theoretical attention to the second, as well as to the first, of these cases, we will encourage researchers to devote more attention to the reciprocal influences of personalities and incongruent situations.

A major area in need of attention from users of the situational strategy is that of assessment. It follows from the basic tenets of the situational strategy that efforts to assess differences between individuals should be directed at the construction and validation of measures of the situations in which individuals live their lives. For example, consider the case of a researcher who seeks to construct a measure of individual differences in the disposition of sociability. Should that researcher construct a measure of the extent to which individuals report that they display diverse behaviors that reflect sociability? To the extent that this researcher takes seriously the situational strategy, he or she should not construct this type of measure. Instead, his or her measure should assess the extent to which individuals report that they choose to spend time in situations that foster the expression of sociability and that they engage in activities that tend to increase the sociability of the situations they confront. To the extent that the goal of any strategy for assessing sociability is the
identification of those individuals who regularly and consistently behave in sociable fashion, any strategy that focuses on the extent to which individuals are to be found in situations that foster, encourage, and promote sociable behavior would seem to possess considerable promise of being a valid assessment strategy. One readily can imagine similar assessment strategies for other dispositions, as well as for attitudes and conceptions of self.

The Situational Strategy and Dynamic Interactionism
As we have suggested, the situational strategy reflects the dynamic interactional perspective on personality and social behavior. Thus the situational strategy shares the major theoretical problem presented by dynamic interactionism: the difficulty of developing a theoretically adequate account of the complex interdependence of personality, situations, and social behavior. Because each of these elements not only influences but also is influenced by the others, theories in this tradition will have to forsake the standard simplifying assumptions of linear, unidirectional causal relationships among variables that can be unequivocally categorized as independent versus dependent. Instead, dynamic interactional models of personality and social behavior will have to deal directly with the problems of specifying the complex, co-occurring processes by which personality, situations, and social behavior are dynamically interrelated. This task is likely to present some formidable conceptual problems for the serious personality theorist.

Important theoretical complications also may arise from the role the self-concept appears to play in mediating stability and change in personality. First, the acceptability of the self-concept as a valid scientific construct has long been challenged, as Allport (1955), Gergen (1971), Epstein (1973) and others have noted. Second, the apparent differentiation (e.g., real self versus ideal self) or multidimensionality of the self-concept is, from a theoretical standpoint, both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, such differentiation enhances the construct’s explanatory potential (e.g., behavior that appears to be clearly incongruent with one aspect of the self-concept may be quite congruent with another aspect). On the other hand, it may contribute to the nonfalsifiability of research hypotheses when it is invoked post hoc to account for unexpected results. Third, with only a few notable exceptions (e.g., Buss, 1980; Carver and Scheier, 1981; Duval and Wicklund, 1972; Turner, 1968; Wicklund, 1975); relatively little theoretical work has been done that attempts to specify the conditions in which certain aspects of the self-concept will become salient at the expense of others (cf. Shaver, 1976). For all of these reasons, it may be difficult to formulate a conceptually adequate account of the role of the self-concept in personality maintenance and change. Secord and Backman’s (1965) congruency theory is clearly an important step in this direction, but much conceptual work remains to be done.

The primary methodological problems presented by the dynamic interactional approach are generally reflective of the theoretical problems just described. Because the assumptions of dynamic interactionism are not consistent with the assumptions underlying the use of most of the conventional statistical models, new statistical models may be required to test the implications of this approach. Some promising evidence that statistical models can be specially designed to capture the influences of individual differences in ongoing social interaction is provided by Kenny’s innovative work on statistical procedures for “splitting the reciprocity coefficient” (Kenny and Nasby, 1980) and for segregating the variances associated with the individual members of interacting dyads (Kenny, 1981; Kenny and LaVoie, 1981; Warner, Kenny, and Stoto, 1979), and by the similar techniques of Mendoza and Graziano (1982) for the multivariate statistical analysis of dyadic social behavior. These statistical considerations suggest the related need for appropriate methodological frameworks, such as Ickes’s unstructured dyadic interaction paradigm, in which the effects of personality on social behavior can be studied at both the between-dyad and within-dyad levels of analysis (Ickes, 1982, 1983). The importance of this level-of-analysis distinction is revealed by Ickes’s (1982) observation that the effects of personality factors on social behavior are frequently more strongly evident in between-dyad comparisons of dyad types having different personality compositions than in within-dyad comparisons of dyad members who differ on the particular personality dimension being studied. In addition to these statistical and paradigmatic issues, other problems remain pertaining to the operational definition and measurement of such essential theoretical constructs as self-concept and situation. Clearly, researchers are only now beginning to recognize and address a variety of methodological problems that adherents of the dynamic interactional approach will have to confront.
Despite these various theoretical and methodological problems, the consequences of pursuing the dynamic interactional strategy are potentially quite exciting. This pursuit should not only stimulate the development of more sophisticated theory, statistics, and methodology but also yield rich insights about personality processes and their role in human social behavior. We may further expect that such insights will enhance our understanding of the disordered personality processes and their role in human social behavior. Carson (1969), for example, already has shown how Secord and Backman’s (1965) congruency-maintaining processes can operate to defend an unrealistic, disordered conception of self, and Berne (1964) has written perceptively of “the games people play” in order to evoke responses from others that are congruent with their own neurotic needs and dispositions. With continued theoretical development, the dynamic interactional strategy for the study of personality and social behavior may contribute greatly to the understanding and treatment of personality disorders. It may also increase our awareness of how such disorders both affect and are affected by individuals’ relationships with others (e.g., Goffman, 1961; Laing, 1961, 1969).

The Situational Strategy and the Social Psychology of Personality

Our reflections on the theoretical perspective and methodological orientation that constitute the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior suggest that this strategy ought to be of particular interest to social psychologists. Together, elements of the situational strategy constitute a fundamentally social psychological approach to determining the origins of the regularities and consistencies in social behavior that are thought to constitute personality. According to this social psychological interpretation of personality, regularities and consistencies in social behavior are to be understood in terms of the regularities and consistencies that individuals create in the social situations in which they live their lives.

As a fundamentally social psychological approach to determining the origins of regularities and consistencies in social behavior, the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior is quite compatible with sociological perspectives on the individual in society. Mead (1934), for example, emphasized the active role that individuals play in shaping their destinies and their social environments. He regarded individuals as both the causes and consequences of society. More contemporary statements in the sociology of identity still echo Mead’s message. In particular, Alexander (Alexander and Knight, 1971; Alexander and Lauderdale, 1977), Goffman (1959), McCall and Simmons (1978), Secord and Backman (1965), Stryker (1980), Turner (1968, 1975), and Weinstein (1966) all have proposed (and have offered some empirical evidence to confirm) that individuals are sensitive to the identities that they will acquire as a consequence of entering specific social situations and social roles, and that situations and roles may be chosen in the service of creating and maintaining features of identity and self-conception. In addition, the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior owes an obvious intellectual debt to Sullivan’s interpersonal theory of psychiatry (e.g., 1953, 1964) that regarded personality as “the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterize a human life” (1953, p. 111) (for a useful summary of Sullivan’s interactional approach to personality, see Carson, 1969, Chap. 2). Moreover, the situational strategy is compatible with contemporary assertions by personality theorists about individuals as active creators of their social worlds; e.g., “behavior partly creates the environment, and the environment influences behavior in a reciprocal fashion” (Bandura, 1974, p. 866), and “the person continuously influences the ‘situations’ of his life as well as being affected by them” (Mischel, 1973, p. 278). In all of these formulations, basic assumptions of the dynamic interactional approach to the study of personality and social behavior may be found.

There is yet another reason why the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior may prove to be of particular relevance to the concerns of social psychologists: An understanding of the influence of situations on individuals may add to the understanding of the influence of situations on individuals. By choosing and influencing their situations, individuals determine which situations will have the opportunity to influence their behavior. Thus by virtue of their choices and their subsequent actions, individuals may knowingly and willingly allow and use situations to influence their own behavior. From this perspective, whenever we witness instances of situations influencing individuals, we ought to ask, “To what extent has the individual chosen to be in that situation?” “To what extent has the individual chosen to allow that situation to influence his or her behavior?” “How might that situation facilitate the expression of real or desired attributes of that individual?” And so
on. Moreover, even when individuals have not knowingly and willingly chosen the situations that confront them, we still may profit from asking related questions: "What actions of the individual may have unknowingly created the situation that confronts him or her?" "What characteristics of that individual might have generated those actions that produced his or her current situation?" And so on. For an elaboration of this analysis of the utility of the situational strategy for understanding not only the influence of individuals on situations but also the influence of situations on individuals, see Snyder (1981b).

CONCLUSION

We began our considerations of personality and social behavior with the proposition that an individual's behavior in a social situation is determined both by characteristics of that individual and by characteristics of that situation. Using this proposition both as a point of departure and as an organizing principle, we were able to define three strategies for the study of personality and social behavior: the dispositional strategy, the interactional strategy, and the situational strategy. These strategies differ among themselves in the extent to which they seek to identify, both theoretically and empirically, the dispositional and situational origins of regularities and consistencies (the defining features of personality) in the behavior of individuals in social contexts.

We then examined the theoretical perspectives and empirical orientations associated with each of these strategies for the study of personality and social behavior. The dispositional strategy is guided by a theoretical perspective that assumes that regularities and consistencies in social behavior can be understood in terms of stable and enduring dispositional propensities that reside within individuals, and by an empirical orientation that seeks to identify categories of individuals who characteristically and typically manifest the phenomena and processes of concern to social psychologists. The interactional strategy is guided by a theoretical perspective that seeks to understand the regularities and consistencies in social behavior in terms of the interactive contributions of dispositional and situational influences, and by an empirical orientation that seeks to identify those categories of traits, of behaviors, of people, and of situations within which regularities and consistencies in social behavior are to be found. The situational strategy is guided by a theoretical perspective that proposes that the regularities and consistencies in social behavior are the products of regularities and consistencies in the situations within which individuals find themselves, and by an empirical orientation that seeks to understand the processes by which individuals choose and subsequently influence their social situations.

Representative illustrations of each strategy in action were presented to convey the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. As we have seen, practitioners of the dispositional strategy seek to identify individuals who typically manifest the phenomena or processes of concern to social psychologists in hopes of gaining access to the ideal candidates for investigating the social psychology of those phenomena or processes. And as our illustrative examples point out, the study of prejudiced individuals has been particularly revealing about the nature of prejudice, the study of people with high needs for social approval has been most informative about the dynamics of approval seeking, and the study of Machiavellian individuals has provided a clearer delineation of the processes of interpersonal manipulation. However, as compelling and satisfying as the portraits of social psychological phenomena that emerge from applications of the dispositional strategy may be, the extent of this strategy's ability to predict the behavior of individuals in social contexts has been a source of some concern and frustration.

Out of this concern and frustration about issues of prediction have emerged the concerted efforts of the adherents to the interactional strategy to maximize the relationships between dispositional measures as predictors and social behavior as criteria. As our illustrative examples have revealed, the search for moderating variables to answer the questions "Which traits?" "Which behaviors?" "Which people?" and "Which situations?" has yielded a set of precise specifications about those features of the predictor, the criterion, the individual, and the situation that define the boundaries of predictability in human social behavior. However, as satisfying as the improved levels of predictability that have emerged from the interactional strategy may be, the limited ability of the interactional strategy to come to grips with the nature of the intimate interplay of individuals and their social situations has been the source of concern and frustration with this approach.

Born of this concern and frustration has been the dynamic approach of the situational strategy for the study of personality and social behavior. With its theoretical and empirical analyses of the processes by which individ-
uals actively choose and influence the social contexts and interpersonal settings of their lives, the situational strategy has promoted an appreciation of the reciprocal relationships between individuals and their social worlds. Moreover, the situational strategy, with its systematic attempts to investigate the dynamics of ongoing social interaction, has provided a vehicle for understanding the complex involvement of personality in interpersonal relationships.

Clearly, the study of personality and social behavior has seen a sequential progression from the dispositional strategy to the interactional strategy to the situational strategy. This progression has not only been one of history but also one of evolution. As a consequence of this evolutionary process, the three strategies possess much in the way of family resemblance, and themes voiced by strategies earlier in the evolutionary process are echoed by strategies later in the evolutionary process. But perhaps of greatest importance, as a consequence of this evolutionary process, not only do we have the fundamental tenet that “every psychological event depends upon the state of the person and at the same time on the environment, although their relative importance is different in different cases” (Lewin, 1936, p. 12); in addition, we have a precise set of propositions about dispositional and situational sources of regularities and consistencies in the behavior of individuals in social contexts. What has evolved has been an increasingly sophisticated theoretical and empirical understanding of the social psychology of personality and of the mutual interplay between the individual and the social world. Indeed, the emerging realization that social situations not only influence but also are influenced by the behavior of individuals may at long last stimulate attempts to answer the question (posed originally by Comte in 1852) that Allport (1968) has defined as the momentous question that provided the impetus for the conception and development of social science: How can the individual be at one and the same time the cause and the consequence of society?

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