Wednesday, October 21 from 2:00-3:30 p.m. via Microsoft Teams.
Our presenter is Narayanan Janakiraman of the Department of Marketing. The paper that he will present is titled “Not All Discounts Are Created Equal: Power Distance Belief and Locus-of-Discount in A Bundle.”.
Title: Not All Discounts Are Created Equal: Power Distance Belief and Locus-of-Discount in A Bundle
Presenter: Narayanan Janakiraman
When: Wednesday, October 21, 2:00–3:30 p.m.
Where:Via Microsoft Teams
Author’s note about the paper's "warts": One of the big issues has been the theory that drives the effect. In essence what we show is that when bundles of products are sold [say a shampoo and a conditioner] should the discount be offered on the main product [e.g. shampoo] or the tie-in product [e.g. conditioner] and would it be affected by a key cultural construct [namely, power distance belief]. When we started the project the consistent finding was that in high power distance countries [e.g., India] discounts on the tie-in product were ignored while in low power distance countries [such as the US] discounts on either the main product or the tie-in product resulted in similar effect. What was indeed puzzling is that a discount on a tie-in product resulted in lower purchase intent belying common intuition that in countries such as India where discretionary income is lower any discount must make the product more attractive. A second issue apart from this suppressed purchase intent, was what is the theory that leads to this. We pursued various paths, and this month we finished an eye tracking study and a field study with actual consumers in the bookstore [which I have not included in the abstract but will in the presentation] makes us convinced on one account that leads to this effect which is the lack of attentional resources devoted to the tie in product by high power distance folks due to a tendency to discriminate. We will present this and see if we can refine our theory and the set of studies before we submit to the journal. As a final input what we would love the group to help us with is the substantive contribution part of our research. We provide as a part of Study 4 and other studies that brand names might play a role etc, but thinking through how a firm might be able to take advantage of our findings is still something we are struggling with.
Abstract: Four studies examine the relation between power distance belief – the tendency to accept and endorse inequalities – and preference for a discount on the focal (vs. tie-in) product in a bundle, the underlying mechanisms and boundary conditions. Our results have important implications for marketing theory and practice.
Wednesday, September 9 from 2:00-3:30 p.m via Microsoft Teams. Our presenter is Kay-Yut Chen of the Department of Information Systems & Operations Management. The paper that he will present is titled “Coping with Digital Extortion: An Experimental Study on Normative Appeals.”
Title: Coping with Digital Extortion: An Experimental Study on Normative Appeals
Presenter: Kay-Yut Chen
When: Wednesday, September 9, 2:00–3:30 p.m.
Where: Via Microsoft Teams
Abstract: Digital extortion emerges a significant threat to organizations that rely on information technologies for their business and operations. We study, with human-subject experimentation, how normative appeals may influence defenders’ engagement of investing in security and refusal to pay ransoms as mitigating strategies to this digital extortion threat. We explore the effects of four types of normative appeals: injunctive norms and descriptive norms promoting investing or not-paying ransoms. We find that the defenders’ decisions deviate from the predictions of game theory. However, given the strategic interactions between the defenders and the attacker as well as noisy decision-making behaviors, it is challenging to untangle the influence of the treatment interventions on the defenders. We develop a structural model using the quantal response equilibrium framework to determine how normative appeals change the defenders’ utilities of investing and not-paying. While interventions may be successful in increasing the utilities of investing and/or not-paying, their impacts are mitigated by the attacker reducing ransoms. Thus, it is challenging for an intervention to significantly boost a community’s investment rate or to suppress ransom payment rate. Based on the model, we characterize how security outcomes of a community (including expected ransoms, attack rate, investment rate, payment rate) change with the defenders’ utilities of investing and not-paying. The results to two new interventions, a penalty for paying ransoms and the ability for defenders to communicate via text chat, further validate the modeling results.
Author’s note about the paper's "warts": We would appreciate comments and suggestions on any aspects of the paper. We look forward to an enlivening discussion.